And even then, should the torts in the Torts Ordinance [New Version] be added to the torts that are based on the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which is broadly defined and sweepingly and by way of establishing the foundations of principles and rights over basic rights?
The answer of the Honorable Justice Strasberg-Cohen in Other Municipality Applications 2781/93 Da'aka v. Haifa Carmel Hospital (hereinafter - the Da'aka case [8]), about four years ago, is that the time has not yet come for this. This question has not been resolved by the Supreme Court to this day."
- In summary, our legal system has not yet recognized a "constitutional tort" as an independent and direct cause of action that allows for awarding damages in torts. The provisions of the Basic Law are general and principled provisions, which constitute a normative standard of conduct.
- Therefore, in order to receive monetary relief for a violation of a constitutional right, the plaintiff must show an infringement in accordance with the classic torts, such as negligence or breach of a specific statutory duty, and not rely on the Basic Law per se.
- Given the above, I determine that the plaintiff has no cause of action by virtue of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In addition, the plaintiff has no cause of action by virtue of breach of statutory duty and negligence, as will be detailed below.
Breach of statutory duty and negligence.
- The plaintiff claimed that he had been blocked from accessing the defendants' Facebook accounts and that the very blocking constituted a breach of statutory duty and negligence by virtue of the Torts Ordinance.
- Although the plaintiff based his claim on a general duty of the defendants towards him, a duty that constitutes a normative standard of conduct, in order to examine the defendants' conduct, proof is required that the defendants violated a specific statutory provision that the law explicitly imposed on them.
- From a review of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff, I found no basis for the claim that the defendants violated a certain provision of the law in the Torts Ordinance, and in general. The plaintiff did not point to statutory provisions that were violated by the defendants in relation to the alleged blocking action, and in fact this is a claim that has no basis or anything to rely on.
- Therefore, I reject the plaintiff's claim that the defendants breached any statutory duty. Regarding the plaintiff's claim of negligence on the part of the defendants, this claim should be rejected. I'll explain.
- According to the plaintiff, the defendants were negligent because they did not act as a reasonable local authority and a reasonable local authority head would have done, and they should have foreseen the damage that is the result of their actions.
- According to the plaintiff, Ms. Kaplan's negligence is expressed in her mistaken understanding of her account, so that as soon as she thought that her profile was private, actions she took out of faulty thought. In this regard, the plaintiff argued in lines 9-21 on page 17 of the minutes of the hearing, the following:
"The answer is not just yes or no. Because first of all, you asked you whether the fact that she blocked a private account establishes a cause of negligence, and I am correcting. Her negligence is born out of a misunderstanding of her account, and as soon as you think the account is private, all kinds of actions you take are derived from your faulty thought, that your account is private and the account is not private."
- It seems that the plaintiff is trying to create a mayor. The plaintiff did not prove the elements of the tort of negligence in relation to any of the defendants, and the statement of claim that he filed does not specify in the minimum manner what are the elements of the tort of negligence attributed to the defendants.
- The plaintiff did not prove that Ms. Kaplan owed him a conceptual or concrete duty of care as he tried to claim, and he certainly did not prove that a "misunderstanding" or "faulty thought" justified any kind of tort compensation, and therefore his claim in this matter should be rejected.
- It has already been ruled that an error in legal interpretation or a "misunderstanding" of the state of affairs, insofar as it is not accompanied by a breach of a concrete duty of care recognized by law, does not establish a cause of negligence. The case law states that not every mistake constitutes an act of negligence, a judgment that turns out to be wrong does not establish a presumption of negligence (Civil Appeal (Tel Aviv District) 2278/09 Aharon (Roni) Kaplan v. Yoav Salomon (Nevo 14.8.2011) The circumstances of the case must be examined according to the circumstances that existed at the time of the act and not as "retrospective wisdom" and examine whether the actions taken are reasonable actions (Civil Case (Central District) 34486-03-14 Anonymous v. State of Israel (Nevo 8.4.2018)), Civil Appeal Authority 5277/08 Estate of the late Amir Elikashvili v. State of Israel - Israel Police (July 28, 2009), Civil Appeal 4584/10 State of Israel v. Voucher (December 4, 2012), Civil Appeal 3580/06 Estate of the late Hagai Yosef v. State of Israel (March 21, 2011), Civil Case (Shalom Bat Yam) 50092-05-18 Gila Segal v. Tamar Peled (Nevo October 14, 2020)).
- The aforesaid matters are given even more force in relation to the Council in view of the fact that the plaintiff did not know how to point to the date on which he claimed he was blocked from the Council page. The plaintiff attached undated screenshots for unclear reasons. The search results presented by the plaintiff do not necessarily indicate that he was blocked from the council's page. It appears that the plaintiff conducted searches from different profiles and devices, and we do not have before us clear proof or reference for the plaintiff's very blocking of the council's account.
