In its application, which revolves around the issue of the statute of limitations, Maersk argues that the District Court erred in determining that the Section III(6) The Hague Regulations do not apply to the relationship between the parties. Maersk reiterated its claim that it is not important that Gold Bond is not a party to the bill of lading, since the notice against it is based on a claim of its responsibility towards Orda, and not towards Gold Bond - a liability based on its being the maritime carrier according to the bill of lading. Maersk believes that the District Court's decision contradicts the language of the Section III(6), as well as its purpose, to provide certainty to the sea carrier and to enable him to "clean up his books" after the period specified therein. Instead, according to her, the decision imposes an obligation on the maritime carrier to retain evidence, information and even insurance coverage for many years - in case any party involved in the transfer of the cargo decides to file a claim for participation or indemnification against it. In its view, this means the violation of the substantive rights granted to maritime carriers in an international convention adopted in Israel's primary legislation.
Maersk further argues that the District Court's decision may lead to a sea carrier being able to defend the shortened statute of limitations claim within the framework of a main claim filed against him by a party to the bill of lading, but not within the framework of a notice to a third party that will be filed against him in the framework of the same proceeding by a foreign party to the bill of lading - in a manner that will lead to contradictory decisions and uncertainty regarding the legal situation. Finally, Marsk warns against "Flooding the courts with endless lawsuits against maritime carriers", including claims by launchers whose claim against the maritime carrier has long since become obsolete, but who can now bring about its charge, indirectly, by filing an artificial claim against a party that had any involvement in the carriage - who will file a third-party notice against the sea carrier.
- Gold Bond, on the other hand, relies on the decision of the District Court, which in its opinion is consistent with the rulings on the subject in Israel and around the world. According to her, Maersk is in fact seeking to order a "precedential and extreme expansion" of the Hague Regulations listed in the Ordinance, so that the shortened statute of limitations will also apply to the claim of foreign parties to the bill of lading - while violating their right to access the courts. Moreover, Gold Bond reiterates its arguments that its notice to the third parties is not based on the bill of lading, and in any case the latter does not have the power to block its claim; and that it has not become statute of limitations even in view of the exception in section III(6a) of the Hague Regulations. Finally, Gold Bond insists on the strict criteria for the intervention of the appellate court in decisions ordering the continuation of the investigation of the claim on its merits.
- Orda, in its response to the request for leave to appeal, also announced that it relies on the District Court's decision and believes that there is no reason to intervene in it. The other respondents, Getter and Komori, chose not to file a response to the application.
Discussion and Decision
- After reviewing the District Court's decision, the application for leave to appeal and its responses, and after examining the case law and the legal literature on the issue before us, I have reached the conclusion that the application should be rejected.
- The deep-rooted rule is that the appellate court will not be inclined to intervene in procedural decisions that mean continuing to examine the proceeding on its merits, including rejecting a motion for dismissal in limine; Intervention in such decisions is therefore reserved for exceptional cases, in which there has been a material error in the decision or there is a real concern that a futile proceeding will involve a significant and extraordinary investment of resources (see, for example: Civil Appeals Authority 6938/19 Ilani v. Baruch, Paragraph 23 [Nevo] (August 20, 2020); Civil Appeal Authority 5464/22 Lederman v. Kiryat Gat Municipality, paragraphs 13-14 [Nevo] (October 19, 2022)). The case before me is not one of these exceptional cases, and in any event, the District Court's decision is even correct on its merits.
- I will note that the basic facts as well as the timetable required for a decision are not in dispute. There is, in fact, no dispute that the parties to the bill of lading for the sea carriage of the cargo are Comori as a routine; Getter as a routine; and Maersk as a marine carrier. Nor is there any dispute that the notice to a third party against Maersk was filed more than a year after the date of delivery of the cargo: the machine was unloaded at the Haifa Port in January 2021, while the notice against Maersk was filed about three years later, on December 19, 2023. Therefore, the issue before us is a legal issue on the question of the interpretation and applicability of the abbreviated statute of limitations provision in section III(6) of the Hague Regulations. Insofar as this provision applies to the Gold Bond Notice, it has become obsolete and should be disposed of out of hand. Insofar as it does not apply, then the limitation period relevant to the notice is the regular limitation period in accordance with the provision of section 5(1) ofthe Statute of Limitations, which stands at seven years - so that the Gold Bond notice has not become statute of limitations.
I will preface by saying that the focus of the question that arises in his case regarding the applicability of the shortened limitation provision is the fact that Gold Bond is not a party to the bill of lading. The question of whether the shortened statute of limitations applies to a foreign party's claim for the bill of lading against the maritime carrier has not yet been discussed, to the best of my knowledge, in this court. Since we are interested in a legal question with implications that go beyond 44Latt The facts of the concrete case, and in light of the paucity of case law on this issue, I have found it necessary to expand a little on the matter. First and foremost, I will present the normative framework in which we operate.