Therefore, we will conclude that not only did the plaintiff not prove that the defendant acted in bad faith with him in the negotiations, he also did not prove that during the negotiations the possibility that the notice period would exceed that prescribed by law was discussed.
- As to the obligation to provide notice to the employee of his working conditions: there is no dispute that the defendant did not give the plaintiff written notice of his working conditions in accordance with its obligation under the Notice to Employee and Job Candidate Law (Working Conditions and Screening and Acceptance Procedures), 5762-2002 (hereinafter: the Notice to Employee Law), and by virtue of which the plaintiff is claiming compensation in the amount of ILS 15,000. The defendant, for its part, opposes the award of compensation under the Notice to Employee Law because it claims that the reason it did not give notice to the plaintiff was the plaintiff's conduct, which made it difficult for the plaintiff to sign the agreement and prevented its signing. Moreover, the plaintiff knew what the working conditions were since his meeting with Mr. Kfir Barak on May 29, 2023.
- Section 5(b) of the Notice to Employee Law grants the court the authority to award the employee compensation that is not dependent on the damage at a rate not exceeding ILS 15,000 if it finds that the employer did not knowingly give the employee notice of the working conditions. This is compensation that is subject to the discretion of the court, and in the circumstances that have been proven before us, we have reached the conclusion that compensation should not be awarded in favor of the plaintiff and we will elaborate.
First of all, we should mention that the provisions of the Notice to Employee Law come to add to the right of an employee by virtue of an employment contract (section 6). Hence, an employer is entitled to sign an employment contract with an employee that includes the details required by the Notice to the Employee Law, and this is what the defendant sought to do. Moreover. Mr. Kfir Barak testified that the working conditions were already known and agreed upon when the plaintiff began to work and they were recorded in the draft employment agreement (p. 43, lines 9-12; 20-22; p. 57, lines 28-29). The plaintiff confirmed this version in his cross-examination when he admitted that from the very beginning of his employment he knew what his terms of employment were, including: the salary to be paid to him and the salary increments to be paid to him (p. 8, lines 8-9); the scope of his position (p. 8, line 11); the date of the commencement of his employment (from p. 8, line 36 to page 9, line 12); His role (p. 9, lines 13-14). Moreover, not only did the plaintiff know what the terms were, but he was the one who "planted" them in the draft employment agreement that was ultimately not signed (p. 11, lines 37-39), because of the plaintiff himself, and even though the defendant waited for it. In other words, it is true that the plaintiff himself thwarted the signing of the contract that we are convinced that he would have fulfilled the provisions of the Notice to Employee Law, as he himself confirmed in his cross-examination (p. 11, line 1). Thus, it should be said that even though the defendant did not give the plaintiff written notice of the working conditions, and as stated, he was aware of most of the details listed in section 2 of the Notice to the Employee Law immediately upon the commencement of his employment. Beyond the fact that the plaintiff knew what his working conditions were by virtue of his agreement with Mr. Kfir Barak, he knew about them by virtue of the position he held, in which he himself was responsible for the employees' salaries. It should be mentioned here that the plaintiff was accepted to the position of CFO, a position that is subordinate to the defendant's CEO and is part of its senior management avenue, and therefore this is not a 'regular' case. In these circumstances, our position is that there is no reason to award compensation in favor of the plaintiff.
- We are aware of the plaintiff's argument that when the employee is not given notice of the working conditions and no employment agreement has been signed with him, his version and the ruling to which he referred in support of this should be accepted (Civil Appeal (Tel Aviv) 6479/09 Kahanovitz v. IDI VentureS. in Tax Appeal [Nevo] (December 4, 2011)). Our position is different. We are of the opinion that failure to give notice to the employee does not automatically require that the plaintiff's version be accepted. Because section 5A of the Notice to Employee Law states that in one of the matters specified in section 2 of the same law, the burden of proof will be on the employer. In other words, it is only a matter of transferring the burden of proof, which the employer can lift, as he did here. Insofar as the matter is directed at the period of advance notice, then, as we have determined above, the plaintiff's version is contradicted. Beyond what is required, we note that the fact that in exchange for advance notice does not appear on the plaintiff's last pay slip, it has not gone unnoticed. However, the plaintiff admitted that as of the date of the hearing, he had stopped coming to the workplace or working, and this was prior to the notice of dismissal (p. 30, lines 24-30). Nevertheless, his monthly salary was paid in full.
The generality of the things in this chapter, in circumstances in which the working conditions were known to the plaintiff and were even put in writing in the draft employment contract, which the plaintiff was the one who thwarted the plaintiff's signature, and given the plaintiff's short period of employment, the claim that the defendant did not comply with the provisions of the Notice to Employee Law in a manner that justifies compensation should be rejected.