Family file (K.S.) 3858-07-23 M. G. v. C. A. C. - part 2

The plaintiffs' arguments

9. The background and the establishment of rights. The plaintiffs claim that they are the owners of the right to farm XX in XXXX, by virtue of an irrevocable appointment as a "surviving son" by the deceased, which was approved by the Agency and the Agricultural Association.
10. The deceased appointed the plaintiffs as a successor son back in 1984. When on the same day the Association recommended to the Agency to approve the appointment, on December 12, 1984, the Agency approved the appointment of the successor son.  As a result, the agency wrote to the deceased that he must contact the Ministry of Construction and Housing, in order to clarify the claimants' eligibility for assistance in the construction of their home on the farm as a successor son.
11. Based on the Association's recommendation and the approval of the appointment, the plaintiffs received a permit to build their home on the farm, and built their home with the knowledge of all the defendants that they were the continuing son on the farm. According to them, the deceased's intention was to appoint the plaintiff as the son of a successor to the tax appeal who would receive full rights in the agricultural farm, after the death of the deceased, without compensating his brothers and sisters.
12. The plaintiffs emphasize that the appointment was never revoked by the deceased, who was lucid until his last days. On the contrary, over the years the deceased signed various documents in which the appointment of the plaintiffs as a successor son is mentioned.  It was further claimed that the appointment was made in the necessary and customary manner as of 1984, when at that time the appointment was signed only by the Agency and the Agricultural Association without the need for registration with the ILA.  The plaintiffs emphasized that the provision of section 55, which was established only in 1997, did not apply retroactively, and since the plaintiffs were lawfully appointed in accordance with the rules that were in force at the time of the appointment in 1984, this is a gift that has been completed and the defendants cannot retract it, let alone that they do not give the gift at all.
13. On April 28, 2008, the Agency reaffirmed the appointment of the plaintiffs as a "continuing son" in the economy, which they claim strengthens the validity of the original appointment.
14. the conduct of the economy and the relations between the parties. In the early 1990s, after the deceased retired, the plaintiffs began to cultivate the agricultural farm.  The plaintiffs and the defendants became partners in all three farms - of the deceased father and of defendants 2-3.  According to the plaintiffs, over the years the defendants treated them as a successor son for all intents and purposes.  Moreover, over the years defendants 1-3 received other farms in view of the fact that they are not the 'continuing son' in farm XX.  Defendant 2 is also a farm owner.
15. In1992, the plaintiff was arrested for 8 months and stopped working on the farm.
16. In view of the defendant's arrest and his inability to work in the farm and in partnership, an agreement was signed between the plaintiff and defendants 2-3 in November 1993 relating to the plaintiff's temporary absence from the operation of the farm. In its framework, defendants 2-3 explicitly referred to the plaintiff as a "continuing son", and it was determined that the plaintiffs would receive monthly advances in the sum of ILS 3,000 on account of the profits from the agricultural activity in the farm.  However, at a certain point, according to the plaintiffs, defendants 2-3 stopped transferring the monthly advance and never transferred their share of the profits.
17. In 1995, the plaintiff was sentenced and imprisoned for a cumulative period of about 7 years and released in 1999 (after which he served an additional period of two years in prison for another offense). Following his imprisonment, the plaintiff moved in 1997 to live in a rented apartment in...  near her family.  According to the plaintiffs, their absence from the farm was only temporary due to the plaintiff's imprisonment and his wife's move to live near her family.  The plaintiff then found herself caring for minor children without any help or assistance, while her husband was serving a prison sentence.  The move to live near her family members was a constraint created by the necessity of the circumstances, and certainly not a relinquishment of rights and abandonment of the farm.  The plaintiffs noted that the defendants pushed them out of the farm and behaved disgracefully toward them.
18. In recent years, the plaintiffs have been forced to live elsewhere as they are unable to earn a living from the farm in light of the defendants' conduct. The defendants do not transfer rent to the plaintiffs and make use of the productive parts of the farm without paying the plaintiffs usage fees.
19. In 2002, the plaintiff and defendants 2-3 signed an agreement in which they treated the plaintiff as the owner of rights in the father's farm, which he received as part of the proceeding of a successor son (an agreement that was not ultimately signed by the deceased and the plaintiff and therefore did not take effect).
20. The deceased passed away on 00.00.2015, a few weeks later a notice was sent by the ILA to the ILA regarding the transfer of the estate to the possession of a settler, and thus the plaintiffs became the owners of the rights in the XXXX farm .

