Civil Case (Jerusalem) 13491-10-23 Talin Shahin Salah v. Ziad Kurd

1. This case concerns a claim filed by the plaintiff for recognition of her rights in the land known as Plot 35 in Block 30558, located in the Shu'fat neighborhood of Jerusalem (hereinafter: "the Land" or "Plot 35"). The land is registered in the Register of the Settlement Clerk in equal parts in the name of Mustafa Omar Mustafa Jaber ("Mustafa") who passed away, and Ibrahim Omar Mustafa Jaber ("Ibrahim").
2. According to the plaintiff, she purchased half of the rights in the land from Ms. Hadil Ahmad Faraj (the "Deal") by virtue of an agreement dated May 28, 2023 (hereinafter: the "Plaintiff's Purchase Agreement"). As part of this agreement, the plaintiff also purchased from Hadil a third of the rights in Plot 1 and half of the rights in each of Plots 5 and 14, in the same block (hereinafter, respectively: "Plot 1", "Plot 5" and "Plot 14").  According to what was stated in the plaintiff's purchase agreement, the deal itself purchased the land by means of an irrevocable power of attorney that was authenticated by notary Yosef Sagi on February 25, 1999 (hereinafter: the "1999 Power of Attorney").  According to this power of attorney, Jamal Mustafa Omar Jaber ("Jamal"), a Brazilian citizen and Mustafa's son, who served as a power of attorney for Mustafa's heirs by virtue of a power of attorney dated April 30, 1998, sold the said plots to Mustafa for consideration paid to him.
3. In accordance with the plaintiff's purchase agreement, the total consideration for all the purchased plots was $285,000 (equivalent to ILS 1,026,000). Of this, an advance payment of ILS 36,000 was paid at the time of signing the agreement, and the balance was intended to be paid on June 19, 2023, against the final transfer of the land to a notary.
4. In clause 5 of the plaintiff's purchase agreement, the dealer declared, inter alia, that the real estate is free of any obstacles, defects and previous transactions, and that it has not been sold to any entity. It also declared that it is clean and vacant, and that it will bear any responsibility insofar as the situation is different.  It should be noted that at the end of this agreement, Anwar Salah, the plaintiff's husband, is also signed as a purchaser (hereinafter: "Anwar").  The witness to the agreement that was also signed is Bahaa al-Ragabi (hereinafter: "Bahaa").
5. According to the plaintiff, pursuant to the purchase agreement, on June 19, 2023, a power of attorney was signed by the dealer in favor of the plaintiff (hereinafter: "Power of attorney 2023"). It was further claimed that on June 18, 2023, the plaintiff issued a registration document of the land from the settlement clerk.  According to her, she relied on this document, which presented Mustafa and Ibrahim as the owners of the land, and on the basis of which the consideration was paid as part of the purchase agreement.
6. According to the plaintiff, on August 20, 2023, she and her husband contacted an engineer named Bashir Tawil (hereinafter: "Tawill") to examine the planning status of the land. Tawil explained to them that Plot 35 had been split into Plots 35A and 35B.  Plot 35A was expropriated for the purpose of paving a road, while Plot 35B is a building under construction.  Hence, the claim that this is vacant land is incorrect.  It also turned out that the defendants were given a building permit for Plot 35B, and on the basis of which the said structure was built by them.
7. There is no dispute that the transaction in which the plaintiff purchased, according to the claim, the land from Mustafa's heirs, was not reported to the tax authorities and was not registered in any registry. The transaction in which the plaintiff purchased, according to the claim, the real estate from the deal, was also not reported to the tax authorities.  The plaintiff claims that the failure to report on her part stems from the current dispute, but it should be noted that as is also evident from the sequence described below, the legal date for reporting occurred even before the plaintiff, according to her, became aware of the dispute.
8. The defendants claim that they purchased the entire plot 35 by virtue of an agreement dated February 14, 2018 with Ibrahim (hereinafter: the "Defendants' Purchase Agreement"), and a power of attorney given to them in this regard from that day (hereinafter: the "Power of Attorney 2018"). The agreement was signed on behalf of Ibrahim by his daughter, Manal Ibrahim Jaber (hereinafter: "Manal"), by virtue of a power of attorney given to her by Ibrahim, who resides in the United States.  The defendants' purchase agreement states that Plot 35 is registered in the name of Mustafa and Ibrahim (section 1), and that it concerns the sale of half of this plot by Ibrahim (section 2).  It is further noted that the area of the land in question became Plot 35B (clause 4.2 of the agreement).  The power of attorney given to the defendants also indicates that only half of Plot 35 was sold.  There is no further dispute that the tax authorities were informed of the purchase of only half of the land, and the tax was paid in accordance with the purchase value provided in accordance with what was stated in the agreement for half of the plot in the sum of ILS 450,000.
9. It was not fully clarified in this proceeding why the defendants claim to have purchased the entire plot 35, even though their documents indicate the purchase of only half of it. It is possible that there are agreements and other documents that have not been disclosed, and the motives for doing so are apparently related to tax matters, with the aim of avoiding, according to them, a report of the purchase of the entire plot at this stage.  However, and as will be detailed below, in practice Ibrahim himself, who claims to have held all the rights to the land, does not claim that he had any right left in the land after the sale to the defendants.  In addition, and as it appears from the analysis below, the question of whether Plot 35 was purchased in whole or in part by the defendants, has no significance at the end of the day for the purpose of deciding this proceeding.  In the circumstances of the case, there is also no position expressed in this proceeding as to the correctness of the tax reports that were made, although it raises a question.
10. Like the plaintiff's purchase agreement, the existence of the defendants' purchase agreement is also not reflected in any land registry. However, and as detailed below, it is expressed, even publicly, in the proceedings for the issuance of a building permit by them for plot 35B vis-à-vis the municipality.
11. The Ottoman Settlement [Old Version] 1916 The defendants further claim that Ibrahim was the owner of all the rights in the land, and is authorized by virtue of this to sell them to them in full in a manner that granted them good rights in the entirety of Plot 35, by virtue of an agreed partition and dissolution agreement signed on April 6, 2000 between Ibrahim and Mustafa's heirs (hereinafter: the "Partition Agreement"). This agreement was signed through Jamal, Mustafa's son, as a proxy for his other heirs.  In accordance with the division agreement, the parties separated joint holdings in various lands that they owned, so that each transferred his share of some of the holdings to the other, and at the end of the process, each party was allocated an exclusive share in some of the plots.
12. 12-34-56-78 Chekhov v. State of Israel, P.D.  51 (2) As it emerges from the division agreement, the heirs of Mustafa transferred to Ibrahim his share in plots 5 and 35 (as well as another plot in another block), while Ibrahim transferred to the heirs of Mustafa his share, inter alia, in parcels 1 and 14.  In this way, Ibrahim became the sole owner, inter alia, of plot 35.  It appears that the division of the various plots, as carried out in the framework of the division agreement, was not reported to the tax authorities and is not reflected in the registration documents of the land.
13. The plaintiff claims that the partition agreement is forged. It appears that this argument is in fact composed of two heads: one, that it is a fictitious agreement that was not signed by Jamal at all; and the second, that it contradicts an earlier transaction - the one expressed in the 1999 power of attorney, in which the rights of Mustafa's heirs (through Jamal) were allegedly sold on February 25, 1999 in plot 35 (as well as in plots 1, 5 and 14) to the deal.  This means that at the time of the partition agreement, Jamal could not transfer to Ibrahim half of the share of Mustafa's heirs in plot 35, and hence the defendants cannot have a claim to full right in plot 35B, since half of it belongs to Hadil, which sold its right in it to the plaintiff.

Evidentiary and Testimonial Proceedings

14. On behalf of the plaintiff, she herself and her husband, Anwar, testified in this proceeding. The plaintiff also submitted an affidavit from Raed Jazi Firas Qassem (hereinafter: "Raed"), the husband of the deal, but this witness did not appear to testify, without an acceptable explanation.  It should be noted that at the pre-trial meeting on December 25, 2024, the plaintiff's counsel stated that the plaintiff herself and Architect Tawil would be brought to testify, but these witnesses were not brought at the end of the day, and no explanation was given for this.
15. On behalf of the defendants, defendant 1 testified, Ibrahim (through a teleconference, due to his age and residence in the United States), Adv. Muhannad Jabara (hereinafter: " Jabara"), who drafted the partition agreement and whose signature appears on it, and Imad Abu Khdeir, an architect who handled the aspects of the purchase of the land and the issuance of a building permit for the defendants, and according to him, was familiar with the circumstances of the signing of the partition agreement.

Discussion and Decision

16. After reviewing the arguments and testimonies, I have come to the conclusion that the claim should be dismissed.
17. Copy of the file deals with conflicting claims regarding the chain of rights in Plot 35. In order to win her claim, the plaintiff - who bears the burden in this matter - must establish the existence of the chain of rights in her favor.  In other words, she must prove that the deal acquired the rights of Mustafa's heirs in this plot in 1999, through Jamal's signature on the 1999 power of attorney in favor of the deal; and that the plaintiff subsequently purchased her rights from the deal, in accordance with the plaintiff's purchase agreement from 2023.
18. Insofar as the plaintiff does not establish the purchase of rights in parcel 35 by virtue of the said purchase chain, it does not matter for the purposes of this proceeding whether the defendants acquired good rights in this plot from Ibrahim. In such a situation, there is no need to discuss the validity of the partition agreement and the question of the relationship between the defendants who claim that they purchased the full rights in plot 35 from Ibrahim, and the claim that Ibrahim could not have sold these rights in full, since the plaintiff has no standing to make such claims.

Failure to establish the first link in the plaintiff's chain of rights (the purchase of the deal from Mustafa's heirs)

19. First, in light of the aforesaid, the question of the first link in the chain of rights on which the plaintiff relies will be examined, i.e., the basis of the claim that the dealer purchased the rights in Plot 35 from Mustafa's heirs. The burden of establishing the existence of such an agreement rests with the plaintiff (see, for example, Civil Appeal 2032/06 Amnon Hagi v.  Estate of the late Salman Yusef Zian (February 1, 2009), para.  41).
20. The plaintiff is not a party to the alleged agreement between the deal and Mustafa's heirs, as it is allegedly expressed through Jamal's signature on the 1999 power of attorney in favor of the deal. Therefore, the plaintiff herself cannot attest to the existence of this agreement or to the authenticity of the 1999 power of attorney.  The plaintiff's husband, Anwar, is also not a party to the said agreement and has no personal knowledge of it, so his testimony is also of no value to establish the authenticity of the 1999 power of attorney.
21. The 1999 power of attorney was also not presented in its original form. It shows that it was verified by the notary Yosef Sagi.  The plaintiff, who has the burden of establishing the authenticity of the document, did not bring this notary to testify, and did not provide or explain why it was not possible to do so.
22. Deal could, of course, have been a relevant witness regarding the agreement she allegedly made in 1999 for the purchase of the land, and the 1999 power of attorney that was signed in her favor. As stated, the plaintiff's attorney stated in the pre-trial that the deal would be brought to testify, but this was not done and no explanation was given.  The plaintiff's husband, Raed, on whose behalf an affidavit was filed by the plaintiff, also did not appear to testify.  No proper notice was given as to why he did not appear, but during the hearing it was argued, incidentally, that he could not be summoned due to his presence in the Occupied Territories (pp.  38, 36, p.  39, 18).  This argument does not constitute a proper justification for the witness's absence from appearing.  It was possible to request a summons in advance to allow him to enter Israel, and to the extent that this was prevented (which was not substantiated), it was possible to petition him to testify through a visual conference.
23. The conclusion that arises is that the plaintiff refrained, without any satisfactory explanation, from summoning relevant witnesses who could have established the authenticity of the alleged agreement between Mustafa's heirs (through Jamal) and the deal. In this regard, the precedents regarding refraining from bringing a relevant witness are well known, which act against the party who refrained from doing so, and establish a presumption that his testimony would have acted against him (see, for example, Civil Appeal 240/77 Shlomo Carmel in Tax Appeal v.  Farfouri & Co.  in Tax Appeal (November 8, 1979), para.  4).
24. In the present case, the failure to bring the deal to testify is even more puzzling, since, on the face of it, it was expected that the plaintiff would vacate part of her claim against her as well. This is given that the plaintiff did not receive land from the deal free of contradictory claims by third parties or even from construction, despite the deal's commitment in the agreement between her and the plaintiff.  The plaintiff claimed in her interrogation that she had no claims against the deal, because according to her, since the defendants do not have good rights in plot 35, the land is free of the rights of third parties; As for construction, in her opinion, this is not a matter that lies at the door of the deal that sold the land to her as an empty (see: pp.  19-21 of the transcript).  Her husband, Unir, did not know how to provide a response to the matter at all (pp.  72, s.  20 - p.  73, s.  10).
25. These answers are unsatisfactory, since it is not clear how a person who purchases real estate for an amount exceeding ILS 1 million, in exchange for a declaration that they are free from claims by third parties and from construction, demonstrates equanimity towards the seller, who is allegedly in violation against him from the moment it becomes clear that there is a third party claiming rights in the land and even building on them. The least that can be expected is that in such a situation, if he is "waived" by the seller, he will at least recruit him in order to help him refute the claims of the third parties.  However, even this is not done, which raises an additional question as to whether the dealer should not testify.
26. The alleged purchase of the land by the deal in 1999 raises additional questions. The defendants point out that in 1999 the deal was 22 years old, which raises the question of how she was able to purchase the land.  Even if it is said that this was done by family members for her, additional questions arise, including how it is that if the land was purchased by the deal in 1999, she did not take any action attesting to any ownership or rights in the land for nearly 25 years.  The transaction, as stated, was also not reported to the tax authorities.  In this context, it should be noted that the plaintiff raises a claim regarding the lack of proper tax reports on the part of the defendants, but this sharpens the difficulties that exist for her in this aspect as well.
27. In addition, no registration of the deal rights in the land was made, despite the many years that have passed. Here, too, the plaintiff raises claims against the defendants that their rights, or the rights of Ibrahim purchased from Mustafa's heirs, were not registered.  According to her, this raises questions as to the authenticity of the partition agreement.  But in doing so, the plaintiff ignores the fact that the rights of the deal, on which the plaintiff relies were also not registered, for a longer period; and that therefore the claims she raises act even more strongly against her.
28. The deal also did not take possession of the land, which it allegedly purchased about a quarter of a century ago. Moreover, after the defendants purchased the land in 2018, they applied for a building permit.  To this end, in 2019, public publications were made regarding the planned construction, both in the press and on the website itself.  Later on, construction began, which is evident and visible.  But the deal, which knew that its alleged rights were not registered, did not take any action to protect its rights, even in the face of the perceived possession of the land by others.
29. All of the above raises questions as to the authenticity of the alleged purchase of the land by the deal in 1999. These questions are strengthened by the fact that the deal was not brought to testify, and no other party with first-hand knowledge was brought to verify the authenticity of the 1999 power of attorney.  This power of attorney, which constitutes the only support for the existence of an alleged agreement between Mustafa's heirs and the deal, was first presented around these proceedings (and in any event - there is no indication that it was presented earlier), about a quarter of a century after it was drafted, and since Jamal, the signatory, passed away in 2018.  In such a situation, it cannot be said that the authenticity of the power of attorney was established, at least on a balance of probabilities.
30. To the aforesaid rule, it should be added that the lands held by the brothers Ibrahim and Mustafa have a history of previous falsification claims. Thus, inter alia, in 2002 and 2003 proceedings were opened (P.  1194/02 and C.A.  5259/03) concerning a claim by Jamal that a person named Nasser al-Anani (hereinafter: "Nasser") fraudulently obtained a power of attorney from him in 1999, inter alia in relation to Plot 35, and in this way subsequently sold this plot to third parties, including, according to the allegation in those proceedings, also to Raed (the husband of the deal).  Jamal himself issued a notice in March 1999 stating that transactions made on his behalf by Nasser should not be relied upon, and on January 25, 2004, a judgment was handed down in the proceeding between Jamal and Nasser, according to which Nasser had not acquired any rights in Plot 35.
31. 00This kind of background makes it even more difficult to accept as "such saw and sanctified" the 1999 power of attorney, which also relates to Plot 35, as an authentic document. This is because, as stated, there is no person with first-hand knowledge who can testify about it, and when those who could ostensibly do so were not brought to testify without a satisfactory explanation; and as stated, when this document first surfaced about a quarter of a century after its creation, and when Jamal, the signatory of it, died, he could not give his version of it as he did with regard to the power of attorney given to Nasser and was later declared null and void.
32. 0Moreover, as appears from the aforementioned development, in 1999 Jamal allegedly sold parcel 35 to Nasser. However, according to the allegation, at that time Jamal sold parcel 35 also for sale.  Even if it is now known that Jamal's "sale" of parcel 35 to Nasser was declared null and void, these "contradictory" transactions still emphasize the necessity for the plaintiff to establish the existence of the sale transaction between Jamal and Hadil from 1999.
33. Similarly, by virtue of the void sale that was made to Nasser in 1999, he sold or sought to sell in 2001 rights in Plot 35 to third parties. It follows from the aforesaid that Nasser allegedly did not see Plot 35 as having already been sold by Mustafa's heirs to the dealer in 1999.  Here, too, since the rights that Nasser acquired, and which he purported to transfer to third parties, were found null and void, the ability to learn anything from Nasser's actions is limited.  Still, this indicates the burden on which the plaintiff had to stand up to establish the authenticity of the 1999 power of attorney, taking into account contradictory claims from various directions regarding the land in question.
34. Moreover, as stated, among those to whom Nassar sold or sought to sell the land that he purchased by virtue of the sale, which was declared null and void at the end of the day, was also included Raed - the husband of the deal. Hence, Raed, for his part, was prima facie aware that the land that is now claimed to have been purchased by the deal from Jamal, was sold according to what was claimed at the time, at the same time by Jamal as well as to Nasser.  This should have raised questions, and in fact even actions were taken on his part, but there is no indication that he did anything or raised a claim in the matter.  A question also arises as to why if the deal purchased the land from Jamal, these lands were again offered for sale to Raed by Nasser.  All of these reinforce the need for Raed's testimony in this proceeding, and the significance of his failure to testify.
35. As stated above, since the plaintiff did not establish the first link in the chain of transfers by virtue of which she claims that she acquired rights in the land, this is sufficient to bring about the dismissal of her claim. It should be noted, however, that it is doubtful whether in the circumstances of the case the claim could have been accepted in the manner in which it was filed, even if the plaintiff had prima facie established the authenticity of the 1999 power of attorney.  This is since the land is currently registered with the settlement clerk in the name of Ibrahim and Mustafa.  The plaintiff seeks by means of a 1999 power of attorney to come on behalf of Mustafa's heirs and demand rights in these lands, and thus, in effect, devour the rights that according to her heirs had in them.  Such a situation necessitates, on the face of it, the inclusion of Mustafa's heirs in the proceeding, in order to preserve their possible rights, as a party who is liable to be harmed by the proceeding.  The attachment of the deal is also required for this, or at least its confirmation, that it no longer claims rights in the land.  All of this was not done, in a manner that it is doubtful would have allowed the claim to be accepted in the manner in which it was filed, even if the authenticity of the 1999 power of attorney was prima facie established.
36. The aforesaid does not ignore the fact that according to the defendants, the heirs of Mustafa have no rights in the land, since by virtue of the partition agreement they transferred them to Ibrahim. This does not detract from the need for the plaintiff to join the heirs of Mustafa as a party, in accordance with the chain of rights that she claims.

Questions regarding the second link in the plaintiff's chain of rights (the plaintiff's purchase from the deal)

37. Moreover, it should be noted that the existence of the additional link in the chain claimed by the plaintiff - the sale of the land from the deal to it - also raises quite a few questions. Unlike the 1999 power of attorney, the existence of an agreement between the plaintiff and the deal is indeed supported by first-hand witnesses attesting to the existence of the plaintiff's purchase agreement and the 2023 power of attorney, namely: the plaintiff and her husband.  However, the defendants are correct in their claim that questions arise regarding the authenticity of the alleged agreement.  In this regard, the following questions can be pointed out, inter alia:
38. Equanimity with respect to the deal: As stated above, the plaintiff was allegedly deceived by the deal in the sale of the land, when it was presented to her that there was no one claiming conflicting rights in them, and that there was no building on them. The equanimity that the plaintiff displayed towards the deal in such a situation, and the irregular responses she provided, all this despite the fact that it turns out that, prima facie, she paid the deal a sum of more than ILS 1 million for defective rights, raises questions.
39. Injunction in other parcels: Similar equanimity The plaintiff presented a similar defect that allegedly also occurred with respect to the sale of parcels 1 and 14, in the framework of the same transaction. It turns out that on December 17, 2021, an injunction was issued against the execution of dispositions in these parcels, as part of another proceeding being conducted in court against Nasser and another defendant (A.  61003-03-21).  Even if the deal is not a party to the said proceeding, so that it can claim that the injunction did not concern it, and that it could have sold parcels 1 and 14, it still follows from the aforesaid that there is a dispute going on around parcels 1 and 14.  Therefore, it is possible that the plaintiff also put her money on the deer horn in relation to them, from the time she paid for them to deal with them.  Despite this, she did not take any action against the deal, including not even demanding that she come and testify as aforesaid about the validity of the 1999 power of attorney.
40. The plaintiff did not know in her interrogation how to explain her inaction with regard to parcels 1 and 14 (p. 30, s.  4).  Her husband, Anwar, explained that the injunction referred only to half of the plots (p.  69), but on the face of it, this is not what is written in it.  Moreover, insofar as it is an injunction that relates only to half of the plots, it is actually a matter of the half relating to Mustafa's heirs.  Hence, the injunction for half of these plots relates to that half that the plaintiff purchased, according to her, which also derives from the rights of Mustafa's heirs.  The answer given, therefore, is not an answer.
41. Lack of evidence of construction and location: The facts surrounding the purchase of the land by the plaintiff are puzzling. According to her, she purchased the land after a realtor named Baha gave her a tour and showed her them in person.  On that tour, she did not see construction on Plot 35, although there is no dispute that at that time the construction was already massive and conspicuous (a house with 3 floors and 9 apartments).  In other words, allegedly, Bahaa misled the plaintiff regarding the land being purchased.  However, Bahaa was also not sued by her and was not brought to testify.  It should be noted that the claim that the plaintiff did not know what plot she bought, and did not know that there was construction on it, is puzzling even in view of the fact that there is no dispute that she lives a short walk from this plot.
42. Late inspections: According to the plaintiff, the fact that there is construction on the land and claims regarding them on the part of the defendants was revealed to her only when she contacted Architect Tawil on August 20, 2023, about three months after the plaintiff's purchase agreement was signed, and about two months after she paid, according to her, the full consideration. It is not clear why the inspections regarding the land were conducted only after the agreement was signed and the payment was made.  Needless to say, Architect Tawil was not brought by the plaintiff to testify about this sequence of events, despite the statement of her attorney who will testify to him.  No explanation was given for this.
43. Knowledge of conflicting rights: It is possible to cast doubt on the question of whether the plaintiff did not indeed know about the alleged conflicting rights regarding Plot 35. These facts can be learned from the point of view of the land on the municipality's website, where it can be seen that a building permit was issued, who received it (the defendants), and what documents were submitted (including the division agreement and an explanation on the basis of which it was claimed that the entire plot 35 belonged to Ibrahim).  It is reasonable to assume that the person who executes such a transaction examines open documents of this type before the transaction, and not only about three months after the signing of the agreement and about two months after the full payment of the consideration.
