"The decisive position is the position of the Bank of Israel, and of the Supervisor of Banks. It is the one that should guide the banks and it is the one that binds them. If the Bank of Israel finds it difficult to decide on the issue of principle, why should we complain about the respondent, or any other bank?
The bank, therefore, is in a state of "woe to me from my trouble and woe to me from my maker" (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Berachot, page 61, page 1). If he permits activities related to Bitcoin trading, he is liable to violate his obligations under the Prohibition of Money Laundering Law, in the absence of the ability or knowledge to manage the risk involved in trading in Bitcoin, which was loudly and jointly declared by the authorities in the country most authorized to do so, in their joint announcement of February 19, 2014, as stated above (and see Erdinast's aforementioned testimony, p. 155). If he prohibits transactions related to Bitcoin trading, he may violate his obligations under Section 2(a) of the Banking Law (Customer Service).
It follows that in this situation, any decision of the bank - the respondent, one way or another, will be within the "realm of reasonableness" set out in the case law, as stated above....
It should be emphasized that my aforesaid conclusion does not mean that the respondent's decision to prohibit any activity in the account related to trading in Bitcoin is more "correct". Similarly, if the respondent had decided to permit such activity, while imposing close supervision and with the assistance of good experts capable of managing such a risk, it is possible that even then his decision would have been more "correct." (My emphasis, 32)
[Opening Motion (Tel Aviv District) 1992-06-15 Bits of Gold in Tax Appeal v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel in Tax Appeal [Published in Nevo] (June 6, 2017)]
An appeal against the District Court's judgment was filed with the Supreme Court, but has not yet been heard and decided. At the same time, the Supreme Court, by the Honorable Justice Baron, was required to apply for a temporary injunction that was filed in the framework of the appeal, and in her decision on this matter, the Honorable Justice Baron held with regard to the chances of the appeal, that although the District Court's judgment was based on factual findings in which the appellate court would not be inclined to intervene, that: