Similarly, the words of the respondent's counsel in the pre-trial hearing: "If the appellant knows how to come and paint additional sums, I assume that we will have a conversation and there will be a positive attitude" (p. 10, paras. 28-29 of the transcript of the pre-trial hearing).
- The same applies to the appellant's claim that the charge for the transportation of a tourist, which is taxable at a zero rate under section 30(a)(8)(b)(2) of the Law, should be deducted from the assessment. The appellant did not bring any evidence that this was a "tour" transportation according to the language of the section, or transportation services from the airport to the hotel, in accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling.
- Similarly, the appellant claims that the invoices issued to it by the service providers came out with a full tax charge due to the 2015 and 2016 tax decisions, which were not publicly canceled until 2025. However, once again, the appellant did not bring a single service provider to support the position and explain that this was the reason why it issued a tax invoice at full rate. It should be added that, as will be detailed below, in Appendix 17 to the Appellant's affidavit, it appears that the 2015 and 2016 tax decisions are not the sole reason for the issuance of the invoices at the full tax rate, and these are also invoices issued in connection with transactions that do not include hospitalization.
- All the appellant did was to prepare and attach Appendix 17 to the affidavit on her behalf, which is a long table that sorts the medical expenses and the inputs paid for them – whether they are related to hospitalization or not. However, the appellant did not present a single invoice that was issued in connection with those cases that appear in the table, and she did not elaborate and demonstrate why certain invoices that were issued at a full tax rate are supposed to be at a zero tax rate.
- To this it should be added that the table was prepared retroactively, and the appellant's own representative admitted that it was not necessarily accurate: "The witness Mr. Cohen: ... Remnik did the work here in retrospect 12-13 years back, it is possible that she was not 100% accurate" (p. 14, paras. 4-5 of the minutes of the evidentiary hearing).
- Moreover, and this is the main point, it appears from Appendix 17 that the appellant admits in practice that she is liable to pay a higher transaction tax than she paid. As stated, Appendix 17 marks the inputs that according to the appellant she paid in connection with medical expenses that are not related to hospitalization – that is, inputs that were used for transactions that are taxable at the full rate. However, the total inputs that were used for the transactions at the full tax rate according to the appellant's own method exceeds the transaction tax paid by the appellant.
For example, in 2017, NIS 391,866 was deducted for medical expenses unrelated to hospitalization or surgery. However, according to the appellant's reports to the respondent (Appendix 3 to the respondent's affidavit), in 2017 only NIS 293,813 was paid as transaction tax. Similarly, in 2018, inputs in the amount of NIS 490,717 were deducted , but only NIS 389,315 was paid as transaction tax. In total of the tax years in the assessment, 2016-2020, NIS 1,827,838 was deducted as inputs for medical expenses unrelated to hospitalization or surgery, while transaction tax was paid in the amount of NIS 1,460,669.
- This is impossible. The premise is that the appellant charged the medical tourist for the medical service a higher amount than it paid the medical service provider. Otherwise, there is no business logic in the appellant's modus operandi. When the appellant's accountant was asked about this, he initially explained as follows:
"Adv. Feierstein: ... How is it possible that the transaction tax is lower than the input tax that was deducted?