Labor Dispute (Be’er Sheva) 32096-04-19 Sylvia Dahan Guetta – Association of Cities for the Environment Ashdod - part 30

As for informing the employees of the filing of the lawsuit, the plaintiff's claim that it was an attempt to harm her is rejected.  Dr.  Rosen explained in her testimony that she had heard about the filing of the lawsuit "from all directions" - from the secretary of Nahal Sorek and from employees in Ashdod.  [270] Out of a managerial perception of transparency and a desire to "put an end to the rumor mill," she convened the union's employees and updated them.  According to her, the purpose of the update call was "to update the union's employees on the matter, in order to maintain the nature and routine of work in the union"[271], and "this update call and what was stated in it did not harm your client"[272].  This action, in the circumstances of the case, is intended to deal with the situation that has been created in an open and orderly manner, and does not constitute an attempt to harm the plaintiff.

1. In light of all of the above, the claim for compensation for bullying and harassment is dismissed.  Although some of the events detailed, such as the timing of the examination of the use of the union's vehicle or the manner in which the matter was presented at the management meeting, may raise questions about good faith or may be improper in the field of labor relations, they do not amount to a systematic pattern of abusive and humiliating behavior that establishes a cause of abuse.  The defendant's actions, including the managerial decisions regarding promotion, overtime, reporting, and work during the COVID-19 period, stemmed from the employer's professional considerations, and do not constitute a cause for compensation for bullying.

1. The plaintiff's claims of wage differentials

1. The plaintiff claimed in the statement of claim for wage differences in the amount of ILS 80,443 as of August 2017.  These differences, according to the claim, stemmed from a decrease in payment in the "3.6% salary increase", "22% increase", A and B study benefits, and "wage differences" in relation to the period from April 2010 to August 2017.  The opinion on behalf of the plaintiff was given by the actuary, Mr. Avi Ayish, and it was attached as Appendix F to the statement of claim.
2. After receiving the statement of claim, the defendant conducted an examination of the plaintiff's claims.  The defendant admitted that some of the components were indeed paid to the plaintiff, like the rest of the union's employees, in shortfall, and in August 2020 the plaintiff was paid wage differentials in the amount of ILS 27,738.  The defendant claimed that the source of the underpayment was the mistake of the software that the defendant used.  It should be noted that the defendant announced that following the statement of claim, the pay slips of other employees in the union were also examined, and accordingly they were also paid the wage differences due to the errors found in the payments.  The opinion of the expert on behalf of the defendant, accountant Michal Levi Yashuviov, was attached as Appendix 28 to the affidavit of Dr.  Rosen's main testimony.
3. On December 1, 2021, the first evidentiary hearing in the case was held, in which the experts on behalf of the parties, Mr. Ayish and Ms. Michal Levi Yashuvyov, testified.  After the evidentiary hearing, on January 16, 2022, Mr. Aish submitted an amended opinion on behalf of the plaintiff.  From the summaries of the parties, it emerges that at this stage, the main dispute between the parties stems from the question of calculating the standard hours, and it is this issue that underlies the gap that remains between the parties' calculations. 
4. In this regard, according to the plaintiff's opinion, the plaintiff's monthly standard hours, as a veteran employee who began working before the March 1999 agreement, should be 180 hours.  The plaintiff claims that the defendant himself calculated her salary according to this standard in her pay slips and in a work arrangement set for veteran employees, and therefore the calculation of the salary differences of the expert on her behalf should be accepted in full.
5. On the other hand, according to the opinion on behalf of the defendant, the monthly standard hours for employees of the local authorities were 184 hours until April 2018, and since then 182 hours.  The expert on behalf of the defendant, Ms. Michal Levy Yashuvyov, explains that for the plaintiff, the purchased standard hours are 182 hours (90 hours for a half-time job in which the plaintiff worked moving to the March 1999 agreement + 92 hours for an additional half-time job in which the plaintiff worked starting in 2010) until April 2018, and since then 181 hours (90+91).
6. The plaintiff claims in her summaries that the defendant himself confirms in his opinion that for veteran employees such as the plaintiff, the distribution factor for the hourly value was 180 hours per month, and that the plaintiff's pay slips always reflected a standard 180 hours.  The defendant, in his summaries, claims that the expert on his behalf explained that some of the discrepancies stem from missing standard hours, since the calculation of the correct standard hours is 182 hours per month until April 2018, and 181 hours since.
7. After considering the arguments of the parties, we found that we accept the defendant's calculation in relation to the standard hours, taking into account the standard hours for employees of the local authorities: 184 hours per month (42.5 hours per week) until April 2018, and 182 hours per month (42 hours per week) starting in April 2018, (following the shortening of the work week in the economy).
8. It should be clarified that the collective agreement of March 3, 1999 established a "snapshot of the situation" according to which local increments that had been in place up to that date would continue to apply to veteran employees (received until April 3, 1999).  In accordance with this agreement, an employee of a local authority who was employed on the determining date (February/August 1999) according to a lower than required hour standard is entitled to continue working according to the same standard.
9. The plaintiff, who began her work in 1990, is considered a veteran employee.  On the date of the determination, she was employed at 50% of the position according to the standard of 180 hours per month, and therefore she is entitled to maintain this standard for the part-time position in which she was employed on the determining date (90 hours).
10. However, during the period of the claim, the plaintiff was employed at 100% of the position, and therefore, for 50% of the position (90 hours) she is entitled to continue working according to the standard of 180 hours per month.  For the additional 50% of the job, which was increased after the deadline, she should work according to a standard of 184 hours per month until April 2018, and then according to 182 hours.

