Appeal Petition/Administrative Claim 63194-08-25 Nevo Ben Cohen v. Ramat Gan Municipality

Appeal Petition/Administrative Claim 63194-08-25

Vice President Noam Sohlberg:

1. The issue of the delusions of artificial intelligence systems has already been discussed by this court, in the context of court proceedings in legal proceedings. As part of the proceeding before us, we are required to revisit the issue (albeit only partially, as detailed below) – but this time in the context of uncontrolled use of artificial intelligence by an administrative authority in its contact with a citizen.
2. We have before us an appeal against the decision of the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court, sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs, dated August 3, 2025, inAdministrative Petition 53460-06-25 [Nevo] (Judge Vardi). The decision was given following a judgment of July 17, 2025, in which it was determined that there was no basis for awarding costs in favor of the appellant.

Background and arguments of the parties

3. The background, in summary: The appeal was filed on behalf of the appellant, by his father. The appellant is a student in special education, his parents separated when he was a toddler, in 2016, while he entered  into a "separation and joint parenting agreement" between them (hereinafter: the separation agreement).  The agreement stipulated arrangements for the appellant's stay with each of the parents – arrangements that were expanded and updated on October 10, 2019, with an agreement that received the force of a judgment (Claims after the Litigation Arrangement 37035-08-18).  According to the current agreement, the appellant stays every 14 days, 8 days with his mother and 6 days with his father; This is when the parents bear joint parental responsibility for the minor.
4. During March 2023, the father moved into an apartment about 6-7 km from the minor's educational institution. As a result, and based on the Ministry of Education's Director General's Circular 5782/12 "Transportation of Students and Teaching Employees to Official Educational Institutions" (August 22, 2022) (hereinafter: the Transportation Procedure), the father contacted Respondent No. 2, the Ramat Gan Municipality, with a request to confirm eligibility for transportation for the minor from his home.  Initially, his request was approved, and transportation from his home began, but on September 12, 2023, he received a response from the deputy director of the municipality's education department, stating that the minor is not entitled to transportation from his home, since according to the separation agreement, custody belongs to the mother.
5. In light of the aforementioned response, on April 29, 2025, the father again contacted the Municipality, this time through a representative lawyer, in a letter titled "Letter Before Legal Proceedings Taken", in which he detailed the claims for which the minor was entitled, in his opinion, to transportation from his home. This time, too, the father's request was denied.  In the response dated May 25, 2025, it was stated that in accordance with the provisions of the Ministry of Education's Director General's Circular 5783/4(a) of September 1, 2022, entitled "Procedure for Transportation of Students Studying in the Framework of Special Education – Children to Parents Living Separately (Joint Parenting)", and taking into account what is stated in the separation agreement, the minor is not entitled to transportation from the father's home, as long as his home is not registered as the minor's permanent residential address.  This is done by relying on quotes from the same Director General's circular, and based on determinations from the "current ruling".

The Ottoman Settlement [Old Version] 1916

6. 12-34-56-78 Chekhov v. State of Israel, P.D. 51 (2)In response to it, the father's counsel turned to the municipality, and noted that he could not find the director-general's circular to which the municipality referred in its letter. At the same time, the father's counsel contacted respondent No. 1, the Ministry of Education, with a request to send him the said circular.  The response on behalf of the Ministry of Education stated that  "the Director General's Circular to which the Ramat Gan Municipality refers is not known to us"; and that the matter is regulated in Section 2.8.3 of the Transportation Procedure.  Subsequently, and after the said procedure was sent to him, the appellant's counsel approached the municipality with a request for clarifications, noting that a review of the procedure sent by the Ministry of Education shows that "it does not contain the quotes" that appeared in the response letter from the municipality.  This request was not answered.
7. Against this background, the father filed an administrative petition with the District Court. In the petition, various arguments were raised regarding the municipality's obligation to provide transportation from the father's home in circumstances of joint parenting.  It was also argued that the repetition that the municipality relied on in the decision that is the subject of the petition does not exist; and that "even the so-called determinations from the judgments mentioned in the letter did not exist and were not created."  It was therefore argued, in this context, that the municipality's decision "is based on invented clauses and judgments, which apparently were written by artificial intelligence"; and that "beyond the grave negligence inherent in this, it follows that the municipality did not present any substantiated reason that could contradict [the appellant's] claims".
8. On July 17, 2025, following a practical proposal put forward by the Ministry of Education, and after an oral discussion in which another proposal was raised, the parties announced that "they have reached an agreement whereby, beyond the letter of the law, [the minor] will be given transportation from his father's address, as long as transportation from his mother's address is not required. [...] Under these circumstances, the petition became redundant."  The joint statement also stated that "the position of [the appellant's] counsel has room in the circumstances of the case to award costs, and therefore it is requested that each party submit its arguments on this matter separately."
9. Quoted from Nevo, the appellant argued, inter alia, that it was only his petition that led to the granting of the requested relief, and therefore, "the award of costs on the higher side in our case is necessary for the purposes of deterring the municipality and other authorities in the future from hardening their backs and arbitrariness." It was further argued that the municipality acted in bad faith, and "made incorrect factual claims before the court"; and that "taking into account the strict approach in case law regarding the use of artificial intelligence in legal proceedings", and given that "the municipality referred to clauses and rulings from non-existent rulings, which raises more suspicion and explains that artificial intelligence was used", there is room for awarding costs on the high side,  "And at the very least, expenses for the benefit of the state treasury."
10. The Municipality, for its part, was of the opinion that there was no reason to award costs in favor of the appellant, and even on the contrary – real expenses should be awarded in its favor. This is done, inter alia, in view of the fact that the solution given to the appellant's case is an "exceptional solution", beyond the letter of the law, which is not based on a "legal right"; and taking into account the "harm to public resources", and the fact that awarding expenses in the circumstances of the case "may encourage the filing of petitions without legal basis".  The Ministry of Education was also of the opinion that given that the proceeding ended without the need for a judicial decision, and that the consent to the outline that was formulated was given beyond the letter of the law, there was no room for an award of costs.
11. In a decision dated August 3, 2025, the District Court rejected the request for an award of costs. This was in view of the "agreement that was reached"; and the fact that "there was a problem in not including the mother in the proceeding and it was necessary to receive her attention and even her consent, as was in practice also given to the practical agreement that was reached".

