To this must be added the conduct of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs never made a written request regarding the aliyah grant. (Amir Gola, p. 39, questions 10-11, of 8 July 2010, Eyal Avrahami, pp. 28, questions 14-15, of 6 July 2010, Dadu Dahan, p. 11, questions 1-5). Dahan also did not bring his father to testify as he claimed about oral requests, and this matter will be attributed to him. In addition, according to him, he was not "senior enough" for the grant (pp. 10, 20-22). It should be emphasized that in some of Eyal Avrahami's agreements, aliyah grants appear and in some of them they do not. The evidence is that when they wanted to grant a grant to her, the matter was put in writing (pp. 26, paras. 27-32 of 6 July 2010). When they were not put in writing, therefore, there was no intention to give them and no right was established.
- Not only did the plaintiffs not put their requests in writing or in the written agreement or in any other way at all, but they terminated the transaction on the following dates:
Shweig in March 2003, Ohayon in May 2006, Exile in May 2002, Avrahami in May 2002, Dado in May 2002, despite this, the statement of claim was filed on December 19, 2007, about five years from the end regarding three, four years for one, and only for Ohayon about a year and a half later.
- Therefore, with regard to the normative aspect relating to the association's bylaws and control, the personal agreements, and the factual aspect relating to the plaintiffs' knowledge and consent and the plaintiffs' actual conduct in not raising the matter for many years, it is possible to reject the claims of oral promises of aliyah grants.
- Therefore, the claims of Mr. Amir Gola, Mr. Avrahami Eyal and Mr. Dado Dahan for the grant are rejected.
Severance Pay - A Normative Aspect
- The Severance Pay Law, 5723-1963 (hereinafter: the Law) states in section 1(a): "A person who worked for one consecutive year - and as a seasonal employee for two seasons in two consecutive years - for one employer or in one workplace and was fired, is entitled to receive severance pay from his employer who was fired. He answers this matter for three consecutive months a year in which he worked at least 60 days." (My emphasis is S.S.)
Plaintiffs 1-5 usually worked for about 10 months a year, from August 1 to May 31 of the following year. In any event, the plaintiffs were employed for more than three months per season. The plaintiffs argued that their place of work should be viewed as one workplace even when there were changes in ownership.