Labor Dispute (Be’er Sheva) 32096-04-19 Sylvia Dahan Guetta – Association of Cities for the Environment Ashdod - part 8

A: No, Doron, Doron, first of all, I inherited it, I came to the association a year earlier,

Q: I understand.

A: I inherited.  Doron, Itay and Haim carried out the preparations, and everything was also anchored in the budget, meaning that at this stage I could not give, to give the two girls standby..."[54] (emphasis added - R.G.).

1. Moreover, Dr.  Rosen clarified in her testimony that as soon as this became possible and another employee who performed 80 hours of alert retired, it was a "fitting hour" for her to give the plaintiff and the other employee hours of air alert in an equal division between them:

A: ...  When I came to the union, he was, so Eliezer was...  I don't remember exactly when he retired, but exactly when he retired, [...]

A: It was a fitting hour.

Q: It's not a memory test.  But in fact, there is a situation here where only after their request do women join an air alert round, right?

A: Not because they're women, because I could give.

Q: I didn't say it's because of me, I was just asking if that's the case.

A: Predecessors ("predecessors" - R.G.) in the job he didn't let them, they were an air crew and more before me,

Q: Your predecessor in this position was Doron, who was on alert during the period of filling the position, right?

A: No, the director of the association, Doron was acting for a year and a half, Aharon Zohar was, first he took the two girls and didn't let them, even though he took them on the air."[55] (emphasis added - R.G.).

1. It should be noted that in practice, the provision of 40 hours of air alert to each of the employees who worked part-time at the time (the plaintiff and the additional employee) corresponded proportionally to the scope of air alert paid to employees who worked full-time (80 hours of air alert).
2. From the aforesaid, it emerges that the plaintiff's claims that the CEO was the one who did not authorize her to carry out the air alert hours, similar to the authorization given to the male employees who she claims to be parallel to her in their positions, out of the CEO's preference for "her people", have nothing to rely on.  When the CEO took office, she "inherited" the existing situation of (male) full-time employees, who received 80 hours of air alert (and 80 hours of air alert as part of their employment conditions), and of the plaintiff and at least one other employee, who worked part-time and did not receive air alert hours at all (and not even hours of air alert hours).
3. It should be clarified that the plaintiff claims that the employment relations between the defendant during the period when Mr. Aharon Zohar was the CEO were excellent.  The picture presented by the plaintiff in the affidavits of her main testimony is that she had no claims regarding the division of on-call during the period of the previous CEO.  On the other hand, regarding Dr.  Rosen, she declares: "Ms. Anat Rosen was the CEO of the Association from 1996 until 2022, when she retired.  Throughout all the years of our joint work, Ms. Rosen worked in the method of favorites, with those who wanted to visit them receiving hours on alert and promotions, and those who did not (me) remained on the same terms of employment, and were blocked from opportunities for promotion, training, and additions to perform their positions." However, as stated above, the other employees who worked full-time (to whom the plaintiff compares herself) received the approval to carry out the on-call duties precisely during the years in which Mr. Aharon Zohar served as the union's CEO.  It should be noted here that according to the plaintiff's testimony, during those years in which she worked in the union part-time, she also worked in the management of a family company that employed 15 employees and with a budget of ILS 8 million per year.  The plaintiff testified that this was the management of a company with a budget similar to that of the defendant.  57]

According to the evidence submitted, the first time the plaintiff asked to join an air alert round was in 1998.  As for the request to increase the scope of the position, even in accordance with the plaintiff's statements, she did not ask to increase the scope of the position before 1998.  In chapter 2 of the supplementary affidavit, she attributes the date of the start of the application to increase the scope of the position to the 2000s.  According to the plaintiff's own statement, she began asking for an increase in the position, after the other employees had been working full-time for about a decade.  Until then, the plaintiff herself preferred, for her own reasons, to work part-time.