Therefore, the plaintiff's purchased standard hours are: 182 hours per month (90 hours for 50% of the job + 92 hours for 50% additional time) until April 2018, and 181 monthly hours (90 hours for 50% of the job + 91 hours for 50% additional time) as of April 2018.

1. It should be emphasized that the fact that the plaintiff was employed part-time prior to March 3, 1999, and that against this background a "snapshot of the situation" of part-time work of only 90 hours was established (even though at that time the half-time job should have been reflected in 92 hours), does not entitle the plaintiff to the fact that the additional half-time, in which she began working about 10 years later, would also be of an exceeding scope.
2. We are aware of the plaintiff's claims that according to her pay slip, the scope of her job was stated to be 180 hours, and that on the basis of this figure, a calculation of her salary was made.  However, this registration, in and of itself, cannot grant the plaintiff rights that are not given to her by law and that deviate from the provisions of the law and the applicable agreements.As clarified
   in the professional opinion of CPA Michal Levi Yeshuvoff, calculating salary on the basis of 180 monthly hours, contrary to the fixed standard, constitutes a salary deviation.  Since the plaintiff is now seeking to receive wage differentials in her favor, there is no reason to base the renewed calculation on a registration that does not comply with the law and the binding agreements.  Therefore, we found to adopt the calculation made by CPA Michal Levi Yashuvoff, which is based on standard hours in accordance with the provisions of the law.  It should be noted that the scope of the said position also arises from the notice to the employee dated September 24, 2012, where a standard of 184 monthly hours was stated (see Appendix A1 to the affidavit of Dr.  Rosen's main testimony).  This is despite the fact that the notice to the employee dated January 1, 2019 stated a standard of 41.5 hours per week (Appendix A2 to the affidavit of Dr.  Rosen's main testimony).
3. In the circumstances of the case, the claim for payment of wage differentials in accordance with the expert opinion of Dr.  Ayish is dismissed. 

Conclusion

1. In light of all of the above, the claim is dismissed in all its components.
2. Each party will bear its own expenses.  In our decision not to award expenses to the plaintiff despite the scope of the proceeding and the dismissal of the claim, we took into account the fact that as a result of the lawsuit, the plaintiff was paid salary differentials in the amount of approximately ILS 27,000 , as well as the failures that occurred in the defendant's conduct, inter alia, the failure to maintain a clear, transparent and permanent standby payment procedure, conduct that could have prevented the need to conduct the proceeding in question.
3. The parties have the right to appeal to the National Labor Court within 30 days of the date of the judgment.

Given today, May 19, 2026, in the absence of the parties and will be sent to them.