In addition, I will refer to what is stated in the case of the High Court of Justice 3734/11 Dudian v. Knesset of Israel, IsrSC 66(1) 65, paragraph 29 (2012):
"Another position holds that taxation does not infringe property - since the state takes its legitimate share as a partner in the citizens' profits, as it is the provider of infrastructure and public services thanks to which these profits were made possible. According to this position as well, a tax should be a 'good tax,' which satisfies, among other things, the requirements of fairness, efficiency, certainty, and consideration of the taxpayer when imposing the tax (Yosef M. Edrei, Tax Events 24 (2007))."
Finally, I will quote from the desert Prof. Joshua Weissman in his article "Constitutional Protection of Property" The Attorney 42 258, 273 (5755):
"A question [...] arises in connection with laws that impose taxes [...]. Such laws clearly infringe on a person's property, but even in connection with this, the accepted answer in various countries is that no tax [...] established in the law should not be examined in light of the accepted tests that permit infringement of private property, but rather they are regarded as a matter within the jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of fulfilling its functions. There are some countries where the constitutions explicitly state that the protection of a person's property does not extend to provisions that impose taxes or prescribe fines, and there are those who have reached this conclusion by way of interpretation. The difficulty involved in constitutional protection against taxing laws stems, among other things, from the fact that property protection is usually given in relation to defined assets. Taxes, on the other hand, usually harm a person's general property but not any specific asset. Another difficulty involved in this issue stems from the accepted assumption that taxes provide funding for the general budget and not for a specific purpose. As such, it is not possible to assess the harm of taking a tax against any specific purpose for which the tax is imposed."
- It is plain, in my opinion, that the legislation we are dealing with is prospective, since it does not purport to cancel an exemption from taxation that was perfected before it came into force.
- Since we are dealing with a lateral arrangement that is based on a consideration of the kind, such an arrangement also does not violate the right to equality (see, among many: High Court of Justice 4124/00 Yekutieli v. Minister of Religious Affairs, IsrSC 66(1) 142, para. 36 (2010)).
- It would have been better if the petitions that the petitioners had placed on our table had not been submitted. For this reason, I would have been satisfied if my colleague, Justice Grosskopf, had seen fit to impose on the petitioners exemplary expenses amounting to double the amount proposed by him (i.e., ILS 200,000 instead of ILS 100,000). However, after considering the matter, I have decided to join my opinion with my colleague's opinion on the matter of expenses - this is in order to avoid disagreements on a matter that is not at the core of the petitions, and also for reasons of fairness, the main purpose of which is to give advance notice to those who file similar petitions in the future.
Alex SteinJudge |