In order to address the explanatory notes to the relevant sections of the Sports Bill, 5747-1987, Bills 5747, 271, 274, he added that:
"The reference is in particular to the issue of discipline, and it seems that as a rule, the rest of the matters of the regulations should be read in this context, and in any case with regard to the core of the contractual relationship between the relevant parties, a player and a team. The same is true of the wind blowing from Section 2 of the Statutes of the Arbitration Institute of the Basketball Association, which deals with arbitration issues, which is clearly - according to most of its clauses - a "contractual spirit". I do not believe that torts in general should have been part of this whole from the outset, and the addition from 2002 to the 1989 Regulations that excluded bodily injury from arbitration (section 9) was a step in the right direction, although not complete in my opinion. However, I am afraid that it implies, indeed, that what is not bodily injury is not excluded, and this distills itself - as my colleague says - also into the sweeping expression "any dispute", which appears as the good hand of the drafters in the preamble to all the paragraphs of section 2 of the Regulations, and which makes it possible to read into the contractual relationship their tortious derivatives that are not personal injury. I am not satisfied with this, but this is apparently the current legal situation."
With regard to the court's words related to the broad interpretation granted to the authority of the internal judicial institutions of the sports associations, on the grounds that these bodies "know better than any judicial body what the needs of their members are and how their affairs should be managed", the Honorable Justice Rubinstein remarked that "the decisive statutory reference to the arbitration proceedings not only violates the freedom of recourse to the courts, and therefore in my opinion the interpretation should not be overly broadened. However, it also denies the litigant - and in fact the litigants - the possibility of appeal, except on the grounds inthe Arbitration Law." He also added that the arbitrator's exemption from reasoning his decision and the finality of his rulings justify "great caution in the expansive trend of piety in transferring to arbitration";"I will add to this a warning sign, to which I will return, regarding the arbitrators' expertise in tort matters, which must be verified."
- Finally, Justice Rubinstein explains why he nevertheless joined Justice Danziger's position:
"This is rooted in a review of the statement of claim submitted by the Applicant to the Magistrate's Court, which includes a variety of claims, the basis and core of which are on the contractual level, and the tort causes derive from the contractual context. Therefore, in terms of the existing law according to the Regulations, when the claim is not defined as a personal injury claim even if it is tangential to it, when the alleged breach of the insurance duty originates in the very contractual relationship of the applicant with the defendants or any of them, where the alleged negligence is related to the failure to arrange insurance, and so on - the referral to binding arbitration is obligatory" and "when the subject of the torts is not invalidated in the claim, Its roots lie in the contractual relations as aforesaid."