Hence the appeal before us.

12. The appellant argues that in accordance with the customary rule regarding the award of costs, there was room to award costs in his favor. Thus, according to him, the filing of the petition was justified, and it was what motivated the municipality to retract its previous decision.  The appellant further argues that the District Court erred in determining that it should have included the mother as a respondent in the proceeding, and in any event, this does not raise or lower the issue of costs.  Finally, it was argued that the District Court was required to take into account in the expenses ruling "the improper conduct of the municipality in the proceeding", which, according to it, included factual claims "which later turned out to be false"; and a reference to "non-existent clauses and rulings", which raises  a "more plausible"  suspicion that artificial intelligence was used incorrectly.
13. In a decision dated December 14, 2025, I asked the Municipality to respond to the appeal, focusing on the claim of improper use of artificial intelligence by the Municipality. In its response, the Municipality argued that the appeal in question was a "clear example" of "procedural ingratitude and an attempt to enrich himself unlawfully"; this is because the appellant enjoys "a creative and exceptional solution granted to him by the respondents", and at the same time, demands legal expenses, despite the fact that from the outset no legal right was in his favor.  The Municipality further argued that the appellant's procedural failures did indeed justify not awarding expenses in his favor; that the matter at hand does not justify deviating from the rule of non-intervention in expenses ruled by the trial court; and that the precedent regarding the ruling of expenses is not at all relevant in the circumstances of the case.  As for the claim regarding the use of artificial intelligence, it was argued that a distinction must be made between cases in which such use gives rise to "a cause of action or fabricated facts", and cases in which "the legal basis exists and is true, and the error is purely technical"; and that in any case, the basis for the decision is solid and solid, in a way that does not depend on "one incorrect quote or another, if any".

Discussion and Decision

14. After reviewing the statement of appeal and the municipality's response, with its appendices, I have reached the conclusion that the appeal should be accepted; I will therefore suggest to my colleague that he was shot. This, on the basis of the text, by virtue of Regulation 138(a)(5) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018 (hereinafter: the Regulations), which applies in our case pursuant  to Regulation 34 of the Administrative Courts  Regulations (Procedures), 5761-2000.
15. First, I will note, with regard to the appellant's claims that are not related to the use made by the municipality of artificial intelligence (a subject that I will elaborate on later), that they should be rejected. As is well known, the discretion of the trial court with regard to an award of expenses is very broad.  As a result,  "it is a well-established rule that the appellate court has no way of intervening in the matter of court expenses, except in exceptional cases in which a legal error has occurred or when a material defect or impropriety adheres to the discretion of the trial court" (Civil Appeal 9147/16 Cohen v. Kreuzer, para. 34 [Nevo] (July 24, 2018); see, among many: Appeal of Petition/Administrative Claim 70929-12-25 Hayoun v. Kfar Shmaryahu Local Council,  Paragraph 11 [Nevo] (February 1, 2026)).  This is true of a decision to award costs, and  equally with regard to a decision not to award expenses (Civil Appeal 7627/20 Eisler Management Company in  a Tax  Appeal v. Tefen Medical Ltd., para. 7 [Nevo] (February 24, 2022); see also: Uri Goren, Issues in Civil Procedure, Vol. 2, 1599 (Thirteenth Edition, 2020)).
16. I do not believe that the arguments raised by the appellant on the merits of the matter show that the decision not to award expenses in his favor falls within the scope of those exceptional cases. The District Court took into account the procedural conduct of the parties, as well as the fact that a solution was reached in the appellant's case, with the consent of the respondents, and in their view this consent was given beyond the letter of the law (on the fact that in cases such as this,  "expenses will not usually be awarded", see: Application for Administrative Leave to Appeal 5259/10 Hamdoun v. Ministry of the Interior, para. 7 [Nevo] (August 29, 2013); High Court of Justice 9746/07 Estate of the deceased Hani Bnei Manya v. The Committee for Payment Beyond the Letter of the Law on Nationalist Grounds, paragraph 3 [Nevo] (July 26, 2009)).  Relevant considerations were therefore taken into account, and I did not find in  the District Court's decision a "material defect or invalidity", one that could justify our intervention.

The (uncontrolled) use of artificial intelligence by the municipality

17. A review of the documents attached to the appeal leaves no room for doubt as to the use made by the municipality of artificial intelligence, both in its initial decision and in the legal proceedings. I will put it in their own words.  In the detailed response provided by the municipality to the appellant's request, in which it informed him of its decision to reject his request, it was written as follows: "The Ramat Gan Municipality is obligated to act in accordance with the law, the relevant case law and the guidelines of the Ministry of Education, including the Ministry of Education's Director General's Circular 5783/4(a) dated September 1, 2022, entitled 'Transportation Procedure for Students Studying in Special Education Frameworks - Children to Parents Living Separately (Joint Parenting).'"  Subsequently, detailed quotes were brought from sections 2.1, 2.3 and 4.1 to the same Director General's Circular, which ostensibly substantiate the Municipality's position.  The problem is that,as the Ministry of Education also noted in response to the appellant's request, the  "Ministry of Education Director General's Circular 5783/4(a) of September 1, 2022", on which the municipality relied, does not exist; like a crow flowered.  Even the detailed quotes that the municipality brought to base its position do not appear in one or another of the Ministry of Education's procedures.
18. As if that were not enough, the municipality also relied on three rulings to which it referred. Thus, for example, the municipality referred to "APA (Center) 31135-07-20S. v. M.M.S.", where "it was determined that equal parental responsibility is not equivalent to the status of 'two centers of life,' with respect to duties and rights vis-à-vis third parties."  I turned and turned around, and a determination as stated in the judgment – I did not find it.  In fact, the terms "center of life" and "third parties", with their inflections, do not appear at all in the judgment.  As another example, the municipality also referred to "A.S. (Tel Aviv) 13008-02-21", where, according to the municipality, it was determined that "the court emphasized that the determination of 'custody' or 'parental responsibility' is irrelevant for the purpose of entitlement to services with the authority, if there is no official dual address."  The problem is that in the judgment there is no mention of the issue of double addresses, nor of aspects related to entitlement to services vis-à-vis the authorities.
19. From what has been said so far, we find that the municipality's decision, with its reasoning – at least as presented to the appellant – was clearly based on the uncontrolled use of artificial intelligence. One might hope that this was enough, but things do not end there.  In the Municipality's response to the appellant's request for expenses – a request that was based, as stated, on the appellant's strong claims regarding the Municipality's improper use of artificial intelligence – the Municipality quoted from HCJ 3272/92 Yitzhak Levy v. Government of Israel, IsrSC 47(5) 672, 679 (1993): 'Legal expenses incurred by a public authority are deducted from a designated budget directed to the entire public.'"  In this case, too, unfortunately, the judgment does not exist; And the quote quoted from him, it can be assumed, is the result of the "feverish mind" of the artificial intelligence system.
20. And if at this stage the reader already assumes that the municipality has learned its lesson, and has also corrected its ways, I am sorry to disappoint him. Even after I asked for a specific answer on the issue of the use of artificial intelligence, the melody was repeated.  Thus, in the reply it was noted, for example, that "in the appeal of Petition/Administrative Claim 2398/12M.T.  Measurement Channels and Infrastructures In the Tax Appeal  v. Tel Aviv Municipality [Nevo] (March 18, 2012), it was held that defective procedural conduct is a central consideration in denying expenses."  A perusal of the judgment shows that such a determination, or even similar to it, is not made (moreover, that the respondent in that proceeding was a member of the Shoham Economic Company Ltd., and the judgment was given on April 22, 2012).  It was possible to go on with the examples, but it seems to me that things are quite clear at this point; Clear and frustrating.
21. Thus, the Municipality's decision on the appellant's request, as well as the pleadings it submitted, both to the District Court and in the present proceeding, are all replete with erroneous references and quotes, some of which are fabricated, which can be assumed to be a direct product of the (uncontrolled) use of artificial intelligence. Indeed, "references to non-existent rulings; references that lack internal relevance; and quotes that did not exist and were not created, show with a high probability that the [respondent's] counsel made use of an AI-based website" (High Court of Justice 38379-12-24 Anonymous v. Sharia Court of Appeals, paragraph 9 of the judgment of my colleague,  Justice G. Kanfi-Steinitz [Nevo] (February 23, 2025) (hereinafter: the Anonymous case)).  And if the severity inherent in one such instance is not sufficient, then from the above description it can be seen that in our case the problem has taken upon itself not once, not even twice, but three or four times (depending on the count), without the municipality correctly concluding that it must change its ways and eliminate it; "Under three the earth will be angry, and under four you will not be able to bear" (Mishlei 30:21; see also Mishna, Bava Kama 2:4).

What is the law that applies in a case such as this? I will turn to discussing this now.  As I will clarify below, the hearing will take place on two levels, in accordance with the various contexts in which the municipality failed to make its use of artificial intelligence – in the framework of the legal proceeding, and in the direct response it gave to the appellant.