In other words, the appellant's retraction of her request to convict the respondent of the aforesaid sexual offenses is the error that occurred in the proceeding. Since we did not accept her request to retract it, which in any case stemmed from a misunderstanding of our position, the mistake was thus corrected in the most just manner.
- The additional assumption of my colleague, Justice Kasher, that there is "no dispute" that the respondent was subjected to legal torture, is also in my opinion erroneous. The respondent, also according to his opinion, was exposed until the day of the judgment of his conviction for the offense of assault. Even if he was of the opinion that the appellant retracted some of her arguments, this does not constitute real reliance because, as my colleague, Justice Stein, noted, the appellant did not retract her appeal. The appellant also did not retract its substantive position that the respondent should also be convicted of the offenses of rape by fraud. In other words, at this stage, the court still has the authority to convict him of the sexual offenses attributed to him. Therefore, the respondent could not rely on the appellant's position, even as he understood it (incorrectly) and conclude that it was no longer possible for him to be convicted of fraudulent rape.
- I also strongly disagree with the manner in which my colleague Justice Kasher reads the far-reaching legal implications of the Court's proposal as one in which its final position with respect to the appeal is embodied (paragraph 28 of his opinion). When the court's proposal is rejected, the appeal should be ruled as if this proposal had never been born. The court is not bound by a proposal that one of the parties rejected, and any other determination, explicit or implicit, is a deviation from a real basic concept.
To all this, I will add that if I had thought that a roof had fallen under my hands, I would not hesitate to act to correct it, whatever the consequences. I would not allow the respondent to be tainted with an offense that is not right and just to convict him, which may lead to the deprivation of the respondent's liberty, as a result of a mistake. However, the respondent is now about to be sentenced solely for his own crimes and not for any mistake. Now, he turns to us and asks for the acquittal by removing the label of the person who fraudulently raped his patients. All of this is due to a misunderstanding of the court's proposal by the appellant's counsel, which does not raise or lower evidentiary and the damage caused to it is highly doubtful.