The Normative Framework Regarding the Jurisdiction of the Labor Courts in the Matters at Issue
- In a judgment Given inThe National Labor Court As part of a proceeding Labor Appeal 53036-03-20 David Peled - State of Israel [Posted inNevo] (dated April 12, 2021) It was clarified that in the framework of the proceeding, the Labor Court will hear matters that focus only on the monetary claim.
"We will precede the latter and note already during the hearing before us, the appellant argued, "The question of the legality of the procedure can be deleted from the statement of claim, and then we will suffice with an indirect attack. that the committee certainly has the authority to attack [indirectly] whether the procedure was followed or not, and whether this was a reason... " (p. 3, lines 1-3 of the transcript).
- It was further held that "...The proposed laws are intended to determine that the status of a police officer or prison guard is not the same as that of another salaried employee for the purposes of jurisdiction under the The Labor Court Law. The ways in which a person is employed as a police officer or as a prison guard, the conditions of his enlistment in the service, his personal liability to the public, the direct responsibility he bears towards the public and the law, the many other powers granted to him upon his enlistment, his special conditions of service, the discipline that binds him and the severe disciplinary punishment, the methods of discharge and dismissal from service – all of these are completely different from what is customary in the field of labor relations. Whether the employer is private or public."
- Due to the special nature of the roles of the police and the prison service in society, and due to the great responsibility associated with the position of a police officer or prison guard, the methods of recruitment of a police officer or prison guard, his duties, powers and significance are determined by a special law, distinct from the rest of the civil servants:
"The connection of a police officer or prison guard to the special judicial framework of the Labor Court, in matters that he may perceive as rooted in the labor relationship between him and his commanders, is liable to undermine important foundations in the delicate and special organizational structure of the service.
There is no intention to be released from the application of the Labor Court Law, except with respect to certain claims related to the special nature of the service. Other powers of the Labor Court, such as its powers regarding withholding wages and annual leave, and its powers as an appellate court against decisions under the Civil Service (Pensions) Law, and under the Discharged Soldiers (Return to Work) Law, 5719-1949, as well as in claims under the Wage Protection Law, 5718-1958, and more, shall not be detracted from them."
- The Supreme Court's ruling shows a clear trend of providing an expansive interpretation Section 93A to the order, taking into account the purpose underlying it..."Even if this leads to a split of the discussion, despite the burden inherent in this... The practical result of the decision is not simple for those who serve in the Prison Service and the police. This is because the Court for Administrative Affairs, when hearing an administrative petition – as opposed to an administrative action – is not authorized to grant monetary relief (see section 8 of the Administrative Courts Law). This restriction requires that duplication of proceedings be taken in two different systems on the way to receiving the relief, i.e., a claim for declaratory relief in the Court of Administrative Affairs regarding the legality of the dismissal, and if it is determined that there has been a defect in these cases, the filing of a claim for monetary relief in the Regional Labor Court. This result raises considerable difficulties in terms of access to judicial courts."
- The guiding judgment on the issue of the Labor Court's authority to hear the claims of prison guards was given in the Halamish case (High Court of Justice 1214/97 Halamish v. Regional Labor CourtIsrSC 35(2) 647). The High Court of Justice – with a panel of five judges – examined the authority of the Labor Court to hear a wage claim of a person who was appointed to serve as the Chief Rabbi of the Prison Service at the time, and discussed the "competition" between Article 129 to the Prisons Ordinance and Article 76 of the Courts Law, which permits a court to hear questions incidentally, and held –
"We will all agree – at least, prima facie – that Halamish's claim for wages from the state is within the scope of the Labor Court's jurisdiction. This is a claim between an employee and an employer; The cause of action originates from the employee-employer relationship, all in accordance with section 24(a)(1) of the Labor Court Law. "By the way" this lawsuit raises a question concerning the legality of Halamish's suspension, as well as a question concerning the legality of his dismissal from service. If these questions had arisen before the Labor Court as direct questions, the Labor Court would not have been able to address them. Everyone agrees on this. Hence the question – does the provision of section 76 of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version] have the power to shoulder a decision on these questions, even if they are – as "incidental questions"... (p. 657 of the judgment)
- Later in the judgment, the Honorable Judge M. Cheshin recalls that at the time, the High Court of Justice decided that the Labor Court was authorized to hear the dismissal of a female police officer because it is a matter of employee-employer relations. However, the legislature did not view this decision favorably, and this is where the provision came into the world Article 129 to the Prisons Ordinance (as well as the Section 93A to the police order). Judge Cheshin quotes at length from the explanatory notes to the bill, and states regarding the provision of the Article 129 Thus:
"The purpose of the provision is transparent and clear: to deny the authority of the Labor Court in matters of status or 'quasi-status' of a prison guard. These words arise explicitly from the incarnation of the law, and we have talked about it at length. An examination of the purpose of the law must lead us to the conclusion that the denial of the jurisdiction of the Labor Court – in matters listed in section 129(a) of the Prisons Ordinance [New Version] – is a negation of the Labor Court in its entirety, a direct denial and an indirect denial. Indeed, with regard to the purpose of the law – to keep certain issues away from the Labor Court – and for explicit and detailed reasons as we have seen, we will find it difficult to distinguish between direct and indirect attacks."