1. A request for the transfer of rights at the ILA was signed by the Association on January 25, 2016.  The ILA responded with a letter demanding that incorrect technical details be corrected.  A month later (May 2016), an order was issued to probate the deceased's will from 2011, in which he bequeathed parts of the farm to the plaintiff and parts to defendants 1-3.
2. Counsel for the plaintiffs contacted the ILA regarding the requirements to amend the application and the probate order that was granted.

23. On June 30, 2016, the Association announced that in light of the probate order, it was not completing the transfer of rights according to the appointment of the surviving son, contrary to the request it signed for the transfer of rights from January 2016, and that it was not taking sides.
24. A few days later, the ILA replied that as of this point, no "continuing son" had been registered. It was then that the plaintiffs learned for the first time that the process of appointing him as a continuing son in the economy had not been officially completed.  The association, on the other hand, replied that it would re-sign the request for the transfer of rights only in accordance with a judicial order.
25. The plaintiffs' rights were determined by virtue of an irrevocable written undertaking by the deceased. This undertaking was never revoked by the deceased, even though 30 years had passed since the undertaking was given until his death.
26. The obligation of the deceased in the affidavit of transfer was not conditional on the consent of a third party, therefore, in the circle of internal relations between the plaintiffs and the deceased, the purchase was completed and cannot be reversed. For many years, the plaintiffs relied on this undertaking, built their home on the farm and did not receive any other agricultural land as defendants 1-3 received.
27. The will of the deceased contradicts the slot agreement, which limits the ability to transfer the right of the licensee to more than one person. In addition, the slot agreement does not permit the division of the inheritance.  In any case, a person can only command what he has, and once a successor's son is legally registered, it is not possible to "bypass" the appointment by means of a will.  Beyond the aforesaid, the farm is not an estate asset at all, and the transfer of rights in it can only be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the agreement between the ILA, the Agency and the Agricultural Association.
28. The plaintiffs' lives were not simple. In addition to the prison terms that the plaintiff served, their financial situation also deteriorated.  The plaintiffs are in bankruptcy proceedings, had difficulty fighting the defendants and the association, and did not have the means to stand up for their rights.  The plaintiffs received permission to file this claim on behalf of the court that manages the insolvency proceedings.
29. The plaintiffs are deprived of income and livelihood from the farm and the houses built therein, while the plaintiffs continue to rent out a house on the estate and enjoy its fruits and profits.
30. The time has come to return to the plaintiffs the estate that the deceased father intended for them and the funds that were illegally withheld from them for years.

The defendants' arguments

31. The deceased father signed the affidavit 40 years ago, in order to allow the plaintiff to build a house on his estate. This is not the appointment of a successor son and the father did not intend to do so.  From then until his death, he was not required to complete the appointment of the actual successor son.
32. Even if the deceased ostensibly intended to transfer to the plaintiffs the rights in the entire estate, there is no doubt that his intention did not evolve into a valid appointment, and the deceased never signed an irrevocable power of attorney to perfect the rights of the surviving son. In any event, the deceased changed his will in light of the plaintiffs' behavior, and in his will he clearly cancelled the gift and instead ordered his desire to divide the farm.
33. The plaintiffs abandoned the estate and the father, and even after he was diagnosed with cancer, they did not visit him or assist in his care and care for his needs and health - even after the plaintiff was released from prison. For decades, the defendants have been the ones who hold the estate, invest in it and the deceased's home, and improve them with their money, while the deceased father is still alive and with his permission.  It was the defendants who took care of the father for all his needs until his last day, while the plaintiffs reneged on all obligation to him and to the estate.
34. The defendants continue to use and invest in the estate after they inherited the father's rights according to his will, and in view of plaintiff No. 1's waiver of his rights claimed in the framework of intra-family agreements.
35. At the end of the day, a successor son was not appointed lawfully - whether due to a change in the father's will and the cancellation of the gift due to disgraceful behavior, or in light of the fact that the appointment was not completed, or due to the statute of limitations, extreme delay or waiver of rights. In light of the aforesaid and in the absence of a successor son, it is necessary to act in accordance with the final order or alternatively in accordance with section 114 of the Inheritance Law and fulfill the will of the deceased as it arises from his will.
36. The rights of plaintiff 2 in the estate, including the residence, which was bequeathed to plaintiff 1 only, are denied. Her rights were completely violated with the separation from plaintiff 1 and in view of her abandonment of the deceased and the estate for decades.  and also in view of his explicit will and the final order.
37. In the ILA records, there are no records attesting to the appointment of a successor son with rights in the estate. Even if we accept the argument that at the time of the appointment there was no need to register the "continuing son" with the ILA, after the provision of Section 55 came into effect in 1997, the plaintiffs had to complete the appointment.
38. The probate order is final, the plaintiffs knew of the deceased's death and the order was about 7 years before the lawsuit was filed. There is no substantive authority to cancel parts of the order.
39. The lawsuit contradicts the ILA's position, which applies a broad interpretation of the provisions of the slot agreement, according to which a person is entitled to instruct in the will to whom his rights will be transferred, provided that the provisions of the will do not contradict the provisions of the slot agreement, i.e., a sale to one party, without splitting rights.
40. The plaintiffs concealed relevant material facts - for example, the fact of severing contact with the deceased was concealed. The plaintiff caused the deceased mental anguish and shame due to his conviction for criminal offenses and serving many years in prison.  The existence of intra-family agreements in the framework of and based on them, the plaintiffs sold to defendants 2-3 any claimed future right, and received hundreds of thousands of shekels directly or through de facto payment, or assistance in payment to creditors and loans.
41. There is no reason to order the transfer of the rights to a "successor son" who for decades has severed all connection with the estate that is supposed to pass to him, ostensibly, by virtue of his being a continuing son.

The ILA's position

42. The rights in the estate are registered in the name of the deceased.
43. On September 9, 2015, the Authority received a notice from the Jewish Agency regarding the transfer of the estate to the plaintiffs.
44. On April 10, 2016, a notice was sent to the plaintiffs stating that they must complete the documents detailed in the notice for the purpose of transferring the rights in the estate.
45. An examination of the ILA's letter dated July 3, 2016 shows that the plaintiffs were asked to transfer documents that were signed for the purpose of registering them as a 'successor son' with the Jewish Agency. The Authority did not find a notice regarding the appointment from the Agency.  The plaintiffs were also asked to renew the validity of the approval of the agency's consent of September 1, 2015.
46. The appointment of the plaintiffs as a successor son in the estate XX in XXXX is denied due to lack of knowledge. If it is proven that the plaintiffs were indeed appointed, the Authority has no objection in principle to the transfer of the rights in their name, subject to the completion of the required approvals.
47. If they are unable to prove their appointment as a successor son, the transfer of rights in the estate after the death of the licensee must be carried out in accordance with the hierarchy set out in section 20.e. to the slot agreement.
48. It is clarified, for the avoidance of doubt, that an estate should not be divided among several owners of rights, but rather that the rights therein should be transferred in its entirety. An agricultural farm is not part of the estate of the deceased, and in any case a will cannot prevail over the rule that estates cannot be divided.
49. However, with regard to the relief requested to cancel the will, in addition to the residence, the Authority will argue that it is currently possible to split the residential plot of the estate into lots - in this context as well, the split will be done only subject to the decisions and procedures of the Authority.
50. The authority leaves the discretion regarding remedies to the court.

Summary of the Jewish Agency's Arguments

51. The Agency clarified that it is not taking a party to the dispute, and will respect any decision of the court in the dispute between the parties regarding the registration of the rights holders in the economy.
52. At the same time, the agency noted that according to its records, the plaintiffs were appointed as continuing sons back in 1984 and that this appointment was approved by it 24 years later in its letter to the Society dated April 28, 2008.

00Discussion and Decision