The truth must be told - the wording of Section 7b(c) The Ordinance is not sufficiently clear on this matter, but the explanatory notes as well as the nature and nature of the decision being attacked (by the plaintiff or by the employee, as the case may be) give us the obvious conclusion that the rules of the law that must be applied with respect to applications according to Section 7b(c) and7B(d) The Ordinance has the rules of administrative law according to which administrative decisions are examined as usual. One of the basic rules in administrative law for judicial review of administrative decisions is that the court does not replace the discretion of the administrative authority with its own discretion and does not examine the wisdom of the decision. As part of the judicial review, he must examine the legality and reasonableness of the decision, in accordance with the grounds for intervention recognized in administrative law (High Court of Justice 11087/05 The General Cooperative Workers' Company in Eretz Yisrael in a Tax Appeal v. the State of Israel, [Published in Nevo] Verse 13
(21.8.2012); Dafna Barak-Erez, Administrative Law at 620-625 (2010)). What emerges from the above is that in considering applications under sections 7b(c) and 7b(d) of the Ordinance, he must conduct judicial review of the state's decision to recognize or not recognize the employee's immunity, while applying the rules of administrative law that apply in this matter. Thus, in my opinion, the authority given to the court in those sections to examine the issue of the fulfillment of the immunity conditions should be interpreted. This is for the reasons detailed above. I will add to them and note that another interpretation that adopts Flexer's position on the matter of the "preliminary clarification test", according to which the court hearing these motions is required to conduct a process of clarification of the evidence regarding the fulfillment of the conditions of immunity, constitutes a disregard for the decision of the Attorney General and the weight that the legislature attributed to this decision in accordance with section 7b(b) of the Ordinance, and it is inconsistent with the authority granted to the state in the first instance to recognize or not recognize such immunity. Indeed, there is no point and no purpose in granting the state the authority to recognize immunity and to determine that its decision obligates the court to dismiss the claim against the employee (section 7b(b) of the Ordinance), if whenever the plaintiff (or the employee in the event that the state decides not to recognize immunity), the court will have to reconsider the fulfillment of the conditions of immunity from the outset.