The club refers to Section 2 of the Association's Articles of Association detailing the issues that are discussed in arbitration in the Basketball Association, and it was determined that the arbitration will hear "any dispute relating to the contractual relationship between a team and a player or between a player and a team." Later on, the bylaws state in section 3 that any dispute as stated above "... will be brought to the hearing only in the framework of arbitration."
The club referred to the Supreme Court's ruling in Civil Appeal 130/01, Amir Katz v. Israel Basketball Association [October 4, 2009] (hereinafter: the Katz Case), which states that when it comes to statutory arbitration, such as arbitration by virtue of the Sports Law, the court has no discretion as to whether or not to delay the proceedings before it, and it must delay the proceedings.
The club noted that this was a serious procedural conduct on the part of the plaintiff, whose purpose was to deliberately and in bad faith circumvent the written consent of the parties. Therefore, the club further requests that the court take this fact into account in the framework of charging the plaintiff with costs.
In the margins, I will note that the plaintiff submitted his response to the request on May 15, 2017, when the club had the right to submit a response within 7 days (according to my decision of May 1, 2017). When the date for submitting the reply (which was a right and not an obligation) has passed, this decision is given even in absentia, on the basis of the arguments as raised in the application and in the response.
- The plaintiff requested that the club's request be rejected. The plaintiff noted that the Supreme Court's decision in the Katz case gave rise to many controversies and cannot take place today, in the face of changes in legislation and case law. The plaintiff referred to a later ruling, which determines that the status of sports associations in Israel is "a voluntary organization that was not established by virtue of the law," and is not "an entity that fulfills a public function according to the law."
The plaintiff further claimed that according to the provisions of section 2J of the Arbitration Institute's bylaws, the tort claim was excluded, stating that "the arbitration institution will not hear claims for personal injury."