I am of the opinion and the basis for my reasoning will be detailed below, because this too was decided on the basis of my above determinations.
What is this supposed to mean?
The Bank argues, as stated, that the relevant date for examining the reasonableness of its decision regarding the closure of the accounts is close to the date of sending the notice of closure in March 2017, and furthermore, it argues that the plaintiffs are prevented from arguing that this date is irrelevant given the procedural agreement of the parties as expressed during the hearing. The problem is that I have detailed above and at length that I am convinced that the decision was made by the Bank in November 2016 and that all the actions, demands of the Bank and the arguments it raised, from that date onwards, were made from the "mouth to the outside", in order to justify the decision and not in order to examine on the merits the counter-arguments of the plaintiffs, as well as material that was invented by them. Moreover, I determined that the bank did not conduct a lawful proceeding, including not allowing the plaintiffs to deal with suspicions that arose in the hearts of its employees in March 2017, but rather gave a closure notice without reflecting these suspicions to its customers - the plaintiffs. In view of the above, it seems to me that the argument as to the correct date for examining the reasonableness of the decision is merely semantic, since even if he had examined the reasonableness of the decision in March 2017, given the determinations that the proceeding conducted by the Bank as the basis for the said decision is not lawful, and in any case the decision is null and void, as I have determined.
The situation is similar with regard to the claim of a crisis of confidence. Thus, according to the bank, in light of the plaintiffs' actions in their accounts, their constant refusal to provide the bank with the information to allay its concerns, and additional information that it became aware of in the course of the legal proceeding, which is inconsistent with previous representations, created a crisis of confidence in its relationship with the plaintiffs. The problem, as I have determined, was that the bank was the one that did not reflect its concerns to the plaintiffs in real time, contacted and asked for documents that were invented, demanded documents that were not previously required, while the plaintiffs were the ones who cooperated with the bank fully or at least sufficiently. Moreover, I have detailed at length that the lack of clarity that remains regarding certain issues also stems in part from questions that were first raised in the framework of the legal proceeding, and in any case it does not establish relevant concrete suspicions. In light of the aforesaid, the bank's claims based on a lack of trust should be rejected - in the sense of "the horse fell and its rider fell" - given that these are based on its claims that were rejected.