(1) the damage that will be caused to the applicant if the temporary relief is not granted, as opposed to the damage that will be caused to the respondent if the interim relief is granted, as well as damage that may be caused to the holder or another person;
(2) If the application was submitted in good faith and the provision of relief is just and proper in the circumstances of the case, and does not harm to a greater extent than is required.
- Thus, in accordance with the provisions of the law and case law, in the framework of an application for interim relief, the court must consider the existence of prima facie reliable evidence and the balance of convenience between the parties, where there is a relationship between these considerations known as the "parallel of powers", according to which the more the court is impressed that the chances of the proceeding are high, it will tend to reduce the importance of the existence of a balance of convenience in favor of the person seeking the relief, and vice versa (see and compare: Civil Appeal Authority 8716/15 Maimon v. Reiter (December 28, 2015). In paragraph 23; Civil Appeal Authority 2397/06 Abergil v. Israel Lands Administration, Civil Case District (August 6, 2006), at paragraph 8; Civil Appeal Authority 6994/00 Mercantile Discount Bank in Tax Appeal v. Amar, IsrSC 56(1) 529, 533 (2001)).
- Indeed, the main function of the interim remedies is to ensure the preservation of the status quo, until a decision is made on the main claim, lest the defendant abuse the interim period (see: Civil Appeal 732/80 Arens v. "Beit El - Zichron Yaakov", IsrSC 38(2) 645, 652 (1984); Civil Appeal Authority 10076/07 Israel Discount Bank in Tax Appeal v. ICC Industries Lnc (November 28, 2007), at paragraph 6). However, case law recognized exceptional situations in which the court would grant temporary relief that would change the existing situation (Uri Goren, Civil Procedure Issues 909 (Eleventh Edition, 2013); Civil Appeal 213/64 Braz v. Water Commissioner, IsrSC 18(3) 647, 653-654 (1964)).
- I will also refer to the provision of Section 11(a) of the Sports Law, 5748-1988, which deals with the internal judicial institutions of the Association, according to which:
The exclusive authority to discuss and decide matters related to activity within the framework of an association or association will be in the hands of the internal judicial institutions set out in the bylaws under section 10, and in accordance with the provisions set out in the bylaws under that section; The decisions of the highest internal court in disciplinary matters shall be final and shall not be appealed before a court.
- There is no dispute between the parties, and as is well known, this provision of the law has been interpreted more than once in case law in a manner that recognizes the intervention of this court in the decisions of the Association's internal judicial institutions, however, this intervention will be sparingly and in exceptional cases, where serious flaws are found in the proper conduct of the proceedings, such as, for example, deviation from authority or violation of the rules of natural justice (see and compare: Opening Stimulus (Tel Aviv District) 661/03 Hapoel Kfar Saba Sports Association (R.A.) v. Israel Football Association (April 14, 2005), at p. 16; Opening Motion (Tel Aviv District) 37631-08-16 Ashdod Association A Cricket Club v. Israel Cricket Association et al . (September 9, 2017), para. 6; Opening Motion (Tel Aviv District) 4797-05-17 Maccabi Dalit Alcarmel v. Football in Israel et al. (May 4, 2017); Opening Motion (Tel Aviv District) 65322-11-17 Eliniv Barda v. Supreme Court of the Israel Football Association (January 10, 2018), at p.
- In our case, after reviewing the arguments of the parties and hearing their arguments orally, I am of the opinion that temporary relief should be granted and that the applicant should be allowed to participate in the National League of the Association until the main claim is decided.
- I am aware that this is a temporary relief that corresponds to what was requested in the main action, however, it has already been ruled that the "identity of the relief" is no longer one of the circumstances that the court must take into account in granting a temporary injunction; and if it is convinced that from the standpoint of the substantive law, the applicant has a prima facie well-founded cause, and that the balance of convenience is clearly tilted in his favor, the identity of the interim relief to the relief sought in the action alone does not justify refraining from granting the interim relief (see: Civil Appeal Authority 2059/98 Volta Land Stabilization inTax Appeal v. R.S. Mediterranean Ltd., IsrSC 52(4) 721 (1998), at p. 732; See also: Civil Appeals Authority 9213/12 Noga Channel in Tax Appeal v. Israel 10 - Broadcasts of the New Channel inTax Appeal (January 20, 2013); Civil Appeal Authority 2430/91 Tiv Tirat Tzvi, Registered Partnership of Kibbutz Tirat Tzvi, Emek Beit She'an v. Delicacy of the Mall, IsrSC 45(4) 225 (1991).
To this, as stated above, it should be added that the exceptional circumstances in our case, which will be detailed below, justify the granting of this relief.
- To this, it should be added that I have found that the requested remedy of prohibiting the activity of the National League until the action is decided is disproportionate, which is capable of harming all the teams in the National League, and even the teams in the National League, while another remedy whereby the Applicant will be able to start the season in the National League and subsequently move to the National League, apparently, is not applicable according to section 13(a) of the Basic Regulations.
- As to the existence of prima facie reliable evidence for the cause of action, I am of the opinion that the Applicant has shown the existence of such evidence.
First, the application and even the lawsuit raise important issues of violation of constitutional rights, and it is clear that there will be room to examine whether the denial of the applicant's right to register in the National League was indeed done lawfully and in accordance with the regulations of the Women's League and does not constitute a violation of constitutional rights. This is against the background of the Applicant's claim that the decision of the Association and the Tribunal is inconsistent with what is stated in the Regulations.