"Movers" by definition Section I(A) To the Hague Regulations "Includes the owner or charterer of the vessel who enters into a contract of carriage with the cargo shipper" (Hereinafter: Marine Carrier).
This provision establishes, therefore, a shortened limitation period of one year, beginning on the date on which the cargo was actually delivered or on the date on which it should have been delivered, after which a claim against a sea carrier in connection with loss or damage caused to the goods transported by it becomes statute of limitations (Hereinafter also: The Shortened Statute of Limitations). As previously determined, the language of the directive, according to which the carrier and the vessel shall be "Exemptions" Responsibility - shows that we are dealing with a substantive statute of limitations, as opposed to a purely procedural statute of limitations ( Banco Exterior, at p. 949; Civil Appeal Authority 2279/24 Harel Insurance Company on Appeal Taxes N. Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A, paragraph 9 [Nevo] (31.3.2024) (hereinafter: the Matter Harel)). Such a statute of limitations not only blocks, on the procedural level, the possibility of suing the maritime carrier; Rather, it completely expropriates the right to sue the maritime carrier and its liability for the goods, in the sense of "[]Taking the sword from the plaintiff and ending the war" (Interest FEYHA, in paragraph 8; For more on the differences between the two, see: Civil Appeal 9817/17 Tel Aviv Real Estate Taxation Administration v. Reich, paragraphs 13-20 of the judge's judgment Stein [Nevo] (21.2.2021); Tal Havkin Statute of limitations 136-138 (2nd ed. 2021) (hereinafter: Havkin)).
It is interesting to note that although this is ostensibly a relatively short limitation period, when it was anchored in the Hague-Visby Rules, in practice it extended the limitation period that was customary at the time for bills of lading. As described above, prior to the formulation of these rules, the strong position of the sea carriers forced the rights holders in the cargo to agree to the conditions in the bills of lading that severely limited the liability of the carriers; This includes a very short limitation period, which was a few months (Polska, at p. 228; Banco Exterior, at p. 950; FEYHA, at para. 9). The purpose of the provision of section III(6) was, therefore, on the one hand, to benefit the owners of the rights in the cargo and to give them sufficient time to file a claim against the sea carrier; and on the other hand, to establish a sufficiently short limitation period that would expedite the filing of their claiMs. The main reason for determining a relatively short limitation period is the nature of the maritime carrier's activity, which makes it difficult for it to retain evidence over time - inter alia, in light of its numerous contacts with various parties around the world, and the possible distance of the alleged damage event from its place of residence. The prompt filing of claims against the maritime carrier thus helps him to clarify the facts of the case while he is still "fresh", and also allows him to "clear his books" within a reasonable time (Bellina, at p. 795; FEYHA, at paragraphs 9 and 11). The shortened limitation period is also intended to contribute to proper trade - while international trade inherently requires legal certainty while quickly determining the rights and obligations of the parties concerned (FEYHA, at paragraph 11).
Does the shortened statute of limitations apply in the circumstances of our case?
- And back to our point. As stated, Gold Bond is of the opinion that the shortened statute of limitations does not apply to its claim against Maersk, so it has not become statute of limitations, for two main reasons: first, that the provision in question applies only in a case where the cause of action is based on the bill of lading, while a claimagainstMaersk is not based on the note but on a cause of action; The second is that this provision applies only to a claim by a party to the bill of lading, while Gold Bond is not a party to it.
The first argument based on the cause of action can already be rejected. Section IVa(1) of the Hague Regulations explicitly states that "the protections and limitation of liability under these Regulations shall apply to any claim against the carrier for loss or damage to goods that are the subject of the contract of carriage, whether it is a contractual claim or a tort claim" (emphasis added). In other words, where it is a claim against a sea carrier in connection with damage to goods transported under a bill of lading, filing the claim on tort grounds does not exclude the application of the Regulations. Accordingly, the case law held with respect to the abbreviated statute of limitations that it applies not only to a contractual cause of action based on the bill of lading, but also to related causes, torts and "non-contractual", "if you do not say so, any plaintiff can circumvent - through the law of the country in which he filed his claim - the uniform international law established in the Convention, and thus extend the substantive limitation period contrary to the purpose of the provision that established it" (Banco Exterior, p. 957; see also Guenter Treitel & Francis Reynolds, Carver on Bills of Lading 740 (4th ed. 2017) (hereinafter: Carver). The fact that Gold Bond's cause of action is tort does not, therefore, "exempt" it, in and of itself, superior to the shortened statute of limitations. - As for the second reason, according to which the shortened statute of limitations does not apply to a foreign party's claim for the bill of lading, this is the schedule of the discussion in our case. As you may recall, the bill of lading lists Komori as a dispatcher; Getter as a routine; and Maersk as a sea carrier. Gold Bond is not a party to the bill of lading. Gold Bond also does not sue Maersk by virtue of entering into the shoes of a direct party to the bill of lading, as in the case of a subrogation claim filed by the Sugar's insurer (see, for example, the Harel case).
