On August 2, 2022, the defendant was interrogated for the sixth time, after consulting with the defense attorney, and again maintained his right to remain silent (P/85, P/85A).
It should be noted that during his interrogations with the police, the defendant often confronted his interrogators, shouted, cursed and cursed, and more than once went berserk and hit the walls, until the interrogators had to handcuff him.
Implications of the Defendant's Silence in His Interrogations with the Police
- The starting point with regard to the silence of a defendant during his interrogations with the police, when he is a suspect, is that the right to remain silent is reserved for him as part of his right to confidentiality from self-incrimination. Silence during a police interrogation, in itself, does not constitute positive evidence of guilt, but according to the Israeli legal system, it may strengthen the prosecution's evidence against the suspect (Criminal Appeal 2996/09 Anonymous v. State of Israel (May 11, 2011)). The rationale for this is that a person fighting for his innocence is expected to give his version when confronted with incriminating material, and the refusal to cooperate reflects incriminating behavior (Criminal Appeal 7952/15 State of Israel v. Eilon Israel Schatz (15.02.2016); Criminal Appeal 230/84 Binyamin Hagbi v. State of Israel, 39(1) 785 (March 27, 1985)). However, the court has discretion in the evidentiary weight that must be given to it, and this weight will be given with the necessary caution in view of the defendant's right to remain silent, which may stem from reasons that do not stem from incriminating behavior, such as an attempt to protect another person, and the demand to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (Criminal Appeal 8328/17 Ziad Jaber v. State of Israel (28.7.2019)).
- In his interrogations with the police, the defendant denied any connection to the shooting incident and consistently chose to remain silent whenever he was asked substantive questions regarding the shooting incident, the background of the act, and evidentiary findings that allegedly suspect him of the act. The defendant refrained from giving an explanation for the evidence presented to him, even though it was made clear to him during his interrogations that his silence would be brought before the court and might strengthen the evidence against him. In his testimony in court, the defendant claimed that he chose to remain silent during his interrogations with the police, refrained from cooperating and did not answer the many questions addressed to him because he did not trust the police officers (pp. 586, 598, 613 of Prut). I have given my attention to the defendant's statements, and I have not found in his reasons a reasonable and well-founded explanation for his consistent silence in his interrogations. Moreover, the case law has already held that the advice of a lawyer to a suspect to maintain the right to remain silent is not considered a reasonable explanation that nullifies the evidentiary weight of the silence. Therefore, the defendant's prolonged and consistent silence in his interrogations, especially when allegedly incriminating evidence was hurled at him, is credited to him, and it strengthens the accuser's evidence against him, when he chose for his reasons to religiously refrain from addressing it, despite the many opportunities given to him.
In this context, I will appeal to a criminal appeal 6731/23 Strug v. State of Israel, paragraph 17 (July 16, 2024):