"In summary, in the absence of any other source of authority and in circumstances that justify it, a person's consent to conduct a search of his body, his belongings or his home may constitute an independent source of authority for conducting the search. In those circumstances, the consent can serve as a substitute for the requirement of reasonable suspicion of carrying a weapon, which is set forth in section 3(b) of the Powers to Maintain Public Security Law, or the requirement of a "basis to assume" that an offense has been committed, which is set forth in section 25 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance. There is no dispute that a condition for this is that that consent be a true conscious and voluntary consent. In order to ensure this, it is not enough to request the consent of the person who is the subject of the search to conduct the search, but it must be made clear to him explicitly that he has the right to refuse to carry out the search and that the refusal will not be attributed to him."
And in paragraph 23:
"With regard to the cases before us, everyone agrees that the Criminal Procedure Ordinance or any other piece of legislation does not explicitly address the question of the authority of a police officer to conduct a search of a person's body or home with his consent alone, in the absence of any other legal reason for conducting the search. It is also difficult to dispute that the very act of searching a person's body, home or belongings violates his right to privacy - even when it is a consensual search. At the same time, it must be taken into account that when it comes to seeking consent and consent is true consent (the question of the conditions required for formulating consent will be discussed by us later), the intensity of the violation of the right to privacy is very low. This is especially true in light of the close connection that we discussed above between the right to privacy and the autonomy of the individual, which the right to privacy is intended to protect; Indeed, from the same concept of the autonomy of the individual also derives the recognition of the possibility given to a person to waive his privacy in certain circumstances or towards certain persons."
- In various criminal applications 7917/19 Urich v. State of Israel (December 25, 2019) It was determined that in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, a search of a computer may not be carried out, except in cases where a search warrant has been issued. See the words of the Honorable Justice Y. Elron (paragraphs 24-25):
"We have learned that as a rule, a search of a computer should not be carried out except in cases where an appropriate search warrant has been issued; and that there are two cumulative conditions for the issuance of a search warrant on a computer, and on a smartphone in particular: first, that the search is 'necessary' in order to ensure that its findings are presented in a trial or other proceeding; The second, which is unique to requesting a search warrant on a computer, is that the purposes and terms of the search will not violate a person's privacy 'beyond what is required'. As appears from the explanatory notes to the bill in which this condition was determined, the purpose of which is to emphasize that: 'In search warrants relating to computers and computer material, the court must give special consideration to the violation of the privacy of the person seizing the computer and other parties' (Explanatory Notes to the Proposed Law to Amend the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Arrest and Search) (No. 11) (Search and Seizure of Computer Material), 5765-2005, H.H. 149).