Caselaw

Civil Appeal Authority 775/11 Avraham Flexer v. State of Israel – Israel Police - part 10

August 11, 2014
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  1. On the other hand, Shai argues that in contrast to the manner in which a notice of recognition of the immunity of a civil servant is examined, an application for recognition of immunity by a public authority should not be examined according to the tests of administrative law. According to her, the Ordinance created an explicit distinction between the mechanisms for recognizing immunity that pertain to each of these two groups of employees, and in the case of employees of public authorities, it was determined that it was the court, and not the public authority, that would determine whether the conditions of immunity were met, based on an application submitted to it by the public authority or by the defendant employee.  Therefore, according to its approach, content should be cast for this distinction, whereas if it is determined that the recognition of the immunity of employees of public authorities will also be examined in accordance with the rules of administrative law, this will negate the distinction made by the legislature between them.  In addition, Shai argues that insofar as the application for recognition of immunity is submitted by the employee according to the Section 7C The Ordinance does not have an administrative decision that can be examined in accordance with the rules of administrative law.  Shai further claims that the municipality's recognition of Adv. Gordon's immunity was done in a conflict of interest, since the municipality was represented by Adv. Eliaz of its legal counsel department, who was subordinate to Adv. Gordon, and she further argues that this highlights the reason why the legislature distinguished between civil servants and employees of public authorities.  According to Shai, the opinion of the legal advisor to the Haifa Municipality, which was submitted for the first time before this court, cannot cure the flaw in the municipality's actions in the previous courts.  In addition, Shai claims that the application for recognition of immunity submitted by Adv. Gordon to the Magistrate's Court was filed about ten months after the statement of claim was served on her and was formulated as a motion for summary dismissal according to Civil Procedure Regulations and not as an application for recognition of immunity under The Torts Ordinance.  It further argues that just as the court is entitled in appropriate cases to rule on applications in civil proceedings without holding a hearing and without interrogating declarants, so too can it be done in a decision on a request for recognition of immunity.  Finally, Shai argues that the application does not raise a legal question of general importance that justifies granting permission to appeal an interim decision "in a third incarnation."

The Attorney General's Position

  1. The Attorney General, who appeared before the Civil Appeals Authority 775/11 in his arguments relating to the process of recognizing an employee's immunity Public Authority that the legislature did distinguish between this procedure and the process of recognizing the matter of a civil servant

 

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