I will note that there are even those who claim that the status of the banking corporations justifies the application of public law directly to them, as if they were actual public bodies, because their involvement in the financial life of every person in the country is so deep that it is impossible to imagine the possibility of managing a person's financial affairs without the banks [see the judgment in the Tsobari case, supra).
- "Eliya" - stems from the fact that in accordance with the case law so far, the court that transfers the decision of the banking corporation under its control will exercise an audit similar to the audit exercised on an administrative authority. In other words, the court does not exchange its discretion for the discretion of the authority [see High Court of Justice 8938/11 "All For Peace" v. Minister of Communications [published in Nevo] (February 24, 2015), paragraph 18 of the judgment of Justice Melcer and the references therein; Uri Goren, Administrative Courts 176 (2008)] and his judicial review will be heard only in cases where the administrative decision is tainted by a flaw or extreme unreasonableness, i.e., it exceeded the realm of reasonableness [see HCJ 4374/15 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Prime Minister of Israel, [published in Nevo] (March 27, 2016), paragraph 46 of the judgment of Deputy President Rubinstein]. Among other things, the court will examine whether the authority conducted a lawful proceeding, considered all the relevant considerations, whether it had before it all the necessary data and whether its decision was not tainted by extraneous considerations (see High Court of Justice 1105/06 Kav LaOved v. Minister of Welfare [published in Nevo] (June 22, 2014), paragraph 37 of Justice Arbel's judgment]. With regard to the scope of the reasonableness of the decision of the administrative authority, the Supreme Court's rulings in the case of the High Court of Justice 2324/91 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The National Council for Planning and Building, Ministry of the Interior, IsrSC 45(3) 678, ibid., at page 688, it was held: "But this is not the test that the court must follow when it is required to intervene in the actions of the Administration. The question in which he must decide is not what the court would have decided, in similar circumstances, unless the Administration's decision is subject to review, since it is a decision that a reasonable administrative authority could have made. If the decision meets the test of reasonableness - in the sense that it constitutes one of the most reasonable decisions that could have been made in those circumstances - the court will not intervene in it."
Similarly, it was also held in the High Court of Justice case 389/80 Golden Pages v. The Broadcasting Authority et al., IsrSC 35(1) 421 at pp. 442-3 that: "The principle of non-interference by the court in the administrative discretion means that the choice between the various possible solutions that fall within the realm of reasonableness is entirely up to the administrative authority..."In summary: the administrative freedom of choice operates within the realm of reasonableness. In this area, the court will not intervene and will not replace administrative discretion with its own discretion. A choice made outside the realm of reasonableness will be invalidated by the court. The realm of reasonableness itself is determined by the court, which asks itself what is the scope of considerations of a reasonable administrative authority in the concrete circumstances of the matter before it."