The first turning point - the Alice Miller High Court of Justice
- In 1995, one of the most well-known judgments in Israeli law, the High Court of Justice 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 49(4) 94 (1995) (hereinafter: the Miller case). The judgment dealt with the Petitioner's request that she be allowed to be selected for a pilot course, and to participate in it if she was found suitable for doing so. In view of the importance of this matter for our matter, I will present the matter in relative detail. The controversy in the Miller case was essentially based on the question of whether the IDF's reliance on "planning reasons," "systemic feasibility," and "organizational limitations" justifies denying women the possibility of being selected for a pilot course, regardless of their abilities. The answer to this question was in the negative; it was held that the said policy of the IDF amounts to discrimination that unlawfully violates the constitutional right to equality.
- In the meantime, Justice A. Matza - who wrote the main opinion of the majority position, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Justices Y. Kedmi and Tal - ruled that "this does not mean that the difference between the sexes is never relevant to the matter of a female soldier's suitability to fulfill a certain position. In my opinion, too, it is quite possible that a female soldier will be disqualified, because of her gender, to fill certain positions, but disqualification for this reason is permitted only where the candidate's gender creates a difference that is relevant to the fulfillment of the particular position" (ibid., pp. 110-111).
- As for the IDF's claims regarding budgetary and organizational considerations that tip the scales against the possibility of integrating women into a pilot course, it was determined that "when a claim for the exercise of a basic right is on the agenda - and this is the case before us - the relative weight of budgetary considerations cannot be great. Neighbor: '[...] Protecting human rights costs money, and a society that respects human rights must be willing to bear the financial burden' (ibid., p. 113; See also ibid., p. 122). The arguments relating to the planning aspect were also rejected, while it was held that "the main and most prominent weakness of this argument lies in the fact that it relies entirely on hypothetical assumptions and assessments and not on lessons learned from cumulative practical experience."
- Justice Strasberg-Cohen joined the ruling that the policy that disqualifies women from being selected and participating in a pilot course amounts to prohibited discrimination. In contrast to Justice Matza, who held that no relevant difference had been proven at all, Justice Strasberg-Cohen was of the opinion that such variance does indeed exist, and that it is even based on substantive reasons; However, according to her, this is not enough: "Variation that causes substantive and real difficulties in the implementation of the value of equality, such as physical, economic, logistical difficulties, and the like, is a relevant variance. Nevertheless, in those cases where it can be neutralized at a reasonable price, it is appropriate to amend and neutralize it in order to achieve equality" (ibid., p. 121).
- Justice Dorner was also of the opinion that the policy that prevents women from participating in a pilot course cannot stand on a machine. On the merits, Justice Dorner ruled that "the means chosen by the respondents to realize their purposes, which is the closure of the aviation profession to women" does not meet the requirement of proportionality. This is because "the system can be designed [...] So the difference between men and women should be taken into account. As noted, the obligation to take planning into account the needs of women is imposed on all employers in the country [...]. In these circumstances, where increased financial expenditure in order to achieve equality between the sexes is imposed on all private employers, considerations of budgetary and planning feasibility, as a rule, cannot justify a state decision that violates a basic right. [...] Moreover, even assuming that the planning consideration may justify discrimination against women, the burden of proof lies on the state seeking to justify the discrimination. Here, the respondents did not base their arguments regarding the violation of planning on a real factual basis, but only on the opinion that its correctness is not self-evident. [...] In addition to all this, the harm of closing a pilot course to women outweighs the benefit of planning considerations. First, closing a pilot course to NASA harms their dignity and humiliates them. [...] Second, the potential of half of the population is not exploited, and thus society is harmed" (ibid., pp. 144-145).
- Thus, following the ruling, women began to serve as pilots in the Air Force; Initially, as part of a pilot, and since it was successful, as aircrew fighters for all intents and purposes. They even reached the skies of Iran. In 1998, women began to enlist in the Captain's Course as well, and over the years they have become an integral part of all the fighters serving in this position.
The second turning point - Amendment No. 11 to the Defense Service Law and Amendment No. 2 to the Women's Equal Rights Law
- In 2000, two very significant legislative amendments were passed for our purposes, in the framework of which "the Scripture equates a woman with a man" (Bavli, Bava Kama 15:1). The first, Amendment No. 11 to the Defense Service Law, was enshrined in Section 16A, entitled "Equality in Service." It states as follows:
“)a) Every female veteran has the same right as a male veteran to fulfill any role in military service.