As already noted, the question is whether the Section III(6) The Hague Regulations apply to a foreign party's claim for the bill of lading - has not yet been discussed in depth in the case law of this Court. However, in a judgment dealing with a related issue, the position was voiced - although this issue was not the focus of the discussion - according to which this provision deals with claims by direct parties to the bill of lading and their replacements.
This is a matter Bellina, in which an indemnity claim filed by the insurer of the shipper against the sea carrier, based on the right of substitution, after the expiration of the shortened limitation period was discussed. In the section III(6) to the Hague Regulations. The insurer's argument was that her claim was not time-barred, since it should be considered "A claim for indemnification against a third party", as understood in an exception In the section III(6a) to the Hague Regulations extending the limitation period (hereinafter: Section III(6a)). In the judge's main opinion J. Englard, which dealt with the question of the interpretation of Section III(6a)), it was held that this exclusion does not apply to the insurer's claim when it was not filed against a third party, but against the sea carrier that is a "second" party, direct, to the bill of lading (Matter Bellina , at pp. 795-796). The Judge T. Strasberg-Cohen She added, and this is the main point of our case, that the conclusion that the insurer's claim does not fall within the scope of Section III(6a)), but within the boundaries of Section III(6) To the Hague Regulations - is strengthened by the fact that "Section III 6, which establishes a short limitation period, deals with the set of relations between the direct parties to the bill of lading - the consignee of the goods and the carrier of the goods - where the consignee is the plaintiff and the carrier is the defendant. The insurer stepped into the shoes of the Sugar" (Name, at p. 797).
- This statement was based by the District Court in our case, when it ruled that the shortened statute of limitations does not apply to Gold Bond's claim, as it is a foreign party to the bill of lading (see paragraph 8.2 of its decision). And for the reliance of the trial courts on this statement in other cases, see: Civil Case (Tel Aviv Magistrate) 36940-12-09 ZIM Integrated Shipping Services in a Tax Appeal v. Friedman, paragraph E(3) [Nevo] (February 7, 2012) (hereinafter: the Friedman case); Civil Case (Shalom Tel Aviv) 47758/05 ISCONT LINES LTD MENTFIELD LTD., PARA. 7 [Nevo] (May 10, 2007)).
As will be detailed below, even in my opinion, the abbreviated statute of limitations provision in section III(6) of the Hague Regulations is intended to apply to the claim of a direct party to the bill of lading, or to a person who enters in his shoes; and not to the claim of a foreign party to the bill of lading. I will note that in view of this conclusion, there is no need to examine Gold Bond's alternative argument according to which the exceptional matter in section III(6A) applies in the circumstances - however, in advance of the closing I will consolidate a number of words on this issue as well.
Non-applicability of the abbreviated statute of limitations provision to a foreign party's claim for the bill of lading
- The main purpose of the Hague-Visby Rules, which include the abbreviated statute of limitations, is to regulate the relationship, rights and obligations between the parties and the bill of lading (Real Estate and Ester, at p. 16). Accordingly, these rules are intended, as a rule, to apply only to the direct parties to the deed that enter into a contract of carriage between them, and to those who step into their shoes - but not to third parties. This is explicitly stated in relation to these rules, in the leading English literature on the subject of bills of lading:
"[…] the Rules are intended to regulate the right and duties of the parties to the bill of lading contract, and between one of the parties and the servants or agents of the other. The Rules do not apply to non-parties, and accordingly do not apply ex facie to claims against the carrier by someone who is not party to the bill of lading contract…" (Bernard Eder et al., Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading 403 (22nd ed. 2011) (Scrutton below:) (emphasis added)).