Discussion and Decision
- The main questions, then, are, does Israeli law grant a court hearing an application under the Searches Ordinance the authority to issue an order directed to a foreign entity that is not in Israel and is not subject to Israeli law, to freeze an account that is not in Israel? Does the "voluntary" response of the foreign entity to the Israeli police's early application to freeze the account grant local authority in Israel to continue its seizure? And does Israeli law give the Israel Police the authority to contact such a foreign entity and ask it to freeze ("voluntarily") an account under its control, without the approval of the foreign state authorities, and in fact without their knowledge?
- Even before I address this matter, I will remove from the agenda the claim that this is a virtual activity on the Internet, which is not located in a specific geographical location, and therefore can be viewed as an asset located in Israel, over which it has territorial authority. Regarding the location of a digital object, there are faces here and there (both from a legal and technological perspective), but in my view, the question being examined is not the location of the object that is sought to be seized, but rather its location and subordination to Israeli law of the foreign corporation to which the Israel Police has approached, and to which the court's order is directed. This is the case whether the corporation operates on the Internet, on a decentralized blockchain, on a decentralized and closed blockchain, or on tabs and paperwork. The essence of the matter is the Israel Police's appeal to the foreign corporation, and the subsequent issuance of the order directed at the foreign corporation, which is required through its persons who are outside of Israel and are not subject to Israeli law, to carry out actions outside of Israel, which are capable of harming a person's property, occupation and good name, and these - the issuance of the order and the application of the Israel Police - require explicit and clear authorization by law or by virtue of the law.
- From the procedural aspect, it seems that the Respondent's position in the last hearing (January 19, 2026) is sufficient to accept the appeal. The respondent's position was that her application to Tether was "voluntary", and that the order requested by the court was not an order for a "coercive act" but rather a kind of "authoritative order".
However, an examination of the order as detailed at the outset shows that it is directed directly to Tether and not to the Israel Police, which he uses explicit injunction against it ("I hereby command ... any other financial corporation"), where the order includes detailed instructions to Tether, including "freezing activity in the entire account", "seizure of any object", and providing detailed information about the account to the Israel Police.