Criminal Case (Tel Aviv) 35106-11-21 State of Israel v. Neta Cuneo - part 5

The databases held by the authorities in general, and the police in particular, give the public servants in charge of them the power, ability and power that derive from their access to a great deal of important information about every member of the Israeli public...  The public's trust and confidence in the police is based, inter alia, on the assumption that the police officers perform their duties faithfully and do not make any other use of the information in their possession, other than lawful use.  A forgiving approach to the defendant's act is tantamount to his justification and to give legal approval to the prohibited and defective act (Criminal Case (Shalom Tel Aviv) 10414/01 State of Israel v.  Amiram et al.  (05.01.2003)).

173. Similar things have been stopped more than once. As stated, a police officer who provides information from police databases, without a lawful permit, acts outside the scope of his duties, as he does not act in a manner that fulfills the public interest that he is entrusted with.  In doing so, the police officer violates the duty of trust he owes to the public and even acts in a conflict of interest with his role as a police officer, because he makes use of the powers given to him to view the databases not for the purpose of fulfilling his duties but for other purposes.  Therefore, in such an act, the police officer is prima facie and prima facie committing the offense of fraud and breach of trust, both with regard to the factual element required in the offense and with regard to the mental element (see, for example, Criminal Case (Shalom Chai) 14028-08-17 State of Israel v.  Karsenty (02.03.2021); Criminal Appeal (Hai District) 33256-03-22 Karsenty v.  State of Israel (March 23, 2023)).
174. However, it should be qualified and emphasized here that not every act of breach of fiduciary, including in an action in a situation of conflict of interest, is likely to constitute criminal liability for the offense of fraud and breach of trust. As can be seen from the definition of the offense itself, cited above, such conduct by a public servant will cross the criminal threshold only when the act "harms the public." The case law interpreted this restriction as a requirement that the act of breach of trust would substantially harm one or more of the values protected by the offense (namely: the public's trust in public servants; the preservation of the integrity of public officials; and the protection of the public interest for which public servants are entrusted) (see, for example, in the criminal appeal of Hassan , supra).
175. Hence,not every provision of information from a police database, without a lawful permit, will constitute criminal liability for the offense of fraud and breach of trust. It is certainly possible to draw cases of the provision of information in which disciplinary measures or disciplinary prosecution will suffice; This is when the intensity of the breach of the fiduciary duty, or the action in a situation of conflict of interest, will not constitute a material violation of the protected values; and for our purposes, the activity of the police, the public's trust in it, or its image.  The issue of the boundary line between disciplinary liability and criminal liability will therefore be discussed separately below.

• Between Disciplinary Liability and Criminal Liability:

176. We noted that a police officer who extracts information from police databases, without a lawful permit, acts outside the scope of his duties and violates his duty of trust to the public; and even acts in a conflict of interest with his role as a policeman. However, in the appropriate circumstances, the police officer's action may constitute disciplinary liability only, as opposed to criminal liability.  Section 5 of the Police Law, 5766-2006, which defines what constitutes a disciplinary offense, refers to the first addendum to the law.  This addendum also explicitly includes, in Item 14, an act of "disclosure, delivery, or attempted discovery or delivery without obtaining lawful permission, of a matter concerning the police, to an unauthorized person...", and in particular 18 an act of "exploiting the status of a police officer for the purpose of fulfilling a duty" (see also in detail 4 of the First Addendum).
177. As a result, the ruling of the police disciplinary court was required, more than once, in cases in which police officers were accused of disciplinary offenses due to the removal of information from police databases without a permit. This case law also established (non-exhaustive) criteria for examining the severity of such acts, for the purpose of determining the punishment to be imposed for them.  Among other things, the indices were noted for the duration of the acts, the amount of information retrieved, and the identity of the person being examined (including a spouse or relative).  They also noted the index of the type of information that the police officer entered illegally, i.e., whether it was only demographic information or criminal or intelligence information, as well as the question of whether the police officer only perused the information on the computer, or whether he printed or photocopied the information and transferred it to a third party (see, for example, Special Court 21/22 The Inspector General v.  Benderker (August 25, 2022)).
178. On the face of it, according to the aforementioned criteria, it is clear that the defendant's conduct in this affair is of a high level of severity. Over a long period of more than three months, the defendant carried out dozens of frequent checks on police information systems, not for the purpose of fulfilling her duties, mainly but not only against the background of her relationship with Yossi.  In addition, the defendant examined information that was not only traffic but also and in fact mainly criminal.  The defendant did not have access to the criminal PLA system and therefore was unable to check the contents of the criminal PLA files.  However, its access to the Adam system enabled it to produce a list of criminal files as well as material information about them, including details of the offenses that are the subject of suspicions in the files, as clarified in the above review of the evidence.  Moreover, the defendant photographed sensitive information on many occasions and passed the footage on to Yossi (and others), while she even passed on information about his accomplices in the Yelp Kedem investigation.  Regarding the accident incident, the defendant entered the investigation file itself (taking advantage of her permission in the PLA Traffic files), photographed investigative materials and passed them on to Yossi, all while conducting the investigation.
179. Beyond all of these, there are also two additional substantial circumstances of severity in this case, which are more severe than the circumstances detailed in the Disciplinary Court's ruling mentioned above. The first additional circumstance is the transfer of the information to the criminals, first and foremost to Yossi (but also to others).  We noted that the defendant knew very well that Yossi was a criminal involved in criminal activity, as soon as she became acquainted with him, while her attempt to argue for a later date shows that she understood the importance of the matter and its implications.  Indeed, it is clear that the transfer of police information to a criminal - who by virtue of his activity is in some kind of conflict with the police - harms the activity of the police, and therefore it not only harms third parties, or their privacy, or the public's trust in the police and its image, but also concrete-real harm to the activity of the police itself.
180. The second severity circumstance, which is also related to the first circumstance, is the clear aspect of the disruption of the investigations that arises from the defendant's activity. Beyond the aforesaid, with regard to the accident, the defendant conducted frequent and repeated checks of the list of Yossi's criminal files and provided him with current and fresh information - as opposed to "historical" information - about his open files.  Moreover, not only did the defendant give Yossi information about him, but she also gave him information about his accomplices.  Special severity lies in the fact that on July 1, 2021, the defendant provided Yossi with a photocopy of the list of his files, which included his fresh bag from the Oz Kedem station, on suspicion of illegally purchasing or possessing weapons.  This is both in view of the severity of the suspicion and in view of the fact that this is a case that has just been opened - that is, a case in which the investigation is in its early stages, or at most in progress.
181. The defendant justified her behavior in the matter of the aforementioned last case by not looking at the list that she photographed and passed on to Yossi. However, beyond the fact that in the totality of the circumstances it is not possible to accept this version, it is clear that the transfer of information to the offender from a police database, without even checking what is being transferred, is serious in itself, since the information transferred may be extremely sensitive.  In addition, the defendant examined not only Yossi but also all of his accomplices in the Yelp Kedem interrogation and, as stated, provided him with information about them; And all this when it comes to an investigation that is pending serious suspicions of arms trafficking.  Needless to say, the transfer of information in such circumstances is also capable of disrupting the interrogations of suspects, since at the very least it allows them to prepare ahead of time for their arrest and interrogations.
182. Here it is not superfluous to refer to another line of argument of the defendant - against the background of her description of herself as a "colorful" type who perhaps likes to "go to the edge" - which seeks to give her actions a touch of laughter, amusement or play. This is, inter alia, in the defendant's joke with her friend Lynn about the "Neta Cuneo Rule" (see paragraph 74 above) or her words to her friend Natalie - while rejecting the latter's warnings - according to which she must feel "on the border that sometimes it is as if I feel like being caught." This line of argument is particularly evident in the arms license incident (the fourth indictment).  As may be recalled, in this incident, the defendant sought to explain her conduct in transferring information to Yossi against the background of small talk, following watching a film together, when Yossi asked her about the way weapons were registered with the police in light of his interest in them.
183. The problem is that police databases are not tools for adventure, amusement or social games, all the more so when it comes to a sensitive matter such as firearms licenses. In fact, in the matter of the weapons incident, the defendant's conduct was much more serious than mere "dangerous game." As may be recalled, in this incident, the defendant gave Yossi not only the information about Yehezkel's firearms license, but also his demographic information.  All this when Yossi was suspected at the time of arms trafficking offenses, under the circumstances described by Chief Superintendent Kogan in his testimony, and when the defendant was aware of the suspicions against Yossi in connection with weapons offenses because she gave him, inter alia, a screenshot in which the file opened in his case on suspicion of illegally purchasing or possessing a weapon was included.
184. The accumulation of the defendant's actions, as well as the circumstances of the severity that accompanied them, not only exclude any possibility of assuming that this was a mistake in good faith, or a one-time stumble, but they also have a material aspect. As has been ruled in the specific context of the offense of fraud and breach of trust, when it comes to an ongoing pattern of conduct, the accumulation of acts in itself may constitute a threshold of criminal severity (the "accumulation thesis" - see Criminal Appeals Authority 6477/20 Shaham v.  State of Israel (November 15, 2021)).  These words are applicable to our case, since the multitude of cases and the cumulative circumstances of severity constitute a real violation of the values protected by the offense, in such a way that the defendant's conduct clearly crossed the criminal threshold.  The severity of the defendant's behavior is also evident from the fact that, on the one hand, she was a veteran and experienced policewoman, who had even served for several years as an investigator, and on the other hand, Yossi was not just a criminal, but rather a declared criminal, involved in violent offenses and weapons.
185. The defense's arguments for protection from justice:
186. The defense raised many arguments against the manner in which the defendant was interrogated, the circumstances of the interrogation, and also the way the investigation was published in the media, which, according to it, formulate a defense for the defendant from justice. It should be said at once that some of the arguments raised are not claims that may constitute a defense from justice and even have no basis whatsoever in the evidence; The reference here is mainly to the claims that the investigation was conducted for extraneous motives, ostensibly on behalf of the ex-wife (Eran).  There is no evidence for these claims.  It should be argued that the very fact that Adv. Carmeli, who represented the ex-wife at the time, sent a letter that raises one suspicion or another against the defendant (P/16) does not substantiate the claims, especially since prosecutors under various laws did not give weight to the aforementioned letter due to significant inaccuracies in it.  Moreover, the idea that lawsuits by virtue of various laws were used in this case, as it were, as the long hand of the ex-wife is truly absurd, since the divorcee himself was suspected of being investigated by lawsuits under various other laws, following which an indictment was filed against him.
187. The defense complained of a very severe violation of the defendant's privacy, in particular in the discharge of her telephone, which contained various materials relating to her private and intimate life, including listening to the conversations she recorded with her parents and friends; All this while the judicial orders that were received stated that the violation of privacy should be avoided to the extent that it is necessary. Indeed, it is clear that every search, let alone a search on a "smartphone", constitutes a significant violation of privacy.  However, it cannot be said that in this case there was an invasion of privacy that was beyond what was required, in deviation from the judicial orders that were issued.  In fact, the opposite is true: the investigative materials were exposed to only a small investigative team, in a way that the violation of privacy was significantly reduced.
188. Moreover, the defendant's TAS found significant evidence that was a legitimate investigative need, especially in light of the defendant's vague version. This evidence included both evidence of the defendant's relationship with Yossi and evidence regarding the police information she provided him, including photographs from police computers.  Given the defendant's inconsistent versions regarding the date on which she learned of Yossi's being a criminal, it was clear that listening to her recorded conversations with her friends and with her father was required from an investigative perspective.  Therefore, there was nothing wrong with these wiretaps, and it cannot be said that they constituted a "fishing expedition", as it were, or a deviation from the judicial orders that were issued.
189. In the addendum to his written summaries, the defense attorney referred to the ruling in the High Court of Justice 8298/22 Public Defender's Office v. the Attorney General (August 31, 2025) and further expanded in this context as part of the completion of the oral summaries.  However, this rule concerns searches that were conducted without a judicial order and therefore it is not applicable to his case, since the searches of the defendant's telescope were all conducted in accordance with judicial orders that were issued.  It is not superfluous to note here that in the course of the interrogation, as stated, some of the defendant's friends gave the prosecutors correspondence with the defendant with them by virtue of various laws, but the investigators did not conduct any search of their phones.
190. Finally, in this context, I will note that I was not impressed by any unnecessary voyeurism on the part of the interrogators, or by the invasion of the private and intimate life of the defendant, and she and her friends were not asked by the investigators anything about these matters. Although it seems that the defendant tends to share on her own initiative and share unnecessary details about her private life, as some of her friends (and herself) have noted, there was no attempt by the investigators to pry into these aspects of her life.  It should be emphasized that the details of the relationship that developed between the defendant and Yossi were not only not the subject of the DIP investigation, but they were also not discussed in the trial that took place before me, and of course do not appear in this judgment.  In addition, the court granted the defense attorney's request - which was submitted with the consent of the accuser's counsel - to prohibit the publication of any detail relating to the defendant's intimate life (see the decision in motion no.  13).  It should be noted, however, that the very existence of a relationship with Yossi, about which there is no dispute and about which the defendant even shared the information on her own initiative, is not an intimate detail.
191. The defense attorney also reiterated the many publications in this case, especially with the arrest of the defendant during the interrogation stage, which was accompanied by the publication of harsh and intensified allegations that the defendant was allegedly a member of a gang of arms dealers, or even a " commander" of such a gang. I accept the defense attorney's argument, in the sense that it is indeed appropriate that investigations be conducted as far as possible from the spotlight and from media publications.  Experience also shows that media publications - especially when it comes to sensational publications - are not helpful to the investigation and in many cases actually interfere with it.  However, it can be understood that there is a media interest in a case where a police officer is suspected of passing information to criminals, and in any case, the investigative unit cannot be responsible for every piece of information that is published.
192. As for the alleged publication regarding the suspicion of aiding and abetting weapons offenses, as recalled, the defendant was indeed interrogated on such suspicion. The suspicion of aiding and abetting the arms trade did not eventually crystallize into an indictment.  However, at the time, the defendant conducted examinations on all the suspects in the Yelp Kedem interrogation and provided them with information, and therefore her interrogation of this suspicion was not unfounded and baseless.  Thus, no evidentiary basis was laid before me that would be sufficient to formulate a defense from justice for the defendant.
193. Finally - the decision on the specific charges:
194. After a general examination of the evidence and the legal issues that need to be decided, the time has therefore come to turn to the individual charges on which the defendant was accused before me and to decide on them. It should be noted that the decision is of course against the background of the general and legal principles set forth above, without repetition of them.

• The first charge:

193. The first indictment lists in a table 38 cases of transfers of information, a significant part of which relate to Yossi, but also to his partners Tal Mizrahi, Omri Weil, and Nachman Apte. The table also details the transfers of information to Yakir Maimoni and Assaf Ben Shmuel.  In addition to the table, the facts of the first indictment describe the opening of the PLA file of the Oz Kedem station, which was opened on June 29, 2021 as part of the investigation of the Yelp Kedem.  As noted, two days later, the defendant photographed the list of Yossi's investigation files (including this new file), and passed the photograph to Yossi, as well as the photocopy of Tal's investigation files.  The facts of this indictment were all proven, as it were, in the digital evidence.  Hence, in view of all of the above, the defendant's charge of committing multiple offenses of fraud and breach of trust in this charge was proven as required.
194. The defendant was also charged, in the first charge, with committing one offense of obstruction of justice under the provisions of section 244 of the Penal Law, in connection with the transfer of information to Yossi regarding the case relating to the investigation of YLP Kedem. The provisions of section 244 provide, in the relevant part of our case, as follows: "Whoever does anything with the intention of preventing or impeding a judicial proceeding or bringing about a perversion of the law, whether by thwarting the summons of a witness, by concealing evidence or in any other way, shall be sentenced to three years' imprisonment; In this regard, a 'judicial proceeding' - including a criminal investigation...".
195. In terms of the factual basis of the offense, it is therefore a behavioral offense, when the provision of information from police databases - in the circumstances of the present case, as detailed in detail above - consolidates it. As already noted above, the transfer of police information to a suspect, when a criminal investigation is underway, allows the suspect (and in our case a number of suspects) to at least prepare in advance for arrest and interrogations, and to minimize the damage expected from this; In this context, we can only refer to the testimonies of the investigators of YLP Kedem, who testified before me.
196. As for the mental element, the definition of the offense quoted above indicates that this is an offense that requires not only criminal thought (i.e., awareness) but also a special goal, which is "the intention to prevent or thwart a judicial proceeding or to bring about a miscarriage of justice." On the level of the mental element, we are therefore dealing with a "purposeful behavioral offense" (see Y. Kedmi, On Criminal Law - The Penal Law (Part Three, 5766-2006), at p.  1577).  In the circumstances of this case, as detailed so far - and in the case of a veteran policewoman, who was also an investigator in the past - the transfer of information from within the police systems formulates such a goal.  This is even if the defendant's main purpose in her actions was another purpose, for the purpose of "dangerous play" - whether out of curiosity, in order to examine whether she would be caught, or out of a desire to impress Yossi, to please him, or the like (such a situation is sometimes referred to as a "double goal").
197. Moreover, the multiplicity of the tests, their frequency, their nature, and the nature of the factors to which the information was transferred, remove any doubt as to the fulfillment of the required goal in the defendant's heart. In these circumstances, it is clear that this is not a mistake in good faith on the part of the defendant, or a momentary or one-time stumble, but rather a systematic and ongoing activity on her part, over time.  It should also be noted here that many years ago, it was ruled, in a binding precedent, that the expectation rule also applies specifically to the offense of obstruction of justice (Criminal Appeals Authority 7153/99 Elgad v.  State of Israel, IsrSC 55 (5) 729, 752-753 (2001)).  Hence, even if it were possible to accept the defendant's claim that she did not intend to disrupt the investigations in the case of Yossi and his accomplices, her responsibility for the offense would have been formed in the expectation of such disruption with a near certainty of probability;Either way, the commission of the offense by the defendant was proven as required.

• The second charge (the incident of Yossi's interrogation in the assault case):

198. The second charge concerned the defendant's actions on April 5, 2021, in the late evening. As the digital evidence shows, the defendant contacted her friend, OfficerLynn Terno, and corresponded with her.  As you may recall, the defendant told Lynn that Yossi was with her and was summoned the next day for interrogation in the Ayalon area and "I wanted to find out what it was about because the next day we were skydiving." The defendant asked to find out the contact details of the investigators on duty, including Sivan Sabag, and Lin sent them to her.
199. The defendant then called Sivan and asked her to conduct an investigation into Yossi's case. However, Sivan was questioned about this matter a few months later, and in light of the nature of the matter, it is not surprising that Sivan had difficulty remembering the details of the case.  In fact, all Sivan said was that the defendant asked her to check a person according to her ID number.  The digital evidence does prove that Sivan examined Yossi and the victim in the assault case at the same time.  However, Sivan herself could not remember the details of the case, even though she clarified that she conducts checks only according to requests from police officers who contact her about information they need in order to fulfill their duties.
200. The defendant's aforesaid actions constitute an offense of fraud and breach of trust, since the defendant took advantage of her position as a police officer in conducting the conversations on the aforementioned date with Lynn and Sivan, which were not needed in the performance of her duties and were in any case not intended to fulfill the public interest that she was entrusted with fulfilling. Moreover, the defendant did not provide Sivan with the reason for her contact with her, and thus acted in a conflict of interest with her role as a police officer, who is supposed to use police information solely for the purpose of promoting law enforcement, and caused Sivan to perform tests that were not required for the needs of the police.  It should be argued that the very fact of contacting Sivan in the aforementioned circumstances was also a misrepresentation towards Sivan, since, as the latter clarified, in the framework of her duties, she acts according to requests from police officers to obtain information that they need for the purpose of fulfilling their duties.
201. However, in the facts of the second indictment, it is also claimed that the defendant gave Yossi the information she received, including regarding the suspicion attributed to him and its nature, and that everything is transferred to his interrogation the next day, and for this reason she was also charged with the offense of obstruction of justice. The problem is that no direct evidence was brought before me for these additional claims.  The defendant, for her part, claimed that Yossi knew very well what he was going to be interrogated about and that she should not have told him anything.  This argument seems difficult on the face of it, for if this were the case, there would be no reason for the defendant to conduct all the inquiries, which are unnecessary according to her opinion, and all late in the evening.
202. Moreover, the totality of the circumstances of the case, and in particular Yossi's presence at the defendant's home at the time and the things she wrote to Lynn as stated above, indicate circumstantially that the defendant did indeed give the information she received from Sivan to Yossi. Thus, it would indeed have been appropriate to determine if a decision had been made in accordance with the evidentiary test of the balance of probabilities, which is customary in civil law.  However, we are dealing here with criminal law, and the degree of proof required of the prosecution is beyond a reasonable doubt.  In view of this required amount of proof, it appears that the accuser did not prove the transfer of the information that the defendant received in this charge to Yossi; and in any case she did not prove the commission of the offense of obstruction of justice on this charge.  The defendant is therefore acquitted of this offense.

• The third charge (the accident):

203. The third charge concerned the defendant's actions against the background of the car accident in which Yossi and Tal Mizrahi were involved. In this incident, the defendant took advantage of her status as a police officer, and the access she had to the police's databases, to pass on information to Yossi about the investigation that had been opened following the accident.  The defendant did not suffice with transferring the details of the investigation file, but also transferred investigative materials from the file, as detailed in the facts of the third indictment.  In other words, the defendant abused the authorization she had in the PLA Traffic system, which allowed her to enter the investigation file itself, photographed investigative materials and passed them on to Yossi, all while conducting the investigation.
204. The facts of this indictment were unequivocally proven by the digital evidence, as we saw in the review above, and all the defendant had to say in this context was that in this case Yossi dealt with the so-called "in a more personal manner" (see paragraph 107 above). It seems that there is almost no need to say that the transfer of investigative materials to the suspect, during an ongoing investigation, constitutes a clear disruption of the investigation.  It is therefore clear that in this case it was proven not only that the offense of fraud and breach of trust was committed, but also that the offense of obstruction of justice was proven.

• The fourth charge (the weapons license incident):

205. The fourth charge concerned the information that the defendant transferred to Yossi - which she extracted from the police databases - including the list of Yehezkel's weapons licenses, as well as the means of communication and demographic information about him. The defendant photographed the information, from the police computers, using her mobile phone and passed the footage to Yossi via text message.  The facts of this incident are not in dispute at all, especially since they are well documented in the digital evidence, when as recalled, all the defendant claimed was that she passed the information to Yossi against the background of small talk following watching a movie together and Yossi's questions regarding the way weapons were registered with the police in light of his interest in weapons.
206. We have already noted that police databases are not a tool for social games or amusement, all the more so when it comes to a sensitive matter such as firearms licenses. It is therefore clear that the defendant committed the offense of fraud and breach of trust in her aforementioned conduct.  This is even without addressing the perplexity that arises due to the fact that information about the owner of a weapon was transferred specifically to Yossi - who at the time was suspected of arms trafficking offenses, and when the defendant even gave him a screenshot that included, among other things, the case that was opened in his case on suspicion of illegally purchasing or possessing weapons.
207. In the fourth charge, the defendant was also charged with an offense of confidentiality, under the provisions of section 16 of the Protection of Privacy This offense states, in the relevant part of our case, as follows: "A person shall not disclose personal information that has come to him by virtue of his position as an employee, manager or holder of a database, except for the purpose of performing his work...".  It is plain that the transfer of information from police databases for the purposes of play or amusement is not the transfer of it for the purpose of fulfilling the function, and on the face of it, it is capable of formulating the elements of the offense.  It is also important to emphasize here that this is not a mere transfer of information about the existence of a firearms license, since the defendant also transferred to Yossi Yehezkel's means of communication and demographic information, i.e., the defendant transferred personal information that enables contact with Yehezkel or to trace him, hence the violation of privacy.

• The fifth charge (the incident of the report):

208. Finally, the fifth charge concerns the incident of the report, which in terms of the schedule is the first of the events in the indictment. There is ample evidence of this incident, not only in the body camera video of Sergeant Kadosh and the text message sent to him by the defendant, but also in the testimonies of the police officers and volunteers who testified before me and the evidence submitted in connection with their testimonies.  There is therefore no doubt that the defendant tried to interfere in the work of the volunteers and the policemen, all in the testimonies of Sergeant Kadosh and the other relevant witnesses, and to bring about the cancellation of the registration of the report to Yossi.
209. The defendant acted, in this incident as well, outside the framework of her role as a police officer. The defendant sought to help Yossi and prevent the registration of the report against him.  Thus, not only did the defendant refrain from acting in a manner that fulfilled the public interest, which she was entrusted with fulfilling as a police officer, but she acted while abusing her status as a police officer - a status that allowed her access to volunteers and police officers at the event.  It is therefore clear that in her actions, which are the subject of the report, the defendant violated her duty of loyalty to the public and even acted in a conflict of interest with her role as a police officer.  The offense of fraud and breach of trust, in which the defendant was charged with this charge, was therefore proven to be deemed and required.
210. Conclusion:
211. Therefore, and in light of all that has been collected, I determine that the facts of the indictment have been proven before me to the extent required in a criminal trial, and that the defendant's sentence is to be convicted of the offenses of which she was accused.

This is with the exception of the offense of obstruction of justice in the second charge, in respect of which reasonable doubt arises on the factual level.  From this provider, the defendant is entitled to benefit, and therefore the defendant is entitled to be acquitted of this offense on the second charge.