1. It should be noted here that in the statement of claim, the plaintiff claims to be entitled to receive an additional 40 hours of air alert only from October 31, 2010, the date on which she began working full-time: "On October 31, 2010, the scope of the position increased to full-time, and therefore the plaintiff did not receive the additional 40 hours of air alert, supplementing to 80 hours of air alert, like the rest of the air alerts that receive 80 hours per month.  Even though they do not belong to an air crew." [58] In her (first) affidavit, the plaintiff also stated that her right to additional air alert stemmed from the increase in the scope of the job: "I will note that my transition from a part-time position to a full-time position in accordance with my professional affiliation with an air crew, in which I am responsible for the air quality control center, I am entitled and should have received the full hours of air alert, i.e., 80 hours like the rest of the air alerts."[59] Similarly, the plaintiff testified in her cross-examination: "I belonged to an air crew and I carried out and received 40 hours of air alert.  And when I went up to a full-time job, as the others kept telling me that I was getting 40 hours because I was working part-time, when I went up full-time, I expected to get 80 hours like the other workers."[60] (emphasis added - R.G.).
2. However, the plaintiff ignores the fact that the increase in the scope of her position to a full-time position was done with the addition of a position in the field of recycling, and it is not a matter of increasing the scope of the position in the same position, nor even any other position in the aircrew.  61] In this regard, it should be clarified that the employee who was replaced by the plaintiff also did not receive air alert (the same employee received 25 hours of internet alert - see below).  The plaintiff also ignores the fact that when the scope of the job was increased, it was made clear to her that during the period of her full-time employment, the number of hours for air alert would not increase, and he would remain for 40 hours per month.  Not only was this clarified to the plaintiff, but she also confirmed what was written in her signature.  62]
3. In the framework of her cross-examination, the plaintiff claimed that her agreement that within the scope of the full-time job she would be paid only 40 hours of air alert related only to the fixed period in which she took the place of the employee who went on maternity leave, and that the said consent did not apply from the date on which the scope of the job was increased to 100% on a regular basis.  The plaintiff reasoned: "It was temporary...  And temporarily they don't do things." [63] We are unable to accept this argument, for the reasons that will be detailed below.
4. First, the essence of the parties' consent must be discussed.  The agreement that the number of hours of air alert will not increase and will remain 40 hours per month is a material agreement relating to the terms of the plaintiff's full-time employment.  The fact that upon the increase in the scope of the position, the defendant acted to clarify to the plaintiff in writing that there would be no increase in the scope of the alert quota, and the plaintiff even approved this in her signature, indicates that there was a substantial agreement between the parties that an increase in the scope of the position would not lead to an increase in the scope of air alert.  It should be emphasized, in practice, that "in real time" no reservation was presented on behalf of the plaintiff and she did not wish to state that her consent regarding the standby was limited to a certain time.  In this regard, the letter states: "During the period of your full-time employment, the terms of the remuneration will be in accordance with your rank in the scope of a full-time position.  It should be noted that the number of hours for air alert will not increase, and it will remain for 40 hours a month."[64] (emphasis added - R.G.).  The plaintiff's interpretation that the consent applies only for a fixed period constitutes an attempt to change an agreed term retroactively, in a manner that is inconsistent with the duty of good faith and fairness that applies to the employment relationship.  This is all the more true when the defendant relied on this agreement when making the decision to expand the scope of the plaintiff's position at her request.
5. Second, there is no basis for the argument that the plaintiff's transition to a full-time position should have necessarily and automatically led to a change in the scope of the alert, in the absence of a new consent and in the absence of authorization to carry out the alert in real time.  This is all the more true when the plaintiff's transition to full-time was at a time when the defendant had already stopped paying his new employees compensation for air alert.  In this regard, the Director General declared, and her testimony was not contradicted, that the addition of air alert is "an addition that no longer exists in the Association, in light of the change in circumstances, and is today only a 'virtual' alert and a remnant of the past period." This "remnant" even provides the plaintiff with a scope of 40 hours while she worked part-time.

Dr.  Rosen also clarified that "in the early years of the association's establishment, 'air alert' hours were more significant, since the monitoring system worked under an intermittent control system from the school." [65] Against the background of the foregoing, we are unable to accept the plaintiff's argument that the defendant's claim regarding the redundancy of air alert in light of the superfluity of the CBS was first argued in the defendant's summaries, and constitutes an extension of the façade and should be deleted.  Admittedly, the defendant elaborated more on this argument in his summaries, and this expansion is indeed prohibited.  However, Dr.  Rosen already stated in her affidavit of her main testimony that air alertness had more significance in the early years of the association, since during those years the monitoring system worked under an intermittent control system.  Dr.  Rosen also clearly stated that this addendum does not exist today in the association and is today "virtual" and is a remnant of the past and this testimony was not contradicted in its cross-examination.

1. Third, the plaintiff's claim that her consent was given for the period in which her position was temporarily promoted to a full-time position is inconsistent with the plaintiff's own conduct.  In this regard, the plaintiff requested an increase in the scope of air alert even during the period in which she worked full-time and not permanently.  As stated above, the scope of the plaintiff's position was temporarily increased to a full-time position in March 2010, when the employee who replaced her went on maternity leave.  Only in 2013, when the same employee announced that she did not intend to return to work for the defendant, did the union's management decide to fix the scope of the plaintiff's position from a temporary full-time position to a full-time position (100%) on a permanent basis.  However, even during the period when the full scope of the plaintiff's job was temporary, the plaintiff requested to receive 80 hours of air alert (and 80 hours of air alert).  Thus, already on November 16, 2010, the plaintiff contacted Dr.  Rosen, claiming that she was employed in two positions and asked to expand her participation in the alert system, while claiming that "each drive receives 80 hours of air alert + 80 hours of air alert." The plaintiff also requested that she be summoned to a meeting of the management to present her arguments on the matter.  [66] Similarly, on August 12, 2012, the plaintiff again asked for "the same salary as my generation...  Each drive receives 160 hours of air and hazard alert."[67] In the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff's attempt to claim that her consent to receive 40 hours of standby while working full-time is relevant only to the time when she was working full-time temporarily, is inconsistent with her own conduct, while even when the full-time job in which she worked was temporary, she asked to perform 80 hours of air alert (even though half of her job was in circulation).
2. In the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff's continued full-time employment, after the end of the period in which the plaintiff replaced the employee who went on maternity leave, should be viewed as a direct continuation of the same arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant regarding the non-increase in the scope of air alert and not as the creation of a new agreement.  Therefore, the agreement reached by the parties at the time of the transition to a full-time position regarding not increasing the scope of alert continues to apply even to permanent full-time employment.
3. To all of the above, it should be added that the plaintiff's argument that she should be compared to the employees whom she calls "my generation"[68], when they had similar seniority to the defendant - should be rejected.  In this regard, it should be clarified at the outset that despite similar seniority, for about 20 years the plaintiff worked part-time, while the employees to whom the plaintiff compares herself worked full-time.  Against this background, the plaintiff's claims in paragraph 22 of her supplementary testimony affidavit that she was "older" and "more skilled in performing alerts" were not proven, and despite this, other employees carried it out.  It should be emphasized that two of the employees who performed the on-call were veterans of the plaintiff and the third employee performed the alert even before the plaintiff's request was submitted in June 1998 to join the air drive team.  In the circumstances of the case, we also cannot accept the plaintiff's claim in paragraph 24 of her supplementary affidavit that "I did not ask to join the round 'from the outside', I had already carried out this alert, so if there were a total of 280 hours of air alert in the union as claimed by the CEO, they should have been distributed 70 to each.  There is no justification for three employees to perform 80 hours, and I, who was already older, and more experienced, performed only 40 hours." It should be emphasized that, in accordance with the plaintiff's written request of June 4, 1998 and the Director-General's reply of July 4, 1998, the plaintiff's request was to join an existing round of air drives.  In fact, the receipt of the plaintiff's request at that time would have led to the result of the need to reduce the standby pay for employees(s) who had already received this payment for several years.  Moreover, the plaintiff's claim that there was room to divide the on-call hours into 4 is unclear, so that the three employees who have already performed the on-call and she will each receive 70 hours, with the result that the additional employee with whom she applied for air alert hours will not receive any on-call hours at all.
