According to Section 2 of the Arbitration Institute's Regulations, the obligation to litigate before the Arbitration Institution applies to all teams, players and coaches from all leagues, as well as to any official as defined in the "Budget Control Regulations".
The term "functionary" is defined in the budget control regulations as: a manager, a team manager, a masseuse doctor, a physiotherapist, a waitress, and any other salary recipient of any kind (except for a player and a coach).
In order to examine the applicability of the law to the respondent, the following questions must be addressed:
- Whether the Respondent is a functionary, as defined in the Association's bylaws, and whether the Arbitration Institute's bylaws apply to him.
- What is the relevant date on which the respondent must serve as a functionary in order to enter the framework of the law?
The respondent served as a trustee in the stay of proceedings of the group, and this position certainly grants the respondent the status of an 'officer', as this term is defined in the law, since the trustee who was appointed to the group is supposed to step into the shoes of the group manager and be responsible for the group, in accordance with the provision of section 4B. A2 to the settings file. In light of this, the Respondent is considered to be an official under Section 2 of the Arbitration Institution's Regulations.
The second question that must be answered is the question of the exact date. I am of the opinion that the determining date for the purpose of examining the status of the respondent in order to apply the law to him is the date on which the cause of action arose.
If so, the question that arises is whether the respondent served as an 'officer' at the time the cause of action arose.
It seems to me that the answer to this question is in the negative.
In our case, the date on which the cause of action arose was the date of the radio broadcast on which things were said that constituted defamation, and which took place on May 19, 2012. The parties disagree as to the last date on which the respondent served as a trustee for a stay of proceedings for the group. On the one hand, the respondent claims that he terminated his position as trustee in February 2012 pursuant to a judicial decision of the Nazareth District Court, which brought his position as trustee to an end within 21 days from the date of the decision. On the other hand, the Applicant argues that the Respondent served as a trustee until June 2012, in accordance with the Association's records. In order to prove his claim regarding the date of termination of the Respondent's position as trustee of the stay of proceedings, the Applicant attached an article that was published on May 18, 2012, in which it was written that the Respondent had resigned from his position. From this the Applicant learns that the Respondent was still in his position as a trustee until 18 May 2012.