44. The plaintiff's husband's expertise: The plaintiff's husband, Anwar, who took an active part in the purchase, presented himself to a private investigator as a real estate expert who understands fraudulent claims, and as someone who is entrusted with examinations and advice. Hence, this is not a layman with regard to the issues at hand.  By virtue of this, too, one may wonder how the plaintiff did not know about the contradictory rights claimed prior to the purchase, and to the extent that she did not know - what was behind it.
45. Reliance on the Settlement Clerk's Register: The plaintiff claims that she relied on the registry with the settlement clerk, according to which Ibrahim and Mustafa are the owners of the rights in the land. However, this alleged "reliance" is useless, for several reasons: a.  This register is not binding; b.  The plaintiff, in fact, did not rely on this register, since she issued the registration on June 18, 2023, about a month after the signing of the purchase agreement she signed with the law; c.  In any case, it is clear from the registry that it does not reflect an up-to-date picture of the rights, since the claimed deal rights were also not registered in it.
46. Lack of interest in the partners: The plaintiff did not bother to check who her real estate partners were. According to her, she did not know about the existence of the division agreement, and hence, when she purchased the rights from the deal, she entered into a partnership in the rights in the land together with Ibrahim.  Such a partnership requires cooperation, and it is reasonable to assume that someone who enters into such a partnership while incurring a considerable financial expense will examine who his partners are.  In this case, such an inquiry could have revealed to the plaintiff in advance that there are those who claim conflicting rights.  However, the plaintiff did not show interest in the identity of the partners.
47. Non-reporting to the tax authorities: The plaintiff's alleged purchase transaction from the deal was not reported to the tax authorities.  The plaintiff claimed that this stemmed from the disagreements that are the subject of this proceeding.  But not only is it not clear why the existence of disagreements allows her not to report the transaction, but according to the plaintiff, she became aware of the contradictory claims only about three months after the signing of the agreement, when Tawil informed her of the status of the real estate.  This means that the date for reporting came even before the alleged "cause" for non-reporting arose.  In his interrogation, Anwar gave another reason for the non-reporting - lack of money.  But this explanation is also puzzling: it is occupied, it is not clear how the lack of money grants an exemption from reporting, and the claim of lack of money is puzzling given that the amount of the transaction (over ILS 1 million) was allegedly paid, when the amount of purchase tax is negligible in comparison.
48. The price of the transaction: The price of the alleged transaction raises questions. As part of the plaintiff's purchase agreement, she allegedly purchased four parcels of the deal in the amount of ILS 1,026,000.  However, according to the agreement between the defendants and Ibrahim, which was drawn up about five years earlier, the price of half of parcel 35 was ILS 450,000.  According to this index, the sum for the four plots should have been much higher.
49. Lack of evidence for payment: No evidence was presented that the plaintiff paid Hadiel the amount of the transaction in the amount of ILS 1,026,000. The plaintiff attached various documents, some unsigned and some incomplete, in an attempt to show that she had paid the full amount.  However, an examination of these documents shows that at most they can attest to financial sources for the payment of a few hundred thousand shekels, if any.  The plaintiff did not present additional financial sources, nor did she present that she transferred a sum to the deal.  According to her, the payment was made in cash.  This also raises questions, given the scope of the amount.
50. All of the aforementioned questions raise a question as to the authenticity of the alleged agreement signed between the plaintiff and the deal for the purchase of the land. There may be a reason to claim that the said transaction was intended in these circumstances only to serve an argument intended to devour the rights that the defendants claim to have purchased in the land by virtue of a chain of rights originating in the division agreement.  This is done by creating an alternative "chain", which originated in the 1999 power of attorney that preceded it, and by attempting to create claims of reliance that may be easier to bring from a third-party purchaser (i.e., not from the deal itself).  In any event, since questions of this kind are added to the fact that the plaintiff did not establish the beginning of the chain she sought to create (the authenticity of the power of attorney 1999), this reinforces the fact that her claim cannot be accepted.

Reference to the nature of the defendants' rights

51. In the circumstances described, in which the plaintiff did not establish rights in the land, there is in fact no need to deal with the nature of the defendants' rights in the land by virtue of their purchase agreement, and the chain of rights on which they rely originated in the division agreement between Ibrahim and Mustafa. This is since the plaintiff has no standing to deal with this.  In this state of affairs, I see no need to elaborate on the said partition agreement.  Thus, since any determination given in the framework of this proceeding regarding the chain of rights claimed by the defendants is in any case valid only against the plaintiff, and not against third parties who are not parties to this proceeding.  Its value is therefore limited, and there is no room for such an analysis, since in any case it is not required for a decision in the present proceeding.
52. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, I will note that Adv. Jabara testified before me, as a signatory to the partition agreement, and as someone who, according to him, also drafted it, and was present at the time it was signed by Ibrahim and Jamal (on behalf of Mustafa's heirs) (pp. 160, paras.  17-20).  Jabara referred to the plaintiff's arguments regarding the difference between different copies of the partition agreement - a difference that does not relate to its contents, but rather to the manner in which the date was recorded, etc.  Adv. Jabara presented the original copies of the agreement in his possession, and gave various explanations as to why the dates are recorded in different ways in the different versions.  Ibrahim also testified before me, in a remote meeting.  As the plaintiff notes, the value of his testimony was limited, taking into account his age, the manner in which the testimony was conducted in the conference (through which it was difficult to communicate), and the fact that others were present with him in the room.  Within these limitations, Ibrahim also confirmed his signature on the partition agreement.  It also emerged from his statement that he no longer claimed rights in plot 35.  In these circumstances, it appears that the very fact that the partition agreement was signed was established by the defendants, at least to the extent that this was necessary for the purposes of this proceeding.
53. The plaintiff raised additional claims, including regarding the fact that the distribution agreement was not reported to the tax authorities (but, as stated, the 1999 power of attorney was also not reported); that there is no expression of the distribution agreement in the settlement clerk's register (but there is also no expression of the 1999 power of attorney); that in accordance with the agreement between the defendants and Ibrahim, they purchased only half of plot 35 and paid tax only for half (when the plaintiff itself did not pay any tax for the purchase claimed by her); and that in the defendants' purchase agreement there is no mention of the distribution agreement.
54. The plaintiff further points out that in the proceeding instigated by opening 1194/02 and in T.A. 5259/03 Jamal argued against Nasser and others to win Plot 35 without stating that a division agreement had been made with respect to the land in such a way that Plot 35 no longer belonged to him.  The judgment given with consent in T.A.  5259/03 In 2004 it also ruled that the rights in Plot 35 belonged to Mustafa's heirs, which is ostensibly inconsistent with the 2000 partition agreement.
55. In the circumstances of the case, and in light of the fact that the plaintiff herself did not establish any rights in the land, there is no need to rule as to the significance of these facts, including the question of the correctness of the tax reports or what arises from the judgment given and Jamal's arguments in the framework thereof. The aforesaid emphasizes, however, that without clear evidence regarding all the details of the chain claimed by either party, there is difficulty in drawing conclusions.  The same applies to the chain claimed by the plaintiff, who, as detailed above, has the burden of establishing it on her, and she did not comply with it, she has no standing to argue regarding the chain of rights brought by the defendants.

