and in the references therein), and it is possible that this explains the fact that for many years this normative change in the responsibility of the state has not been accompanied by a real change in the scope of the responsibility of public servants, even though this is ostensibly necessary as a result. Thus, in the fifty-three years that have elapsed since the enactment of the Civil Torts Law until the enactment of Amendment 10 to the Ordinance, parallel liability has been imposed on both a public servant who caused damage in his wrongdoing and on the state or public authority in which he was employed, insofar as they are liable for the tort he committed (Kalhora and Radenstein, at p. 301; Dotan, at pp. 251-257; Gilad, Part Two, at p. 88; Civil Appeal 915/91 State of Israel v. Levy, IsrSC 48(3) 45, 70 (1994); and see also Aharon Barak, Law of Torts - General Torts 407-411 (Gad Tedeschi, ed., 2nd ed., 1976) (hereinafter: the Law of Torts)). A similar legal situation prevails to this day in England and Canada, where responsibility is imposed on the state and public authorities in parallel with the liability imposed on the employee (Kalhora and Radenstein, at pp. 333-335; Avnieli, at p. 455). In imposing the parallel liability as aforesaid, the courts in Israel relied on the provision of section 11 of the Ordinance, which states that where two wrongdoers are jointly liable, the two can be sued jointly and severally. Therefore, and according to the legal situation prior to Amendment 10 to the Ordinance, the choice of whether to sue the employee, the authority, or both of them was exclusively in the hands of the injured party. Naturally, and because, as a rule, the capacity of the state and the other public authorities to repay is higher than that of the employee, It can be assumed that a rational plaintiff who was interested in receiving the relief that would improve his damage would prefer to sue the governmental authority first and foremost, and in some cases he might even be satisfied with this and would not see the need to sue the employee personally. However, the legal situation that prevailed prior to Amendment No. 10 left the choice in this matter in the hands of the injured party and on the substantive level, and according to the provision of section 7(a) of the Ordinance, as drafted prior to the amendment, the rule was a rule of personal liability that applies to the employee for the wrongs he committed in the course of performing his duties, and the exception was the granting of a certain immunity when the conditions set out in the end of that section are met.