- From the above grouping, it appears that the plaintiff did not prove that the defendants violated a statutory duty and did not prove the elements of negligence in relation to any of the defendants, including the alleged damage (Civil Appeal Authority 2063/16 Rabbi Yehuda Glick v. Israel Police, published in Nevo, 19/1/2017)
- If so, it has been proven that the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants, and therefore I am not required to address the plaintiff's claims regarding the classification of the defendants' 'Facebook' accounts as public or private. The discussion of these arguments in the framework of the lawsuit in which we are dealing with in the format in which it was filed is superfluous and has no purpose other than to anger and defiance.
- With regard to the plaintiff's claim that the case in question is similar to the case discussed in the Connick case, it is sufficient to note that in view of the determination that the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants and that these are different platforms, therefore the judgment is not relevant to the case at hand. The judgment given in the Connick case explicitly stated that it does not "establish a comprehensive arrangement" regarding the accounts of elected officials on social networks, and that such an arrangement should be determined by the regulatory bodies.
- Before concluding, I will refer to the plaintiff's argument that was first raised in section 37 of his summaries that in addition to the torts on which he bases his claim, he claims that the defendants wrongfully wronged him under the Prohibition of Discrimination in Products, Services and Entrance to Places of Entertainment and Public Places, 5761-2000 (hereinafter: the Prohibition of Discrimination in Products Law).
- First, in the pre-trial hearing on April 28, 2025, the plaintiff stated for the record that he was not suing under the Prohibition of Discrimination in Products Law: "I did not sue under the Discrimination in Public Places Law because my grounds are different. My claim is financial, but the tort/negligence is from the administrative world" (see: lines 32-33 on page 5 of the minutes of the hearing there).
- Second, this is an expansion of a forbidden front that should be rejected. As is well known, the rule prohibiting the expansion of the front is intended to prevent litigants from raising new claims that surprise the other side and to focus on the real dispute between them. Although the rule does not mean that once the pleadings are filed, a party can no longer raise any claim that was not explicitly argued therein, but this is a legal claim about which there is no dispute that it was a cause of action in the first place and stems from the factual data that were placed before the court in the pleadings, (Civil Appeal 8881/07 Rami Lev v. Elias Toby (August 27, 2012), published in Nevo.
- Given that the legal framework of the hearing is delimited by the pleadings, and taking into account that the plaintiff did not claim a violation of the Prohibition of Discrimination in Products Law in his statement of claim and did not even seek to amend his statement of claim, therefore, I reject the plaintiff's claim for compensation by virtue of the Prohibition of Discrimination in Products Law.
- This is especially true in light of the fact that the defendants were not given an opportunity to defend themselves against a specific claim and against the evidentiary requirements unique to the Prohibition of Discrimination in Products Law.
The Plaintiff's Conduct
- In his lawsuit, the plaintiff discovered a handkerchief but covered a handkerchief as detailed below.
- The plaintiff claimed that his entry to the defendants' Facebook and Wake platform was blocked and that he was denied the opportunity to keep up to date with what was happening in the community, but he did not disclose that he was a political opponent of defendant 1 who ran in the elections for the Tel Mond council and that he was aware of what was happening in the community and even opened a website called "Israel" in which he expressed criticisms (here and there) and even rated what was happening in the council by its officials. For example, the head of the council and the CEO, in the 'shit' index he established on the website. The plaintiff even asked the followers on the site to rate the aforementioned in the aforementioned dimension.
- Thus, for example, the plaintiff awarded defendant 1 (Ms. Kaplan) the weekly gold medal of Shit.Israel after calling it a "toxic aesthetic" and "the spray" and asking his followers on the site for a rank in the "shit" index (see Appendix 1 to defendant 1's statement of defense, p. 14 Bennett).
- The plaintiff gave the council's director-general, "and for all this, you will receive from us, Tehila, the honorable weekly silver medal of shit.israel" after he asked his followers for a rank in the aforementioned index (see: Appendix 2 to defendant 1's statement of defense, at p. 17 Bennett).
- Moreover, the plaintiff did not disclose that he had filed claims in a matter similar to his case here and that he conducted additional proceedings against the defendants in other courts, and these facts were concealed in the introduction to his statement of claim, and these proceedings should have been disclosed to the courts.
- In the context of the aforesaid, the plaintiff concealed from his considerations that on December 21, 2023, a judgment was given in an administrative petition (administrative petition 60883-06-23) which he conducted against the defendants in a matter similar to the matter at hand. (See: lines 20-36 on p. 26 and 1-4 on p. 27 of the minutes of the hearing).
- I am of the opinion that it would have been appropriate for the plaintiff to lay out before the court the full factual picture as it is, accurately and completely,without concealing relevant data or proceedings relating to the dispute between the parties.
Conclusion
- What is lifted from the aforesaid rule is that the plaintiff has no causes of action against the defendants for the reasons detailed above. Therefore, I decide to dismiss the claim and oblige the plaintiff to pay the defendants expenses and attorney's fees in the amount of ILS 10,000 for each of the defendants.
- All amounts will be paid within 30 days, otherwise they will bear shekel interest.
The right to appeal lawfully.