With regard to the arbitrator's decision that the sums due to the Applicant in respect of pension deposits should be deducted from the sums that the Respondent overpaid him, we did not find that a miscarriage of law was caused that justified our intervention, in light of the circumstances of the case, the Applicant's severe conduct in conducting the proceeding, the amount in question is a minimal percentage of the amount of the claim, and since in any case it is not a deduction from sums that were due to the Applicant in law, but rather from sums that were overpaid to him due to a mistake (according to the arbitrator's decision). and that the arbitrator could have similarly ordered their return to the respondent (in light of the counterclaim).
As to the Applicant's argument, which he raised for the first time in the course of the evidentiary hearing and in the summaries he submitted to the Tribunal, that the part of the deposits that the Respondent allegedly made was never transferred to him, this is a new argument that does not arise at all from the arbitration award. More than necessary, this is a clear appellate argument relating to the facts, which should not be discussed in the framework of a motion to set aside an arbitration award.
- Even with regard to the disciplinary proceeding and the fine imposed on the applicant, we did not find it appropriate to intervene and annul the arbitrator's decision. The disciplinary process of players is a subject unique to the field of sports and is within the area of the arbitrator's expertise. The same applies to the fine imposed on the applicant - imposing fines for disciplinary violations is an accepted practice in the various sports, and questions relating to the imposition of the fine itself, its amount, the circumstances justifying its imposition, the procedure preceding it, etc., are within the area of expertise of the arbitration institutions of the sports associations.
As to the question of whether the Respondent could have withheld the Applicant's salary due to the same fine in accordance with the provisions set forth in section 25(a) of the Wages Protection Law, which deals with "deductions from wages" (as opposed to submitting a demand for payment to the Applicant separately from the payment of his regular salary on time), this question is indeed within the scope of the jurisdiction and expertise of the Labor Court, but we found that this is not the case to discuss this question. For in the circumstances of our case, the applicant was not caused a miscarriage of justice that justifies our intervention. After examining the circumstances of the case, we have reached the conclusion that even if we had discussed this question, and even if we had reached the conclusion that this case did not fall within the scope of the cases listed in section 25(a) of the Wages Protection Law, and that the Respondent should have imposed on the Applicant only a forward-looking fine, there would have been no miscarriage of justice, since at the time of the termination of the employment relationship, the Respondent was entitled to deduct this amount from the Applicant's last salary. If he had not paid the fine earlier, in accordance with section 25(b) of the Wages Protection Law, which states that "if an employee ceases to work for the employer, the employer may deduct from the employee's last salary any balance of debt that the employee owes him, including advances."