The Nachmani Affair
- On July 16, 2000, Yossi was elected. Nachmani (Hereinafter: Nachmani) to serve as deputy mayor of Dimona. In the decision of the council in which he was appointed to serve - it was explicitly stated that he would not receive pay for his work for 28 months (see the minutes of 20 July 2000, p. 2, Gabi Lelouche's remarks - p/7). The aforementioned decision was based on the rules that were in place at the time regarding deputy mayors who were replaced in the middle of their term. Rules Introduced by the Ministry of Interior.
Later, the rules were changed to allow the payment of salaries to deputies from July 1, 2001, and on December 3, 2002, the city council decided to pay salaries toNachmani. As of that date, December 3, 2002, at the end of the 28 months in which he was not supposed to receive wages, his salary was indeed paid. Nachmani claimed that he was entitled to wages from the date of the change in the rules of July 1, 2001. When he did not respond, he filed a lawsuit on this matter with the Regional Court. On 22 November 2006, the Municipality requested that the State be added as a party to the lawsuit because the rules by which the Municipality operated were dictated by the State. The state agreed and joined as a party, and after joining it sought to dismiss the lawsuit in limine, based on the same argument it raises before us in the present petition, namely, that the Labor Court has no substantive jurisdiction to hear issues related to the salaries of elected officials. The Regional Court rejected the motion while expressing criticism that the state, which had agreed to join it as a party to the lawsuit, wished to dismiss it out of hand: "... Therefore, this request of the Applicant is puzzling (to say the least) and there is no reason to allow a party to conduct the proceeding in such a way that it wills to be a party to the proceeding and wills to withdraw from it." (See Decision A/4 of 9 November 2005).
The state has reservations about this decision and the law with it on this point. There is no connection between a party's consent to join him in one proceeding or another, and his substantive claim that the court in question (in our case, the Labor Court) has no substantive jurisdiction. The consent to the attachment means that the party in question acknowledges his belonging and involvement in the affair in question, and in the words of the court, "being a party to the proceeding". However, the proceeding must be conducted before the right forum, and once a certain person is joined as a party to the proceeding, he is entitled to express his opinion on the issue of the right forum.
- On the decision of the Regional Court (not to dismiss the claim out of hand), the Petitioner (the Respondent therein) filed an application for leave to appeal, which was rejected (Request for leave to appeal 849/05 of December 19, 2005). The President of the National Labor Court, Judge S. Adler, ruled that the issue of principle had already been decided in the Official and"I do not believe that it would be appropriate to address this issue once again in the framework of an appeal against a preliminary decision.". Until I come to the discussion of the core issue in this case, i.e., the substantive authority of the Labor Court to hear questions relating to the salaries of elected officials, I deem it necessary to address briefly the procedural aspect raised by the Petitioner with regard to the aforementioned decision of December 19, 2005 of the National Court. As quoted above, the Honorable President Adler's reasoning for rejecting the motion was based on the procedural stage at issue - a preliminary decision. It seems to me that there is truth in the state's objections on this issue. As a rule, there is no connection between the principle of the issue and the need to "address it once more" (as defined by President Adler) and its place on the axis of the legal proceeding from beginning to end. In our case, taking into account the essence of the preliminary issue, the aforesaid is even more valid. The existence or absence of substantive authority is an important and essential question that dictates, to a large extent, the rest of the discussion. Still, it is naturally located at the beginning of the process (although it is possible to raise a claim of lack of substantive authority even at later stages), and is defined as a preliminary claim. In retrospect, in the petition before us this is the core issue, to teach you about its importance and principle, at least according to the Petitioner. Therefore - assuming that it requires discussion - the fact that it is a preliminary argument does not constitute a barrier that must dictate its rejection. In this context, we should mention that in Parashat Official (which is the basis for the rejection of the application in the case of Nachmani), the decision in principle was given in a hearing on a preliminary argument. On the face of it, it also appears that there is no reason to postpone the decision until the end of the hearing (as the President recommended in the aforementioned decision), since the postponement is liable to lead to an idle hearing that will be conducted before the wrong court. There is a point in postponing the decision until the end of the hearing, when the facts that will be clarified during the hearing can have implications for the outcome. However, when the facts, regarding the authority, are clear and within their scope, it seems that there is no reason to postpone the decision. It seems to me that the State was also right in the additional argument in this context, according to which the postponement of the decision on the question of jurisdiction until the end of the hearing, is liable to put an end to its ability to put the issue before the appellate court (in the aforementioned decision of December 19, 2005, President Adler noted that"The Applicant will be able to upload the claimants... In the framework of an appeal against the final judgment of the Regional Court if it is filed") for if the claim of the Nachmani to her body - The state will not be able to appeal the Reasons for the rejection, including any decision made on the subject of authority. In retrospect, it appears that the Petitioner can say, in this context, "As long as I live, I feel like it". On September 12, 2006, the judgment was given in the Be'er Sheva Regional Labor Court in the case of Nachmani. His claim was dismissed on its merits, when it was determined that "Between what is being heard in this case and what is being discussed in a formal case". The only substantive judgment that stands anywhere in our case, in which the Petitioner requests that we intervene is the judgment in the matter Official.
Discussion