- The Honorable Justice Cheshin adds, that "We are not talking about the dichotomy of the main thing, and we will not build on it. We are talking about the purpose of the law, with the aim that the law intends to achieve. It seems to me that the interpretation of the provision of section 129(a) as permitting is the granting of indirect authority to the Labor Court (through section 76 of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version]), is capable of profoundly undermining the purpose of the arrangement established by the law." (at pp. 668-669 of the judgment in the Halamish case).
- At the end of the day, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the petition and ruled that "The Labor Court lacks jurisdiction to hear claims submitted to it. A decision on Halamish's claim – with all its grounds – requires a decision on the validity of the act of his release from service or the validity of his suspension from service, and as per the provision of section 129(a) of the Prisons Ordinance [New Version], the Labor Court lacks the authority to address these questions. ... Since the Labor Court was denied the authority to address the issue of dismissal, it was in any case deprived of its authority to appeal the decision of the medical committee as well." (671-672 of the judgment).
- In the matter Labor Dispute 30939-04-15 [so-and-so] State of Israel v., [Posted inNevo] Decision of April 28, 2015 (hereinafter - "The Derakatz Matter") מסביר The Judge Oren Segev, who has the authority to discuss the dismissal of police officers or prison guards and/or the violation of their employment conditions;
"... Well, the authority is not with the Labor Court, but with the Administrative Courts."
- In the judgment In the matter of Drektz The question was discussed, why should the labor court not hear a prison guard's claim for exposing corruption, since and Section 3 to the Workers' Protection Law (Exposure of Offenses and Violation of Integrity or Proper Administration), 5757-1997 (hereinafter: "Workers' Protection Law") states that the Labor Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear a civil proceeding due to a violation of the lawK?
- In the judgment, it was held that, in fact, two provisions of the law conflict: on the one hand, Section 129(a) to the Prisons Ordinance, which excludes an action against a decision to dismiss a prison guard or release him from service, has the authority of the labor courts, as opposed to Section 3(a) The Workers' Protection Law according to which the labor courts will have exclusive jurisdiction to hear a civil proceeding due to a violation of the lawK.
- In the judgment in the Drektz case, the Honorable Justice Segev ruled that although the Workers' Protection Law was enacted after the enactment of the Section 129(a) To the command, so The Halamish ruling indicates that we are interested in a specific statutory provision that the legislature inserted into the Ordinance against the background of court rulings, with the aim of To remove any doubt that the exclusive authority to hear the dismissal of a prison officer or the violation of their employment conditions, even if they were done in violation of the law, was vested in the administrative courts and not on the labor courts.
- The legislature did not make a diagnosis with respect to the reason for dismissal or discharge from service, but rather determined sweepingly that in all matters related to such a decision, the Court for Administrative Affairs would hear the matterM;
In addition, the Labor Court ruled in the Drektz case that according to the Halamish Rule, the Labor Courts are not authorized to hear matters in Guerra that are in the first place within the scope of their exclusive jurisdiction, when it is one of the cases specified in section 129(a) of the Ordinance: