"... We will point out more than necessary a number of criteria that may, in the appropriate circumstances, form a reasonable suspicion against a particular person, as required in accordance with the provisions of the law mentioned above, and justify conducting a search without a judicial warrant on that person's body or belongings. In this context, it is possible to point to circumstances which, only when joined to the totality, will establish a cause of action, and circumstances in each of which are sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion. Thus, inter alia, it is possible to point to the suspicious behavior of the person who is the subject of the potential search, information regarding the commission of an offense in the place where the person is located or in the vicinity of it, together with the time he is in that place. In addition, reasonable suspicion at a level that justifies conducting a search without a warrant may be formed when the police receive information about the description of a person suspected of committing a certain offense or about the area in which the suspect may be located. In such circumstances, it is possible that the information received will establish a reasonable suspicion that justifies conducting a search of a person whose external characteristics or whereabouts correspond to the information received. These criteria, of course, are not exhaustive, and it can be assumed that additional standards will be recognized in court rulings when the time comes. At the same time, we consider it necessary to note in the margins that the existence of a mere criminal record that is detached from concrete external circumstances does not in itself constitute a reasonable suspicion that authorizes a police officer to conduct a search of a person's body or belongings without a judicial order."
- Thus, the "reasonableness" of the suspicion will be examined according to objective criteria, each case according to its circumstances and based on an indefinite list of parameters, such as: the question of the existence of information regarding the commission of an offense in the place (such as a house or a vehicle); the existence of information regarding the suspect himself who intends to commit an offense; suspicious behavior of the suspect; the time of attendance; The experience and professional judgment of a police officer and more.
- As a rule, in the absence of a source of legal authority to carry out the search, the consent of the person who is the subject of the search can serve as an independent source of authority to carry out the search, and in this way authorize a search of his body, utensils or home. However, the consent of the object of the search to infringe on the autonomy given to him and to allow the violation of his privacy, in certain circumstances or towards certain people, must be a conscious and voluntary "true consent". In other words, in the absence of any other source of authority, "informed consent" on the part of the person who is the subject of the search, to his right to refuse to carry out the search, and that the refusal will not be attributed to his obligation, can serve as a source of authority for the search. For this purpose, the police officer, the search conductor, was obligated to make it clear to the person whose consent to the search is being requested that he has the right to refuse to carry out the search and that the refusal will not act in his obligation. Hence, when, in accordance with the discretion of a police officer, in suspicious circumstances that do not amount to "reasonable suspicion" or "basis to assume", consent is requested to carry out a search, and to the extent that this consent is indeed true consent on the part of the person who is the object of the search, the search can be conducted; Provided that the other conditions set forth in the law for conducting a search without a judicial order are met.
This determination is also rooted in the concept that the individual's right to autonomy allows him to waive his privacy in certain circumstances. See the judgment of the Honorable President (retired), Justice D. Beinisch on the matter Ben Haim, verse 31: