Civil Lawsuit in a Quick Hearing (Netanya) 18255-01-24 Yaakov Kasdi v. Lynn Kaplan

Judgment

Brief Background

1. Prior to a lawsuit concerning monetary compensation in the amount of ILS 50,000 on grounds of breach of statutory duty and negligence, on the grounds that the plaintiff was unlawfully blocked from defendant 1's Facebook accounts and from the Council's Facebook page, thus violating his dignity and freedom of expression and depriving him of vital information.
2. The plaintiff in this case is Yaakov Kasdi, a lawyer and resident of Tel Mond. Defendant 1 is Mrs. Lynn Kaplan, head of the Tel Mond Local Council, and defendant 2 is the Tel Mond Local Council.
3. Defendant 1, Ms. Kaplan, manages a Facebook page and a Facebook profile in her name, (hereinafter - the Facebook profile). The Council maintains a Facebook page on which publications about the Council's activities, including security directives, are posted from time to time (hereinafter - the Council's page).

The parties' arguments in summary

4. The plaintiff claims that Ms. Kaplan, who manages a Facebook page and a Facebook profile, blocked him from her accounts, thus violating his dignity and freedom of expression, and thus prevented him from publishing information on her accounts. According to the plaintiff, in parallel with the aforementioned blockage, the plaintiff was also blocked from the council page.
5. The plaintiff assumes that his blocking was done against the background of criticism he wrote in response to the publications published by the defendants on their accounts, without prior notice of the intention to block the plaintiff and without receiving a reason for the blocking.
6. The plaintiff claims that he asked defendant 1 to cancel the block, and in response, the council's counsel replied that the plaintiff was not blocked from the council's Facebook page or from Ms. Kaplan's Facebook page, as opposed to her personal profile. According to the plaintiff, following the warning letter, he was unblocked from the council's page.
7. The plaintiff claims that defendant 1's Facebook profile and the council's page are a public matter and there is no dispute that the rules of public law apply to them in their entirety, and that it is blocked, especially during the war, and when security directives are published, constitutes from the plaintiff's point of view a vicious and criminal frontal attack on his basic rights as a person and as a resident.
8. The Ottoman Settlement [Old Version] 1916According to the plaintiff, Ms. Kaplan's accounts are clearly of a public nature. The vast majority of the publications on Ms. Kaplan's "personal" profile are public publications that she usually opens with "Dear Residents," which include announcements of new appointments, regular updates regarding the community, instructions from the Home Front Command, and more.  The same is true of Ms. Kaplan's Facebook page, which is full of clear public publications.

12-34-56-78 Chekhov v.  State of Israel, P.D.  51 (2)

9. The plaintiff claims that contrary to Ms. Kaplan's claim, he was also blocked from the Facebook page and not only from her "personal" profile, and thus in fact he was blocked from any content that Ms. Kaplan shared. The blocking action is arbitrary, forceful and intended to silence any criticism of Ms. Kaplan, all under the guise of a "private account" that exempts Ms. Kaplan as an elected official and head of the council from the rules of public administration and the rules of natural justice.  In this regard, the plaintiff refers to the Supreme Court's ruling inAppeal Petition/Administrative Claim 7659/22 Rubinstein v.  Konik, dated December 21, 2023, published in Nevo, (hereinafter - the Konik Case).
10. The plaintiff claims that the aforementioned conduct caused him non-pecuniary damage in the form of mental anguish estimated by him in the sum of ILS 50,000, while he bases his claim on the ground of negligence and breach of statutory duty.
11. On the other hand, defendant 1 argues that the plaintiff is not a simple and innocent citizen who seeks to use his right to legitimate criticism and receive vital information, but rather a political actor whose sole purpose is to harm defendant 1 and blacken her face for the purpose of promoting personal interests.
12. Defendant 1 claims that the manner in which the plaintiff chose to deal with her on various occasions crosses the boundaries of normative discourse and constitutes a blatant and extreme attack that is intolerable.
13. Defendant 1 further claimed that the plaintiff runs a website called "Shit.Israel" in which he raises his criticism and opinions and lashes out at various people, including her. Defendant 1 refers to legal proceedings in which the plaintiff represented the members of the opposition in the matter of stopping spraying throughout the council, when the proceedings ended with the dismissal of one petition and the rejection of the other, while presenting the court's criticism of the plaintiff in the legal proceeding.
14. Defendant 1 claims that since the plaintiff is a political activist on behalf of the members of the opposition council who also disseminates harsh and crude criticism on her Facebook page and Facebook profile, she decided that she did not want the plaintiff to be present in her personal space and to make use of her and her family's personal information, including her photos on her Facebook profile.
15. Defendant 1 emphasizes that the plaintiff has not been blocked from the other channels of information and communication in relation to the Council and its Facebook page, and that he is exposed and available to all the public information published there.
16. Defendant 1 argues that there is nothing between the rulings in the Konik case and the plaintiff's case here, both in light of the difference between the platforms, and in light of the Supreme Court's statement in the Konik case that the rulings stated in the aforementioned judgment do not constitute a comprehensive arrangement with respect to the accounts of elected officials on social networks. In addition, defendant 1 claims that the plaintiff did not relate at all to alternatives for receiving information and expressing opinions and responses, nor did he relate to the scope of information available on these platforms.

Copied from Nevo

17. Defendant 1 claims that the plaintiff was not blocked on her public page, nor was he blocked at the time he sent a letter and could have consumed all the public information on the various platforms of the council, and he did not prove otherwise.
18. In addition to the aforesaid, defendant 2 claims that the plaintiff is not blocked from the council column and he did not first present evidence to block him from the council column when the burden of proof is on him. The plaintiff did not prove the dates of his blocking, and when the land fell under his main and sole evidence for blocking it from the council's account, his claim should be dismissed.
19. Moreover, defendant 2 claims that there is no violation of human dignity and liberty or breach of statutory duty or negligence. In addition, there is no causal connection between the alleged damage to any alleged action or act or omission.
20. Defendant 2 further argues that it did not breach a statutory duty towards the plaintiff and that, contrary to the plaintiff's claim, section 63(a) of the Torts Ordinance does not establish any duty imposed on the Council, and the plaintiff should have specifically stated the law and the section that was breached against him, if at all.
21. As to the cause of negligence, defendant 2 claims that it does not have a conceptual duty of care, since the operation of a Facebook page is not a governmental action as claimed by the plaintiff.
22. It was further argued that the operation of a Facebook page, as opposed to a website, is not one of the means of communication that the local authority must operate and publish information through.
23. In conclusion, defendant 2 argues that the council does not have a concrete duty of care. The plaintiff did not point to an unreasonable risk caused to him as a result of his blocking on the council page.
24. It was further argued that even assuming that the plaintiff was blocked from the council's page, the plaintiff has access to other platforms on which he can express his opinions and positions, and therefore the lawsuit against him should be dismissed.
25. On December 28, 2025, an evidentiary hearing was held (hereinafter: the hearing) in which the plaintiff, Ms. Kaplan, and the Council's CEO, Ms. Tehila Maimon, were interrogated. After the hearing, and at the request of the parties, an order was given to submit summaries in the case.  The parties summarized their arguments in writing.

Discussion and Decision

26. After reviewing the arguments of the parties, hearing their arguments in the hearing that took place before me, and after submitting written summaries, I decide to dismiss the claim. I will clarify and explain.
27. Since we are dealing with a fast-track proceeding, the judgment will be reasoned in a concise manner in accordance with the regulations in accordance with Regulation 82(b) of the Civil Ink Order Regulations, 5779-2018.

The absence of an (independent) cause of action by virtue of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

28. I will first discuss the cause of action by virtue of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and then the grounds for breach of statutory duty and negligence. After examining all of the plaintiff's evidence in the case, I was convinced that the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants in the case for the reasons that will be detailed below.
29. The plaintiff argues that the conduct of the defendants, who blocked him from his Facebook accounts, establishes the tort of breach of statutory duty and negligence by virtue of the Torts Ordinance, and as a derivative of the breach of statutory duty, his dignity protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was violated , and the freedom of expression and freedom to criticize, which are constitutional rights, was violated (see: p. 4 of the minutes of the hearing of April 28, 2025).
30. An examination of the relevant case law shows that the question of whether it is possible to award compensation for a violation of a basic constitutional right outside the scope of tort law has not yet been decided. It is evident that the courts preferred in the cases brought before them to base their determination on tort grounds. See, for example, Civil Appeal 2781/93 Mayassa Ali Da'aka v.  Carmel Hospital, PD 54 526, where compensation was indeed awarded for the very infringement of the plaintiff's autonomy over her body, but it was a negligent infringement and therefore the Honorable Justice Or emphasized that there was no need for a decision on the question relating to the judicial recognition of the existence of constitutional injustices.
31. The Supreme Court addressed the issue as in our case in Civil Appeal 10508/08 Dor Zahav Building Contracting and Investment Company in a tax appeal v. The District Planning and Building Committee, Tel Aviv District (published in Nevo), and held: "...Section 3 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not constitute a statutory duty within the meaning of Section 63 of the Torts Ordinance.  This is a general and principled duty that grants the citizen a basic right, but we are not dealing with a specific obligation under the law." (My emphasis: H.H.). 
32. These words were also emphasized in the article of the Honorable President Justice Yitzhak Amit "On the Blurring of Boundaries, Blurring Boundaries and Uncertainty in Law" Din Ve-Devarim 6 17 (2011):"... The idea that the rights enumerated in the Basic Laws would constitute the basis for the tort of breach of a statutory duty was rejected at this stage in a short Supreme Court ruling in the Dor Zahav case. There it was held that section 3 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty should not be regarded as a statutory duty within the meaning of section 63 of the Torts Ordinance, since the property right set forth in this section is "a general and fundamental duty that grants the citizen a basic right, even though we are not dealing with a specific duty under the law". 
33. Subsequently, the Honorable President Justice Amit notes in his article above that at this stage, the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a constitutional wrongdoing even in cases in which an appeal to constitutional rights was ostensibly It was also written that one of the results of blurring boundaries in law is relativity, lack of certainty, lack of stability, and perhaps even erosion of legal professionalism. It is important that the boundaries of the fields are not breached unknowingly and in the absence of awareness, and thus it is written "...Indeed, it is desirable for one legal field to enrich the other, it is desirable for other disciplines to water the legal orchard, but in some matters we must return to the first concepts.  It should be aspired that at the end of the judgment the reader will know what is desired.  The legal argument should be based, as far as possible, on the modest basis of local doctrine, such as a breach of an agreement or tort, without resorting to general and vague tools such as constitutional rights..."

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34. 0Moreover, in the context of the above, it was held in Civil Appeal Judgment 8489/12 Anonymous v. Anonymous (published in Nevo, October 29, 2013) that: "...A distinction must be made between the source of the right and the cause or tort. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does indeed constitute a source of the right to dignity and privacy, but the direct use of this right as a cause of action, in the sense of a "constitutional tort" has not yet been recognized in our law, and the use of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty as a source of breach of a statutory duty has also been rejected in case law (Civil Appeal 10508/08 Dor Zahav Building Contracting and Investment Company in Tax Appeal v.  District Planning and Building Committee, District Civil Case [published in Nevo] at paragraph 54 (February 4, 2010)).  (My emphasis: H.H.).
35. Moreover, the Honorable Justice Prof. Dafna Barak Erez, in her article "Constitutional Wrongs in the Refinement of the Basic Laws" (Law and Government 9, 2006), referred to the gradual consolidation of liability of a financial-tort nature for a violation of constitutional rights in Israeli law, but the focus of the matter was on cases in which the compensation claim is directed against the government, although she explained that "it has a connection to the issue of liability in torts for violations of human rights even in private relationships."
36. After the fundamental discussion of the question of constitutional liability, the degree of openness of the case law to the idea of constitutional compensation claims was examined, and this examination revealed "the willingness of the Supreme Court to consider the idea, while avoiding decisions of precedential significance", according to the Honorable Justice Prof. Barak Erez in her aforementioned article.
37. The gap between the paucity of case law in the Supreme Court and the repeated reference to the matter in the rulings of other courts, according to the approach of the Honorable Justice Baraz Erez, "is the result of the fact that constitutional compensation claims almost never reach the Supreme Court. This state of affairs is undesirable, because it contributes to legal ambiguity in an area that is of both practical and educational importance. Therefore, the Supreme Court would do well to clarify its position in principle with regard to the law that applies to compensation claims that violate constitutional rights, even if the matter does not require a decision in a case that will be heard before it, taking into account the rare nature of appeals against judgments in constitutional compensation claims."
38. This was also ruled by the Supreme Court in the judgment of the Civil Appeal Authority 2015/20 Anonymous v. State of Israel Ministry of Health (Nevo, October 25, 2020): "However, despite the weighty reasons that support the recognition of a constitutional tort, it should be emphasized that this tort is not regulated by the Torts Ordinance or any other legislation, and in practice, we are dealing with a tort that has been discussed in case law and legal literature only.  In view of the above, it is necessary to examine whether it is possible and proper to recognize a constitutional tort by way of "judicial legislation".  In this context, it is interesting to note that despite the extensive discussion that has taken place on the subject in case law and literature over the years, this Court has not yet decided the question of the recognition of a constitutional tort in Israeli law (see: Civil Appeal 6296/00 Kibbutz Malkiya v.  State of Israel, 2004 (3) 1805, Civil Appeal 7703/10 Yeshua v.  State of Israel - Sela Administration, IsrSC 67 (1) (2014), at pp.  50-51, 54; Civil Appeals Authority 2063/16 Glick v.  Israel Police, [published in Nevo], paragraph 18(g) of the opinion of Justice Y.  Amit (January 19, 2017); Yitzhak Amit, "On Blurring Boundaries, Blurring Boundaries and Uncertainty in Law," Din Ve-Devarim 6, 17, 27 (2011); Barak, at pp.  375-376 and 407).  It was further held that: "Admittedly, many noted the difficulties involved in creating a constitutional tort, while the legislature did not enshrine the existence of such a tort in the law.  Thus, the imposition of this liability in case law may have a significant impact on government policy in various areas, on public priorities, on state resources, and so on.  Therefore, a real difficulty arises in the creation of a constitutional injustice in case law, instead of regulating it in legislation."
39. Moreover, in other municipal applications 1303/09 Kadosh v. Bikur Cholim Hospital, from 5/3/12 (published in Nevo), the Supreme Court clarified that even today, as long as there is no basis for torts, the boundaries should not be breached in determining compensation for a tort that has not yet been defined in law or case law as a constitutional tort "... I will also note that although the expression "constitutional tort" has already become a language in case law, this court has not yet recognized a constitutional tort."
40. Other Municipality Applications 1081/00 Avneel Company and Distribution In a tax appeal v. State of Israel, (published in Nevo), the court left as an open question the power of the court's judicial legislation to create judicial precedents that impose liability for the payment of compensation outside the accepted norms in private law.
41. See also what was said in Family Case (Jerusalem) 18551/00 S.N.K.M., 5764 (3) 201 The Honorable Justice v. Maimon, as follows:

"...  Indeed, there are those who see the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty as a basis and a source of intervention and compensation for such wrongful conduct, but the question is whether the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Violation of its Foundations constitute the basis for obligations and compensation for its violation, even when it is a matter of a violation or violation of its foundations in the relationship between individuals and not an individual vis-à-vis a governmental organ (A.  Barak, "Protected Human Rights and Private Law" [45]; D.  Barak-Erez, Constitutional Injustices [40]).