Labor Dispute (Jerusalem) 19212-10-24 Sanaa Mahamra – Shaare Zedek Medical Center - part 3

 Publication according to the plaintiff's method Advertising according to the defendant

It should be noted that this is a screenshot of part of the video that included the verse from the Quran quoted above.

22. After examining the evidence brought before us, we accept the defendant's version regarding the publication made by the plaintiff for the following reasons.
23. First, the defendant presented a photograph of a screen in which the name "Sana 20 Ezer" appears, in which the verse from the Qur'an appears and in the background, among other things, a blurred picture of Sinwar. Subsequently, the plaintiff was confronted with the aforementioned publication during the hearing held for her and was explicitly told that most of the murderers appeared in the publication (contrary to her claim before us that the publication was not presented to her at the hearing) and in response the plaintiff did not deny the aforementioned publication but noted "I did not notice at all that Sinwar is in the video, and these are verses from our Koran, I can bring you someone who will even explain and show you, I didn't notice" and later "I didn't see what I uploaded to WhatsApp".  In other words, the plaintiff did not deny during the hearing that this was a publication made by her, but claimed that she did not notice that Sinwar's picture appeared in the background.
24. Second, after the plaintiff made the decision to dismiss her, she contacted the defendant on August 13, 2024, through an attorney, requesting that he reconsider his position. In the response provided on behalf of the defendant on August 21, 2024, through the attorney general, it was explicitly stated that "the quoted verse appeared against the background of a video in which only the murderers, Yahya Sinwar, appear." To the extent that this factual detail was incorrect, the plaintiff would have been expected to turn to the defendant again and point out his mistake.  The fact that the plaintiff did not point out the defendant's mistake leads to the conclusion that, like her attitude at the hearing, the matter was not in dispute.
25. Third, the plaintiff filed her claim with the court, and in this framework, although she attached the defendant's letter of August 21, 2024, the plaintiff did not claim in the statement of claim that the publication made by her did not include the picture of the murderer Sinauer. The plaintiff did not protest against this argument of the defendant even after the defendant explicitly claimed in the statement of defense that the verse from the Qur'an was brought next to a picture of Sinwar, nor even after it was attached to the file of the minutes of the hearing, in which it also appears that the publication included a picture of Sinwar.  These circumstances support the conclusion that the plaintiff's suppressed claim that she published another publication should not be accepted.
26. Fourth, the status that the plaintiff attached together with a photo of horsemen riding horses is dated August 11, 2024, while the hearing held for the plaintiff was for a status that had been published the day before. In this context, the plaintiff noted at the hearing that she uploaded additional statuses to WhatsApp "several times on other days", with a status on WhatsApp deleted after 24 hours, so it is possible that she also uploaded the verse from the Qur'an in an additional status dated August 11, 2024, with horsemen riding horsemen in the background, and this does not negate the publication of the verse with a blurred picture of Sinwar in the background.
27. Although we have reached the conclusion that the plaintiff published the status that includes the verse from the Qur'an and a blurred picture of Sinwar, in our opinion it was appropriate on the part of the defendant to attach to the summons to the hearing a photocopy of the publication attributed to the plaintiff so that the concrete publication for which she was summoned to the hearing would be clear and understandable to her, in a manner that would have prevented the dispute that arose in this proceeding with regard to the publication attributed to her.
28. We would also like to clarify in this matter that we are not required in this proceeding to discuss the plaintiff's claim that was raised at the hearing that she did not notice that the photo of the murderer appeared on the status she published, since we are dealing with monetary relief for defects that the plaintiff claims occurred in the dismissal proceeding, and the plaintiff has no request to cancel the dismissal decision and return to her job.
29. Below we will address the plaintiff's claims of defects in the hearing process and discuss the question of whether, to the extent that defects occurred, this justifies monetary compensation.

From the general to the individual

30. Below we will discuss the plaintiff's claims regarding the flaws in the hearing process and address them individually.

Speed of the dismissal process

31. The plaintiff was summoned to a hearing on August 11, 2024, during her work day, and in this framework, the plaintiff was informed that the hearing would be held that day at 12:00 p.m. About half an hour after the hearing, the plaintiff received a dismissal letter in which she was informed that she was being dismissed immediately, and according to her testimony, which was not concealed, a security guard escorted her to the hospital door.
32. In this context, it should be noted that the defendant's claim in the statement of defense that the dismissal letter was given to the plaintiff a day after the hearing process was not only not proven by the defendant in any way, this claim is also contradicted by the dismissal letter itself, on which the date on which the hearing was held, when it was explicitly stated that "your last day of work will be on August 11, 2024". The aforesaid is also consistent with the plaintiff's testimony that on that date a security officer accompanied her until she left the hospital door.  Schwerin also testified in her fairness that the decision to dismiss the plaintiff was made on the same day (p.  9, s.  13).  Therefore, we accept the plaintiff's version that the decision to fire her was made on August 11, 2024, shortly after the hearing held for her.
33. The speed with which the hearing process was conducted did not allow the plaintiff to properly complete all of her arguments before making a decision on behalf of the defendant. In this context, it should be noted that during the hearing, the plaintiff sought to complete additional arguments regarding the verse from the Koran, and in this context she noted that "I can bring you someone who will even explain and show you...".  In other words, as far as the plaintiff is concerned, if she had been given sufficient time, she would have sought to present additional evidence and reasons on her behalf, which she was prevented from doing in view of the speed with which the hearing process was conducted.
34. In this proceeding, the plaintiff changed her version and claimed that she had published the verse from the Qur'an with a different picture, and also asked in her affidavit to present a different interpretation of the verse published by her. For the reasons we discussed above, we rejected this argument of the plaintiff.  However, in our opinion, there was still room to allow the plaintiff to present her full arguments and to allow her after the hearing, for example, to complete an additional written argument in light of her request during the hearing, and in particular in the circumstances in which the hearing is scheduled from now on.  The case law held that when the employer attributes serious guilt to the employee, the employee's right to be heard is strengthened (Labor Appeal (National) 415/06 Malka v.  Shufersal in a Tax Appeal (Nevo, July 15, 2007), so that in circumstances in which the defendant attributed to the plaintiff the publication of offensive nationalist messages with the intention of incitement, there was room on the part of the defendant to allow the plaintiff to complete her arguments and to persuade the plaintiff of a different interpretation in relation to the publication.
35. In this context, we emphasize that the court does not take lightly the severity of the publication made by the plaintiff. However, the defendant did not give a satisfactory reason for the urgency and urgency of the plaintiff's dismissal in a manner that harmed his integrity.  Thus, for example, it was not clarified why the plaintiff could not be suspended or placed on forced leave until the conclusion of the hearing process, etc.
36. The defendant did not show in any way that the publication caused harm on the part of any of the hospital's employees or patients in a manner that justified a speedy dismissal proceeding. In this context, we emphasize that the fact that the publication was transferred to the defendant's security does not indicate the urgency of the plaintiff's dismissal.  Further to the above, Ms. Schwerin did not know at all who was the party who transferred the photograph of the publication to security (pp.  5, 4 and 20), so we were not presented with a satisfactory reason for an expedited proceeding that deviates from the defendant's routine conduct that allows for preparations in advance for the hearing (pp.  9, 28-29).
37. With regard to the defendant's claim that the plaintiff did not apply and requested additional time in order to prepare for the hearing, it has already been ruled that "the fact that the appellant did not actually demand the additional period of time for preparation for the hearing does not mean that the IEC was exempted for nothing" (Labor Appeal (National) 620-07 Gamliel v. Israel Electric Company in Tax Appeal (Nevo, June 19, 2008) at para.  14) and that in the absence of concrete circumstances for holding a hearing from now on, In a manner that is likely to harm the employee, and without allowing the employee to complete his claims after the hearing, a defect has occurred that justifies monetary compensation.
38. In light of the aforesaid, we found that there was a flaw in the manner in which the defendant chose to conduct a hearing and expedited dismissal process for the plaintiff from one day to the next.

Hearing Minutes

39. The plaintiff claims that no minutes were prepared for the hearing and she was not even required to sign a transcript at the end of the hearing. The defendant claims that a transcript of the hearing was prepared and on February 23, 2025, after the plaintiff's request and the court's decisions, the defendant attached the minutes of the hearing to the file.
40. In the affidavit, the plaintiff reiterated the claim that no hearing minutes were conducted, but did not refer concretely to the hearing transcript presented by the defendant. On behalf of the defendant, Ms. Schwerin testified that she was present at the hearing and testified that this was the transcript of the hearing.  In the framework of the minutes, it is stated that Mrs. Ortal Benita recorded the minutes.  Schwerin testified that the transcript was drawn up after the hearing and therefore the plaintiff did not sign it at the end of the hearing (pp.  8, 23-26).
41. Despite the fact that the minutes of the hearing were not given to the plaintiff shortly after the hearing, after reviewing the minutes of the hearing that the defendant attached, taking into account the testimony of Ms. Schwerin, and in the absence of a concrete reference by the plaintiff to the minutes that were attached, we accept the defendant's argument that the minutes attached by her are the minutes of the hearing that reflect the hearing held for the plaintiff.
42. In addition, in the framework of the plaintiff's letter to the defendant dated August 13, 2024, after the decision to dismiss her, the plaintiff did not claim that no minutes were prepared for the hearing, while in the dismissal letter of August 11, 2024, it was explicitly stated that "Ortal Benita - a record of the minutes." The fact that the plaintiff did not complain in the framework of her late request to the hearing, which was written through counsel, about the lack of a transcript, strengthens the conclusion that a transcript of the hearing was prepared.
43. Further to the above, we will turn to the gap between the plaintiff's claim in the statement of claim that "no orderly protocol was prepared during the hearing" in the sense that no minutes were prepared at all, and the claim in the reply summaries that "no minutes were provided in real time", where the plaintiff's summaries imply that she admits that a transcript was drawn up but claims that the minutes were not given to her as required shortly after the hearing.
44. At the same time, it is clear from the minutes of the hearing that it includes matters that are not clear and were not properly clarified by the defendant neither in the affidavit nor in her testimony (see p. 12 of the transcript), in a way that indicates flaws in the hearing process.  In this context, we will add that the fact that the minutes of the hearing include sentences that do not assist the defendant's claims about the proper conduct of the hearing reinforce the fact that it is an authentic transcript that reflects the hearing held for the plaintiff.
45. For example, at the beginning of the transcript, Ms. Schwerin noted that "you were summoned to a hearing because of all kinds of events that happened to you at work, dissatisfaction at work itself." This argument was not raised in the summons to the hearing. Even in the framework of this proceeding, the defendant did not allege "events" or professional dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's work.
46. Later in the transcript, it was noted that the plaintiff was followed for a long time - "you were followed for a long time", a claim that was inconsistent with the summons to a hearing for a single publication that occurred the day before the date on which she was summoned to the hearing. In this matter as well, the defendant did not provide a reference in the framework of Ms. Schwerin's affidavit, and no clear answer was given to this matter at the evidentiary hearing (see p.  13 of the transcript).
47. Another flaw in the minutes of the hearing arises from the discrepancy between the list of attendees mentioned at the beginning of the minutes - in this framework it was not stated that Ms. Schwerin was present at the meeting, but the continuation of the minutes indicates that the aforementioned was present at the hearing, so that it can be understood that the aforementioned was present at the meeting. On the other hand, there is a contradiction between what is recorded in the minutes of the hearing, according to which Ms. Eti Gabbay, the chairperson of the workers' committee, was present at the meeting, while a decision after the hearing that was given to the plaintiff shortly after the hearing states that Mr. Avi Moyal, a representative of the workers' committee, was the one who was present at the hearing.  It should be noted that the plaintiff did not raise arguments in this matter and the defendant did not bother to resolve this contradiction.
48. In addition, we accept the plaintiff's argument that the minutes were not given to her after the hearing, but only in the framework of this proceeding. In this context, the plaintiff attached on her behalf the summons to the hearing and the dismissal letter, and not the minutes of the hearing, which she claimed was not held.  The defendant did not attach her reference showing that the minutes of the hearing were sent to the plaintiff after the hearing, and Ms. Schwerin testified in her fairness that "there is a situation in which she did not receive" the minutes (p.  8, s.  34).  However, it should be taken into account in this matter that the plaintiff did not contact the defendant with a request to receive the minutes of the hearing, neither in a letter she sent shortly after the decision to dismiss her, nor in her application prior to the filing of the lawsuit.
49. In light of the aforesaid, we accept the defendant's argument that a transcript of the hearing was prepared and also accept the plaintiff's argument that the hearing minutes were not given to her as required after the hearing. However, the transcript itself shows that in the framework of the hearing, allegations were directed against the plaintiff that deviated from the claim stated on the summons to the hearing, in a manner that indicates a flaw in the hearing process.

Lack of an interpreter

50. The plaintiff claims that she is not fluent in the Hebrew language and that the absence of an interpreter for the Hebrew language impaired the conduct of the hearing and constitutes a flaw in the hearing process. The defendant claims that the plaintiff's manager, who speaks Arabic, was present at the hearing.
51. First of all, we will note that we are unable to accept the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's direct manager, Mr. Imad (hereinafter - Imad), was present at the hearing, since his name does not appear in the list of those present at the beginning of the hearing, nor in the framework of the speakers during the hearing. In this context, we note that Ms. Schwerin was also not mentioned in the list of those present at the hearing, but her name was mentioned in the list of speakers at the hearing, so that there is documentation of her presence at the hearing, as opposed to Mr. Imad.  In addition, and mainly, in her cross-examination, Ms. Schwerin retracted in her testimony the claim that Mr. Imad was present at the hearing and clarified that he was not present at the hearing (pp.  7, 28 and 30).
52. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, the minutes of the hearing indicate that the plaintiff understood the arguments that were addressed to her and responded in a substantive manner to these claims, so that whether or not an interpreter was invited into the Arabic language, her arguments were heard during the hearing.
53. In addition, we will add that at the evidentiary hearing before us, an interpreter was invited to the Arabic language, but we were under the impression that the plaintiff understood most of the questions addressed to her and even answered in Hebrew to the questions addressed to her. Thus, even if there was a need for assistance in concrete translation in the framework of the hearing, it appears that this did not constitute an obstacle to the proper conduct of the hearing process.  In addition, we will add that Ms. Schwerin testified in this context that there was someone who translated at the hearing and she did not know how to say who it was (see pp.  8, paras.  21-22).
54. Our conclusion that the absence of an interpreter in the hearing proceedings did not prejudice the proceedings is joined by the plaintiff's testimony that she knew how to read the letter of summons to the hearing that she received in Hebrew (pp. 2, s.  5) and did not raise claims at the hearing about the lack of an interpreter or difficulty in understanding the allegations made against her, and it should be noted that the plaintiff worked at the hospital for a period of about 12 years and testified that although she also treated Hebrew-speaking patients, she did not require an interpreter for the Arabic language as part of her work (pp.  3, 30-32).
55. In addition, in a letter dated August 13, 2024, which the plaintiff sent to the defendant through an attorney after her dismissal, the plaintiff complained about flaws in the hearing process, but did not claim that there was no interpreter or that in view of the absence of an interpreter for the Arabic language, she did not understand the arguments that were addressed to her or that her arguments were not heard during the hearing. The fact that the plaintiff approached the defendant shortly after the hearing and did not raise claims of language difficulties shows that she understood that this did not constitute an obstacle or a defect in the framework of the hearing that was held for her.
56. In light of the above, we reject the plaintiff's claim that there was a flaw in the hearing process in the absence of an interpreter for the Arabic language.

Lack of Representation at the Hearing

57. The plaintiff claims that she was not allowed to bring an escort or representative to the hearing, while the defendant claims that she was not prevented from bringing anyone she wished.
58. As will be detailed below, the speed with which the hearing was carried out effectively prevented the plaintiff from bringing an escort or a representative with her, however, the plaintiff did not show in the course of the proceeding that she intended to bring a representative or an escort to the hearing.
59. As may be recalled, the plaintiff received a summons to a hearing on August 11, 2024, during her work day, when the hearing was set for 12:00 on the same day. On the summons to the hearing, it was stated that the plaintiff "may add an escort and/or representative on your behalf to the hearing," but it was clarified that if she intends to add an escort or representative, "you must notify the Human Resources Department up to 48 hours before the hearing." The fact that the hearing was held only a short time (a few hours) after the letter of summons to the hearing was sent, did not allow the plaintiff to request to be accompanied by an escort or representative on her behalf as required in the summons to the hearing, and thus the defendant prevented her from being represented in the hearing.
60. However, in the course of the proceeding before us, the plaintiff testified that after she received the summons to the hearing, she did not request an additional period of time for the purpose of organizing or adding an escort or representative on her behalf (pp. 2, s.  4), even though she knew and understood the reason for her coming to the hearing (p.  7, s.  35).  To be precise, the plaintiff did not claim and did not prove that she asked to bring another specific party with her to the hearing and this was prevented from doing so, and she did not claim to bring an escort or concrete representative on her behalf to the hearing that was held on her behalf.  Even in the framework of this proceeding, the plaintiff did not bring an affidavit of another person for the purpose of her defense.
61. In this context, it should be noted that we are unable to accept the defendant's argument that the plaintiff could have approached the workers' committee and asked for their help and appearance at the hearing, since in circumstances in which the hearing was held in a quick period of time from now on, the plaintiff could not have been expected to turn to third parties in order for them to join the hearing that was scheduled from now on. Moreover, the defendant's claim in the matter of the workers' committee is not clear, since the minutes of the hearing indicate that the workers' committee was present at the hearing.
62. In light of the aforesaid, we have reached the conclusion that there was a defect in the defendant's conduct in that he prevented the plaintiff from bringing an accompanyor or representative with her to the hearing. However, since the plaintiff did not claim at all, and all the more so did not prove that she intended to bring a concrete escort or representative, in a manner that she avoided, this will be reflected in the amount of compensation appropriate in the circumstances of the case.

A hearing in good faith and with a willing soul

63. The plaintiff claims that the hearing that was held for her was not done in good faith and willingly, while the defendant claims that the plaintiff was given a hearing as required and with a willing soul, and at the end it was decided to terminate her employment.
64. Schwerin testified that the plaintiff was summoned to the hearing quickly because "we wanted her to explain this to us" (pp. 9, 34).  During the hearing, it was explained to the plaintiff that the hospital is a sensitive place since it is a place that employs and treats a diverse population, and therefore the hospital works to maintain routine and coexistence even in complex situations, and that "we try to unite together in order to get through this in a relationship and to be patient and tolerant" when the publication made by the plaintiff not only harms the name of the hospital but is also likely to harm the already sensitive fabric of work in this place (see also the testimony of Mrs. Schwerin at p.  5, para.  38 - p.  6, s.  4).
65. Despite this, as part of her response at the hearing and in this proceeding, the plaintiff did not apologize and did not seek to correct the publication made by her, but rather absolved herself of responsibility by claiming that she had not noticed the picture of the murderous rabbi Sinwar (as stated above, in this proceeding the plaintiff denied the aforementioned publication) and focused her claim on a verse from the Koran and noted that the publication was not made "for the purpose of hatred". Notwithstanding the aforesaid, the plaintiff's attempt to give an alternative interpretation of the verse from the Qur'an does not explain the background picture that included Sinwar's image.
66. Schwerin testified in this context that the hospital wanted to make a decision in the plaintiff's case as soon as possible in view of the severity of the publication and the fear of consequences that might result from the publication, and therefore it was decided to summon the plaintiff to a hearing on the same day and to make a decision shortly after the hearing (pp. 9, 12-18).  The defendant examined the plaintiff's response at the hearing, and in view of the combination of the picture and the verse from the Qur'an at the time when the publication was made, in the midst of the war, and taking into account the sensitivity of the workplace, which is a hospital in which employees and patients work from different backgrounds, this justified the decision to dismiss the plaintiff immediately.  The plaintiff did not address these claims at all in the framework of the legal proceeding.
67. The severity of the publication of the verse from the Qur'an on a picture of the murderer Sinwar can be found, for example, fromCriminal Case (Jerusalem) 2144-02-25 State of Israel v. Balbisi (Nevo, June 29, 2025), in which the defendant was convicted on the basis of his confession in an indictment that included offenses of identifying with a terrorist organization and offenses of incitement to terrorism for a number of publications he published on his personal account on the social network   One of the publications in which he was convicted, as noted, included a verse from the Koran published by the prosecutor alongside a picture of the murderer Sinwar.  It should be clarified that this judgment does not lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff committed any offense in the criminal law, but rather indicates the severity of the publication made by the plaintiff, along with her evasive response in the framework of the hearing process, which justified the defendant's decision to bring about her dismissal.
68. The plaintiff asked to learn about a hearing process that was conducted in bad faith and in light of the speed of the proceeding and the flaws that occurred during it. Conducting a quick hearing process from now on, without allowing the employee to complete his claims, may indicate that the proceeding is an "addicted game" that is not in good faith and willingly.  However, after examining all the facts presented to us, we have reached the conclusion that despite the defects detailed above, and in particular the speed of the hearing process, there is no basis for the plaintiff's claim that the hearing held for her was in bad faith and was not conducted willingly, and despite the defects that we have discussed, the core elements required in the hearing process were preserved, so that these are not defects that go to the root of the matter.  Ultimately, in view of the publication made by the plaintiff, her place of work, the timing of the publication, and in particular taking into account her answers at the hearing held for her, the decision to fire her was justified.
69. We will add in this matter that the plaintiff did not apply to the Labor Court for relief to return to work, even though she was represented by an attorney, in a manner that strengthens the assumption that the plaintiff understood the difficulty of this relief in the circumstances of the case.
70. Despite the conclusion we reached that the decision to fire the plaintiff was justified in the circumstances of the case, this does not justify the speed and manner in which the defendant decided to terminate the plaintiff's work from one day to the next. In view of the speed with which the decision was made in the plaintiff's case, the defendant gave the plaintiff a laconic dismissal decision shortly after the hearing process, which included the following sentence: "In light of what arose in the hearing conversation, it was decided to terminate your employment with the hospital." In his decision, the defendant did not address the plaintiff's request at the hearing to explain the verse from the Koran, no reference was made to the plaintiff's employment seniority, the absence of professional and other complaints throughout her many years of work, as the plaintiff claimed in the hearing proceeding, in a manner that constitutes a defect in the process that also stemmed from the speed with which the dismissal process was carried out.
71. In summary, we have reached the conclusion that there were a number of flaws in the expedited hearing process conducted for the plaintiff. However, the core elements of the hearing proceeding were preserved in the sense that the defendant gave the plaintiff the reason for the hearing, the plaintiff referred at the hearing to the publication made by her, and in accordance with this reference, the defendant made a decision to dismiss her immediately.

Damage caused to the plaintiff

72. In her summary, the plaintiff claimed that after receiving the dismissal letter, a security guard accompanied her to the entrance to the hospital "in front of all the employees, doctors, nurses and visitors in a manner that harmed her dignity and " With regard to this claim, both in the statement of claim and in her affidavit and testimony before us, the plaintiff did not claim at any stage that her removal from the hospital was done in front of employees, doctors, nurses and visitors in a manner that harmed her dignity and personality. In this regard, we will clarify that it is not enough to claim that a security guard accompanied her to the door of the hospital (a claim that the plaintiff raised in her statement of claim and affidavit), since this can also be done in a sensitive and thoughtful manner, and that insofar as the plaintiff sought to claim that her removal from the hospital was done in a humiliating and humiliating manner in front of everyone, she should have specified this specifically already in her statement of defense and at the latest in the framework of her affidavit.  In order to allow the defendant to address this claim.  Therefore, we are unable to accept this argument of the plaintiff.
73. However, within the framework of the amount of compensation that will be awarded for the defects in the hearing process, consideration was given to her claim that her dismissal took effect immediately, and in this framework a security guard escorted her to the hospital door.
74. The plaintiff goes on to claim in her summaries that the denial of completion of severance pay caused her "financial damage". This claim was not explicitly made by the plaintiff in the framework of her statement of claim and was not proven by the evidence as required, and therefore we are unable to accept it.  The plaintiff further argued in her summaries that her personal situation should be taken into account in the framework of the award of compensation.  This claim was also detailed by the plaintiff neither in the statement of claim nor in the affidavit she submitted, and in any case it was not proven by her (and the letter of August 13, 2024 does not remedy this defect), in a way that makes it impossible to relate to her personal situation in the framework of examining the damage caused to her in the judgment.
75. The plaintiff adds that the defendant paid her the advance notice fee late and made a maximum tax deduction, in a manner that would force her to contact an accountant and pay rent for the purpose of restoring the tax deduction. The plaintiff did not claim financial expenses that she would be required to intake in the framework of an affidavit (see paragraph 24 of the affidavit) and that there was no room for financial relief in respect of the portion of the money that was deducted from the payment of the advance notice.  However, in the framework of the compensation that will be awarded to the plaintiff, we accept the argument that consideration should be given to the fact that the defendant retracted his claim in this matter, and that the amount for the advance notice fee was paid to the plaintiff in the framework of the legal proceeding without an orderly approach to the plaintiff beforehand, as would have been expected in the circumstances of the case.

Proper Financial Relief

76. In Labor Appeal (National) 43380-06-11 Anonymous - Anonymous (Nevo, December 9, 2014), the National Court reviewed the rules for awarding monetary compensation for unlawful dismissal, distinguishing between compensation for pecuniary damage and non-pecuniary damage.
77. In this framework, it was clarified that the compensation for pecuniary damage is intended to compensate the employee for the loss of his income in the period following the dismissal, and it is subject to the obligation to reduce the damage (see paragraph 13 in the Bader case). In our case, the plaintiff focused her arguments on defects that were made in the hearing process, and not on its economic ramifications in the period following the dismissal, and in this framework the plaintiff did not raise claims and did not attach appropriate references to prove financial damage.  Therefore, there is no reason to award the plaintiff monetary compensation for pecuniary damage.
78. Compensation for non-pecuniary damage is intended to compensate the employee for the mental anguish caused to him in circumstances in which the employer breached the duty of good faith and did not give the employee a fair opportunity to voice his claims prior to the decision to dismiss him (see paragraph 14 in the Bader case).
79. In the Bader case, the National Court discussed the considerations that must be taken into account in the framework of awarding non-pecuniary compensation for defects in the hearing process, as follows:

"In this framework, it is possible to consider a variety of considerations, which, without presuming to exhaust them, include: the intensity of the defect and the severity of the employer's omissions, whether the duty to hear was fully or partially violated (for an examination of the materiality of the defect, see: the Oren case; Aharonov, paragraph 63); the nature of the proceeding - to the extent that it exists - and whether it was preserved within the framework of the discourse and achieved the employee's dignity as a person, or whether accusations were only made (see the case of Anonymous and the case of Oren); whether the dismissal was a substantive reason or a non-relevant reason, since the substantive severity that exists in a case where the cause of dismissal is not relevant also affects the result of the severity of the failure to protect the employee's procedural rights prior to his dismissal; the duration of the employee's employment period; the age of the employee (see Aharonov, paragraph 63); Was there a defect in the employee's conduct as well (see the matter of Anonymous, paragraph 42) and more."

80. In the case law, it was clarified in the context of non-pecuniary damage, that the amount of the salary does not attest to the extent of the employee's grief and the damage caused to him as a result of his dismissal, and that "as a rule, compensation for mental anguish is given for poor conduct and the grief caused by it, in the sense of "for pom tzara agra" (Avot, 5:26), and its rate does not necessarily correspond to the amount of the alleged damage and is not necessarily derived from the salary that the employee received" (Application for Leave to Appeal (National) 20418-03-13 Sa'id v. Manusevich (Nevo, 7.11.2013 (at para.  13).
81. The case law also held that not every defect in the hearing process justifies monetary compensation, and that there is a need for balance and proportionality, taking into account the nature of the defects and all the circumstances of the matter. Thus, for example, inLabor Appeal (National) 10940-10-15 Menora Mivtachim Insurance in a Tax Appeal - Ron (Nevo, September 6, 2018) it was held that:

"This is the place to note that not every defect that occurred in the hearing proceedings justifies awarding compensation, and when it is a minor defect that did not affect the efficiency or fairness of the hearing process, there is no need to award compensation.  In this regard, we will turn to what was said inLabor Appeal (National) 554-09 Sabra Iron Supply and Marketing of Metal in a Tax Appeal - Moshe Shamir [Nevo] (January 13, 2011).  And so it is said (our emphases):