Additional Matters

56. Request to add evidence: After the conclusion of the evidence chapter and the submission of its summaries, the plaintiff filed a motion to add evidence, concerning an alleged declaration made by Manal regarding Plot 1, in the framework of documents submitted to the Jerusalem Municipality, according to which in 2017 Ibrahim was still the owner of Plot 1. This ostensibly contradicts the division agreement, by virtue of which this plot was transferred to Mustafa's heirs.  The plaintiff thus wishes to challenge the existence of the division agreement.  I do not see fit to accept this evidence.  These are documents that are in the custody of the Jerusalem Municipality, and have been available for examination since at least 2023.  Therefore, this is evidence that could have been submitted earlier, had diligence been taken.  Beyond that, and more importantly, in any event, the aforesaid evidence has no bearing on the outcome of this proceeding, which is determined on the basis of the plaintiff's failure to establish the chain of rights on which it relis.  In these circumstances, there is no need to determine the question of possible defects in the chain of rights claimed by the defendants.
57. Graphological examination: The plaintiff claims that she was willing to perform a graphological examination of the partition agreement, while the defendants refused, which works against them. I do not see things that way.  Nothing prevented the plaintiff from conducting her own examination, if she believed that it was significant.  In the circumstances in which Adv. Jabara testified that the agreements were signed before him, it is not certain that a graphological opinion was required or what its significance would have been in the face of a witness who claimed that the document was drafted by him and his signature.  It should also be noted that in any event, the question of the validity of the partition agreement for the purposes of this proceeding has no significance, since the plaintiff has not based the chain of rights on which it relied.  In this regard, since the plaintiff did not bring either the deal, her husband Raed, nor even the notary who testified regarding the authenticity of the 1999 power of attorney, it is possible (without setting rivets) that she could have benefited herself precisely by bringing a graphological or other expert opinion that would relate to the said power of attorney, but she chose not to do this either.
58. The defendants' purchase agreement as evidence of a prior transaction: The plaintiff tries to substantiate her claim regarding the existence of a previous transaction, in which the share of Mustafa's heirs was sold through a 1999 power of attorney for the dealership, and this is also based on the fact that, as detailed above, the defendants' purchase agreement and the accompanying documents (i.e., the power of attorney and the tax report) relate to the sale of only half of the rights in plot 35 to the defendants. Hence, according to her, it was known that the other half had been sold earlier, and therefore no sale of the entire plot was made.  I do not believe that such an inference can be constructed, and it certainly does not alone establish the authenticity of the 1999 power of attorney, which was not otherwise established.  The same is said with regard to the plaintiff's claim that in the division agreement it was not stated, with respect to the situation prior to the division, that half of Plot 35 was in the hands of Ibrahim.  The argument does not help the plaintiff, given that the said agreement states that half of Plot 35 is owned by Mustafa's heirs, implying that the starting point was that as of the Partition Agreement (April 6, 2000), Mustafa's heirs had not yet sold their rights in half of the said plot.  The fact that it was not recorded that the other half was in the hands of Ibrahim does not increase or decrease it.  In any event, it was recorded that after the division was made, Ibrahim is the owner of all the rights in Plot 35.

Conclusion

59. In light of the aforesaid and detailed above, the claim is dismissed.
60. The plaintiff will pay the defendants expenses in the amount of ILS 40,000, plus reimbursement of the expenses of the witness summoned by the defendants, and whose salary was awarded in the sum of ILS 1,500.

Given today, April 21, 2026, in the absence of the parties.