The principle of "fair accounting" does not deal with the motives of the advertiser, but rather with the question of whether the method of publication misleads or presents in an unbalanced and tendentious manner the reported subject, and in this case the personal details of the respondent. Since the respondent did not express in any way at the time his reservations about the publication of his personal details, which he presented in the public proceeding, it is difficult to see how the publication of the title of the claim constitutes an unfair account of its submission. Moreover, the publication was not accompanied by a call to use the personal details, nor to further repetition of them, nor to the use of visual or other means (see the Ben Horin case below), which could increase the violation of privacy beyond the report itself, or to remove the personal details from the context in which they were published.
The purpose of the protection of correct and fair reporting, which enables the repetition of protected publications, is to promote the overarching principle of the publicity of the discussion...
It was clarified that the solution lies in the application for a gag order by virtue of section 21, the "main purpose of which ... to prevent publication on matters of a 'completely private nature.'" (ibid., paragraph 43 of Justice Orr's opinion). The scholar Uri Shenhar presented the difficulty that arises from the very publication of "particularly offensive content", which cannot be corrected by presenting a counter-position (Shenhar, Defamation Law, supra, para. 16 October 2014). However, he clarified that denying the defense of reports about what happened in a public meeting would harm the publicity of the hearing. Therefore, there is a basis for the argument that a plaintiff who wishes to protect his good name or his private interests that arise in a public meeting can apply in advance for a gag of publication, and if he does not do so, or the court rejects his request, he cannot complain about the person who published the matter (Application for Leave to Appeal (Tel Aviv) 1376/02 Yefet v. Yedioth Ahronoth Ltd., p. 7 (March 26, 2006))."
- The plaintiff claims in his claim for compensation also by virtue of the tort of negligence (see, for example, paragraphs 76 and 81 of the statement of claim). The question of the relationship between the tort of negligence and the tort set forth in the Protection of Privacy Law has not yet been decided in the Supreme Court's ruling, although in the various magistrate's courts the opinion that a claim for invasion of privacy can also be filed by virtue of the tort of negligence:
"In the case law, the position was expressed that the particular tort by virtue of the Protection of Privacy Law does not exclude the possibility of a lawsuit on the basis of the same circumstantial array by virtue of the tort of negligence (see, for example, the detailed decision in Civil Case (Shalom Netch.) 22029-06-11 Khalilia v. Israel Bar Association (September 3, 2015), at paragraphs 15-26 of the decision of the Honorable Justice A. Golomb; Similarly, the words of Justice Y. Amit sitting in the Magistrate's Court in Civil Case (Acre Magistrate) 2483/97 Shaltiel v. Mizrahi Bank United in a Tax Appeal (October 4, 1999), where he expressed his opinion that a negligence claim can be filed even in the case of a complete overlap between the tort of invasion of privacy and the tort of negligence. However, for a different position, see the extensive review inCivil Case (Shalom Rishon LeZion) 8238-05-11 Anonymous v. Partner Communications Ltd., (March 25, 2014), paragraphs 71-107 of the judgment of the Honorable Justice Y. Blecher." (Civil Case (Shalom J.M.) 16319-12-13 Bnei Sela v. Israel Police (Nevo, March 2, 2018), by the Honorable Judge D. Gidoni).