in this approach. The outline in which Flexer sought to discuss the application was necessarily derived from his approach regarding its essence, and therefore he petitioned to attach to his request affidavits of witnesses on his behalf and to invite about 12 witnesses who refused to give him an affidavit, all in order to clarify on the merits of the matter the fulfillment of the conditions of immunity in the present case. Flexer's request was rightly not granted by the trial court. The court was also of the opinion that the judicial review in the present case does not require factual clarification and does not require an oral hearing, in view of its impression of reading the state's response that there was no defect in its judgment and that it was not found that its statement was unreasonable. This decision does not justify intervening in the circumstances of the case at hand, in which both parties relied in fact on the investigation file, the contents of which were not controversial.
The Registrar's Authority
- Another argument raised by Flexer in his arguments relates to the substantive authority of the Registrar (as he was then called) A. Zamir to be required to rule on applications according to Sections 7b(c) or 7B(d) to the command. The provisions of the Ordinance and the Regulations do indeed relate to the "court" and do not explicitly refer to the registrars or registrars who are judges as those who are also authorized to hear these requests. However, it appears that in this matter as well, it is possible to draw an inference from the ordinary civil procedures to the procedures that must be applied in applications on the subject of immunity under the Ordinance and the Torts Regulations.
Regulation 101 The Civil Procedure Regulations authorize a registrar who is a judge to dismiss a claim in limine due to the existence of an act of court, due to lack of authority, or because "Any other reason according to which he believes that the claim regarding that defendant can be dismissed in the first place." Granting this power to a registrar who is a judge, as opposed to a registrar who is not a judge who has only been authorized Delete Claim in limine (according to the reasons listed In Regulation 100 To the Civil Procedure Regulations), clarifies that the subordinate legislator considered the registrar to be a judge as the appropriate person to decide the existence of a threshold ground, even when his decision has a significant outcome in view of the act of the court that is created in the event of the dismissal of the claim. The weight of such a decision is certainly not less than the weight of the decisions required in a plaintiff's application according to Section 7b(c) by order or at the request of an employee according to Section 7B(d) to the Ordinance (see and compare the decision of Judge (as he was then called) A. Grunis in this case of May 11, 2009). Therefore, I see no justification for interpreting the Ordinance and the Regulations in a manner that