"Q. Confirm to me that you are not a player of Hapoel Jerusalem but of Beitar Jerusalem.
- That's right. Until 1994 I was a player for Beitar Jerusalem, then I wandered between several teams. My player card as soon as I left Beitar was mine. Every year I wrote in my contract that at the end of the year, it is impossible to write 0 shekels, so I wrote that at the end of the year for 100 shekels I would be released, so as not to be tied to one group or another.
- The card is your property, so you made sure not to sign long-term contracts, but to reserve an option whether to continue or not.
- That's right.
- Every year, it doesn't matter if Hapoel or other teams negotiate new terms for a new season.
- That's right."
The continuation of his testimony (p. 41, s. 32, p. 42, Q. 1-25 of July 8, 2010) indicates that he himself made sure to terminate his contract every season in order not to be tied to one team or another. The fact that he was on loan and not a Hapoel player was supported by paragraphs 14 and 15 of Mr. Sassi's affidavit and his cross-examination (p. 56, s. 6-16) and in the testimony of Mr. Yona (p. 51, s. 5). A loan player also cannot rely on the continuation of the deal.
Mr. Schweig's last agreement for a period of 9 and a half months from 15 August 2002 to 31 May 2003. Clause 8 of the agreement explicitly states that at the end of the season, the player will be released. Mr. Schweig presented agreements for 2000-2001 in which he received a monthly salary of ILS 6,800 per month. (This includes, as stated therein, per diem convalescence travel and vacation fees. and did not enter into a ruling on this matter as it is marginal to the matter itself).
Clause 9B of the agreement states: "The parties may cancel this agreement before the end of its validity period, provided that the cancellation is made by mutual consent." In this case, the parties agreed to cancel at the end of its validity.
This was also the case with the 2001-2002 agreement, which also states: "At the end of the season, the player will be allowed to move to any team he wishes, and this will be for a fee of 100 NIS." It is therefore clear that the plaintiff agreed in advance to a contract for 9 months (1/8/01 to 31/5/02), at the end of which he is free. The agreed compensation was recorded in the body of the agreement in the amount of ILS 100. Such a contract does not establish a right to exemption compensation, since this is the desire of the "employee" - the actor to begin with. This stipulation repeats itself for the 2002-2003 seasons: "At the end of the season, he will be released in the amount of 100 NIS."
- The one who claims a fixed-term contract is not the one who understands the contract that he himself is the one who limits its applicability and determines the amount of compensation in order to maintain his independence. The balance of power is equal and it is not a matter of "superiority" of the employer for the purpose of examining the essence of the written agreement. The aforementioned plaintiff was also a player in Beitar Jerusalem, on loan at Beitar Tel Aviv, etc., and did not claim severance pay from any of them. (p. 42, paras. 16-18, of July 8, 2010). The agreement between Mr. Schweig and the defendants does not meet the accepted condition in football, and in our opinion, the judgment in the Yanai Cohen case does not apply in this case. The compensation agreed upon the departure was written with the consent of both parties and with recognition and understanding, while preserving the interests mainly of the plaintiff's freedom of movement and at his request. Factual support for this arose from the affidavit of Mr. Sassi (paragraphs 14-15) and the affidavit of Mr. Yona (paragraphs 8-10), from which it appears that at the same time Mr. Schweig worked at Bezeq full-time and his employment in the morning as an actor was liable to harm his work, and thus we also found support for his voluntary departure. Their version was not hidden. (See also Prov. p. 51, p. 56).
- In a judgment in the matter of Labor Appeal 2562/07 Shimon Geyer v. The Association for the Advancement of the Football Industry in Arad (given on December 8, 2010), the principle was established that in order to determine continuity, the reliance on employment at the end of the recess period or the termination of the employment relationship between the parties must be considered.
This judgment deals with a soccer coach in children's clubs, who was employed for 10 months each year, and received unemployment benefits for two months (July-August). He claimed that it was always clear to him that he would continue the following year, a criminal appeal that in fact, his work depended on how many children would enroll in his classes. In this case, the defendantwas given a note and it was determined that he was entitled to severance pay because of his reliance.