"... His suspension from his position, dismissal or discharge from service, or his employment outside of his duties within the framework of the Prison Service - shall not be considered as a claim arising from an employee-employer relationship for the purpose of section 24 ofthe Labor Court Law, 5729-1969" (p. 668, paragraph 23).
- For our purposes, none of the differences referred to by the state between an "ordinary" employee and an elected official are equivalent against the qualification that falls within the scope Section 129(a) 30The Prisons Ordinance which was quoted above, which, as stated, blocked the authority of the Labor Court. Below I will briefly address the differences enumerated above with regard to their impact on the possibility that the respondents before us will be recognized as employees, but until I reach this and in order to complete the discussion of the question of relief as a test - it is appropriate to refer to what was said by Justice E. Barak (as he was then called) High Court of Justice 727/85 Created N' The National Labor Court, פ"41:41(2) 589 (1987) at p. 593 (also cited in the Halamish) and thus it is stated:
"The court's jurisdiction is usually determined by the nature of the relief sought by the applicant (see Civil Appeal 27/77 Toby v. Rafael, IsrSC 31 (3) 561; Civil Appeal 510/82 Hassan v. Feldman, IsrSC 37(1) 3. The remedy required in the action filed by the petitioner to the Fact Court is the payment of wages, and this remedy is subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. This remedy is not mentioned at all in section 93A of the Police Ordinance, and therefore the authority of the Labor Court has not been revoked in respect of it."
And later on:
"In the context of the jurisdiction of the Labor Court, which is determined by the nature of the relief sought, the main question is the question of wages, since this is the claim filed by the petitioner" (p. 594).
Justice Cheshin partially disagreed with the path taken by Justice Barak, i.e., a decision on the question of the court's authority according to the requested remedy. According to the Honorable Judge Cheshin"The authority of the labor court is not similar to that of the Magistrate's Court: the authority of the latter is determined according to the remedy, the authority of the former is determined by the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant" (פרשת Halamish p. 667). Both are living God's words, and I do not believe that a decision should be made between the two approaches. Even with the assumption that the jurisdiction of the Labor Court is determined by The Essence of the Relationship There is no impediment between the plaintiff and the defendant that for the purpose of deciding the question of the nature of the relationship, weight will also be given to the relief sought, lest from its examination we will also reach a conclusion regarding the true nature of the relationship in question. In the present case, the question of whether this is an employee-employer relationship will be decided both according to the relief requested and according to an examination of the differences enumerated by the state between an employee "according to its method" and an elected official. In parentheses, I will note that the Petitioner also does not completely detach itself from the relief test for the purpose of examining status, since, inter alia, she refers to the fact that the two respondents did not base their right to wages on Wage Protection Law. In other words, the use of relief as a criterion for examining status (see paragraph 108 of the petition).