"According to her own testimony, she knew that she was mortgaging her rights in the apartment as collateral for the credit given by the bank to the project partners (one of whom was her husband), and that before she signed on, her (former) husband also explained to her that this was indeed the case. She also knew and understood that as long as the bank, by her husband and his partners, was not given an alternative collateral, the lien and mortgage on the apartment would remain in full force."
In light of this, the Supreme Court did not find any substance in the appellant's claims regarding her ignorance or lack of understanding of the essence and significance of the mortgage deed signed by her.
The Supreme Court further emphasized (in paragraph 6 of the judgment):
"We also find no basis for the appellant's argument that it was not enough for her to sign the mortgage deed in front of a lawyer, and that the bank itself was obligated - through its representatives - to provide a prefix for signing its meaning and consequences. As aforesaid, the appellant signed the mortgage deed with advice and in unison with her husband (the partner in the project) and their lawyer.
0It was ruled that the validity of the undertakings will not be impaired even when the obligor signs the document "... According to the advice of his attorney or other consultant who is trusted by him, without there being any mistake or misleading as to the nature of the document, but rather out of blind reliance on the opinion of the said consultant, and relying on it, and with a willingness to sign any document at the discretion of the latter - whatever the document may be" (President Shamgar, Civil Appeal 413/79 Adler Building Company in Tax Appeal v. Mansour, IsrSC 34(4) 29, 38 (1980)).
In the matter at hand, it was proven that the appellant did not sign the document with "blind reliance", until after consulting with her husband, the partner in the project, and their lawyer, and after she understood its content and significance.