The purpose of the section is to exclude from the scope of the jurisdiction of the Labor Court an action "that comes to object to the use of the powers given under this Ordinance", in matters listed in the section, against the background of the perception that due to the unique roles of the Israel Police, there are matters in which the relationship between police officers and the police should not be regarded as a "regular" employee-employer relationship, lest the "delicate and special organizational structure of the service" be undermined. IsrSC 41(2) 589 (1987)). In other words, the legislature chose to relate to decisions in connection with the exercise of the powers enumerated in section 93A, as administrative decisions and not as decisions in the framework of labor relations.
- At the same time, Section 93A does not negate the authority of the civil courts to be required to use these powers as an incidental hearing in the framework of a claim for monetary relief, and there is no impediment to the proper exercise of the power in the framework of a hearing in the civil courts, in accordance with the rules of administrative law and not in the framework of an employee-employer relationship. This, in fact, is the obvious result of the decision that the Labor Court cannot resort to these issues (The Karhili Matter).
- In addition, by its very nature Section 93A directly, in situations in which the plaintiff seeks to attack by directly attacking the administrative act and opposing it. This is not the situation in the present action. The plaintiff does not seek to cancel the administrative act, but rather to examine its outcome, against the background of his claim that he is entitled to financial compensation for the manner in which the said powers were exercised, and there is no impediment to the question of the reasonableness of the administrative decisions being examined with an indirect attack. "When a person wishes to cancel or change a decision made by a local authority, and in the absence of a special arrangement, he must apply to the Court for Administrative Affairs. The situation is different when the relief sought is monetary relief. This case should be distinguished from a case in which a remedy of cancellation or change of an administrative decision was requested..." (Civil Appeal Authority 6590/05 Ashdod Municipality v. Shimon Sarfati in Tax Appeal [Published in Nevo] (published on September 19, 2005)). This is fine, with the necessary changes, for our purposes as well. And in the Glick judgment (Civil Appeal Authority 2063/16 Rabbi Yehuda Glick v. Israel Police [Published in Nevo] (Published on January 19, 2017) - below: "The Glick Rule") It was held that when a civil (tort/monetary claim) requires, for the purpose of clarification and determination, a substantive examination of the administrative act (of its legality/reasonableness), the civil instance before which the claim was filed is substantively competent to hear the claim (separately from the jurisdiction of the administrative court, including the High Court of Justice, to hear a direct attack on that administrative act). and that "As a rule, the substantive authority follows the remedy, and when Reuven claims compensation from the administrative authority, the claim will be heard in the Magistrate's or District Court, in accordance with the amount of the claim. When the relief of an injunction is requested, the substantive authority in a direct attack is given to the Court for Administrative Affairs or to the High Court of Justice, as the case may be... In tort law, we examine, retroactively, the case of a specific injured party, and many times, in administrative law as well, the case of a specific petitioner is examined. However, in administrative (and constitutional law), the issue is sometimes examined as a petition related to the public, such as a petition that revolves around the fact that the minister did not enact regulations under a particular law, or that the minister did not fulfill his duty to consult with a particular body. The application of norms from the field of administrative law in tort law will therefore be made when a particular injured person is injured due to a specific act or omission in the exercise of the authority's authority, so that "the discourse on 'administrative right' must therefore relate to the norms of administrative law whose object is a specific individual or a defined group"... This is in contrast to the imposition of tort liability in favor of an unspecified public due to the exercise or non-exercise of the authority's authority. The reason for this is that in order to impose liability in the tort of negligence, we require "closeness" between the tortfeasor and a particular injured party, a proximity that is different from the relationship between the tortfeasor and the general public."
- In our case, this is a proceeding that revolves around the plaintiff's individual case, and it is not a proceeding with broad ramifications or a proceeding that concerns a large public or many matters. The proceeding focuses on administrative actions and omissions that were made and completed in the past, and does not seek to change administrative actions in the future. The proceeding does not (indirectly) validate anything of the law, but rather the concrete conduct of defendant 2 towards the plaintiff, when the plaintiff's alleged damage had already been consolidated at the time the claim was filed.
- It is not superfluous to add that accepting the defendants' position means splitting the hearing between the Administrative Court and the Civil Court, since the plaintiff will first be required to apply to the Court for Administrative Affairs in order to discuss the issue of placing him in a different position upon his return from sick leave, and his retirement from service, and only afterwards, and in accordance with the decision, to file a financial claim, when as stated, it is possible that it will not be possible to clarify the claim in the Court for Administrative Affairs. Since the claim may be considered a theoretical claim, taking into account the fact that no operative relief is sought in the framework of the lawsuit to cancel the decisions made by the defendants (Civil Appeal Authority 363/08) Butterfly v. Meuhedet Health Fund (published on November 23, 2009)).
- In all of the above considerations, the application is denied.
The defendants will bear the plaintiff's expenses in respect of the application in the sum of ILS 1,500, which will be paid within 30 days from today.