See also Assaf's article at length Harel, "A dual body as a handiwork of the legislator - braai Sports Law, Retrial - 1988", Alei Mishpat 9 5771, Pp. 419, 435-440.
- As part of the management of the soccer industry, and in continuation of the provisions of Section 10 of the Sports Law, the Association amended the "Registration Regulations of the Football Association" (the "Regulations") as well as the "Regulations of the Supreme Court of the Football Association" (hereinafter: the "Rules of the Tribunal") and established its institutions such as the "Foundation" and the "Tribunal" as stated above.
- Section 11(a) of the Sports Law states as follows:
11 (a) The exclusive authority to discuss and decide matters relating to activity within the framework of an association or association shall be in the hands of the internal judicial institutions set forth in the Articles of Association under Section 10, and in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Articles of Association under that Section; the decisions of the highest internal court in matters of discipline shall be final and shall not be appealed before a court.
- The court interpreted the provision of section 11 of the Sports Law as one whose purpose is to create a system for quick and efficient resolution of disputes unique to the field of sports, given the nature of this field as a dynamic field in which decisions are required to be made at an urgent and rapid pace, see Civil Appeal 180/07 Katz v. Israel Basketball Association, published in Nevo (2009), paragraph 13, Civil Appeal Authority 2186/12 Amar Malikson, published in Nevo, May 20, 2013. In accordance with this purpose, the case law determined that the internal judicial procedures of the sports associations should be exhausted, given their specific expertise both in the needs of the members of the sports association and in the various management needs of the members of the association. In this regard, see Civil Appeal 436/90 Israel Basketball Association v. LBN. For the promotion of women's basketball, published in Nevo, given on June 22, 1990, in paragraph 5 (hereinafter: "the LBN case"):
"It has already been determined more than once regarding voluntary bodies that when they have an internal judicial mechanism, it is appropriate to exhaust those internal judicial proceedings. This is appropriate, both because this is what these voluntary bodies have determined, when everyone who joins them knows and accepts the instructions regarding internal jurisdiction, and because the judicial institutions of these bodies have the knowledge and expertise related to the activities of those bodies. Thus in our case: there is no doubt that the judges in the court have the knowledge and experience relating to the operation of the association and its affiliated associations, knowledge and experience that can assist in making the appropriate decisions".
- It was also held in the case of L.B.N. Because in certain cases, and even though there is an internal judicial system in voluntary bodies, the court can intervene in the decisions of that body, if there is justification for doing so: "Here is the place to emphasize that despite the tendency not to intervene in matters in which there is an internal judicial arrangement in voluntary bodies... Even after the court's decision, the path to the court is not blocked in those cases where the court's intervention is appropriate. Only explicit words by the legislature can rule out such intervention by the court in the decisions of the tribunals of voluntary bodies. Section 11 of the Sports Law also contains a clear hint that such intervention was not denied by the law in our case. The end of the section states that "the decisions of the highest internal court in matters of discipline shall be final and shall not be appealed to a court." This language includes the denial of the authority to adjudicate disciplinary matters that have been finally decided by the Association's judicial institutions. However, since the legislature has determined only with respect to decisions in disciplinary matters, which cannot be appealed before the court, it can be understood from this that in other matters the decisions of the highest court of the association are not immune, in appropriate cases, from the intervention of the court." (ibid., at para. 7).
- By virtue of the rule that the internal judicial proceedings of the voluntary bodies must be exhausted, it was determined in case law that the law will intervene in the decisions of internal judicial instances in limited and defined cases of deviation from authority or violation of the principles of natural justice, as well as in other exceptional cases, see Civil Appeal 2211/96 Cohen v. Cohen, IsrSC 50(1) 629, at p. 635, by the Honorable Justice Cheshin:
"It has long been established that a court will not intervene in the decisions of internal tribunals of voluntary associations, except in defined and limited cases that fall within the framework of these categories: one, where an internal tribunal exceeded its authority, and two, where a tribunal violated the principles of natural justice. However, the courts refused to include themselves in these two limited grounds, emphasizing that there may be additional cases in which the court may consider interfering with the decision of an internal tribunal. These additional cases are nameless - one case will not resemble the other - but everyone agrees that these are exceptions to the rule of non-intervention".
- See also Civil Appeal 7162/06 Stern v. Egged Cooperative Association for Transportation in Israel in a Tax Appeal published in Nevo, given on February 17, 2008, paragraph 20:
"It can be summarized and said that according to the traditional approach, the court will not intervene in the decisions of internal tribunals of voluntary organizations, except in exceptional cases. The typical cases in which the court will intervene will be a deviation from its authority and a violation of the rules of natural justice. Additional exceptional cases cannot be defined in advance, and they will be determined from case to case. At the same time, it is clear that the rule is non-intervention, while intervention is the exception."
- In an even later ruling, for example, other municipal applications 2129/19 Truiman v. Likud National Liberal Movement (December 24, 2019, published in Nevo), where it was held (paragraph 7, by the Honorable Justice Amit, hereinafter, the Troiman case):
"A long-standing rule with us is that the intervention of the courts in the decisions of internal tribunals of voluntary bodies is limited and reserved for exceptional cases.... The court must examine the procedural and normative-substantive aspects of the decision, and the court will intervene, if the decision is contrary to the law or the party's bylaws or constitution, while deviating authority, when it contradicts the principles of natural justice, or a decision made in bad faith, unreasonableness, or contrary to public policy. These are the grounds for criticism, and to them must be added intervention in the level and reasonableness of the punishment - the Agent case above, as well as other cases in which the court will also see fit to intervene."