4. Moreover, even though the plaintiff declares that the employee Doron (Mr. Lahav) worked with her "shoulder to shoulder" from the 1990s until the date of her submission of the affidavit (2023),[69] and although the plaintiff claimed in her cross-examination that Mr. Doron is a "very senior" employee "like me"[70], Dr.  Rosen's testimony implicitly indicates that these are not employees who performed the same duties and that their work should not be compared to the defendant.  Thus, Dr.  Rosen clarified in her affidavit of her main testimony that despite the plaintiff's claim that Mr. Aharon Zohar served as the Association's CEO until 1996, in fact Mr. Aharon Zohar ended his position as CEO in 1994 and at that time, Mr. Lahav was appointed, by the Association's plenum, to the position of Acting CEO of the Association and has the right to sign with the Association, and served in this position between the years 1994-1996.  Moreover, Dr.  Rosen stated that "the promotion of Mr. Doron Lahav in particular and of other employees in general was not based on seniority at all, but on the degree of suitability for the position.  Mr. Lahav is one of the cornerstones of the Association, having served for over a year as Acting CEO of the Association, and recently the Association's Council extended his tenure after retirement age, due to his necessity and great contribution to the system..."[71].  Dr.  Rosen's testimony on this matter was not contradicted, and she was not even questioned in relation to this statement as part of her cross-examination.  Moreover, from the notices to the employee that were attached to the affidavit of Dr.  Rosen's main testimony, it appears that already in September 2012, Mr. Lahav was registered as the plaintiff's deputy director general and direct supervisor (together with Dr.  Rosen).  [72] To the above, it should be added that even from a summary of a meeting held in January 2003 with Mr. Ami Yifrach, in charge of wages and conditions of service in the bodies accompanying the local authorities in the Ministry of the Interior regarding the ranks of employees, it can be seen that already in 2003 Mr. Doron Lahav served as Deputy Director General and Human Resources Coordinator, while the Plaintiff served as Computer Coordinator.  It should be noted here that at the management meeting on September 26, 2017, the plaintiff was asked which employees she was comparing herself to, and the plaintiff replied: "I do much more than Itay and Gad and earn less"[73], so that at this meeting, as opposed to her statement in the supplementary affidavit, the plaintiff did not claim that Mr. Lahav is an employee whose work should be compared to hers.  The name of the employee Haim was also not mentioned during the said meeting (in practice, no data was brought before us regarding his position and work in the defendant, except for a general statement by the plaintiff in her affidavit of her main supplementary testimony according to which "Haim was an agroecology coordinator, and he began working a short time before me"[74]).
5. The other employee, Itai, had a Ph.D.  at the relevant times, while at the time the plaintiff began working full-time, she did not have a bachelor's degree.  According to Dr.  Rosen's testimony, "In the Ashdod Cities Association, the cold sorting of our occupation is the supervision of the industry, it is the protection of the population from the ejection of hazardous materials, sewage from the industry..."[75].  The employee, Mr. Itai, worked in the field of infrastructure and industries.  The plaintiff herself did not bring any data about Mr. Itay's role and did not clarify why she claimed her work was equivalent to his.
6. With regard to the employee who will be referred to below, we note that the plaintiff's claim in paragraph 17 of her main testimony affidavit that "one of the employees in the union" was not placed on air alert boards and hazardous materials "for years" and "would have received the component in full - 160 hours of standby per month" without actually performing the alert was also claimed in vain and without proof.  Only in the course of the cross-examination did the plaintiff clarify that "one of the employees" to whom she referred in paragraph 17 of her main testimony affidavit was G.  During Dr.  Rosen's cross-examination, the plaintiff sought to substantiate the claim that Mr. G.  did not actually carry out the calls, and presented for the first time alert boards for the years 2009-2010 in which G.'s name was not mentioned.  These are standby boards that were not submitted by the plaintiff before the evidentiary hearing.  In her testimony, Dr.  Rosen insisted that there was no employee who received an alert and did not actually do it, and her testimony on this matter was consistent, unequivocal and reliable to us.  This is especially true when the documents presented by the plaintiff were presented only in the framework of Dr.  Rosen's cross-examination, and the plaintiff even refrained from mentioning in the affidavit in relation to the years in which she claims that G.  received payment for bookcases that he did not actually perform.  As the defendant's counsel noted during Dr.  Rosen's cross-examination, no evidence was presented that G.  received payment for standby in the years 2009-2010, years in respect of which the alert boards were submitted.  Moreover, due to the plaintiff's conduct in submitting the documents during Dr.  Rosen's cross-examination, Dr.  Rosen did not have time to examine the documents and treat them as required.  It should be added that if, G-d forbid (and we do not determine so) G.  received payment for unlawful standby due to his family ties to one of the heads of the councils, as the plaintiff tried to claim,[77] this does not establish the plaintiff's entitlement to receive the alert that she claims.  It should be emphasized that the plaintiff did not bring any data about G.'s role and it was not proven that his work was equivalent to hers.
7. From the aforesaid, it appears that the plaintiff did not prove that her work was equivalent to the work of the male workers who received permission to perform 80 hours of air alert in the 1990s when she worked part-time and did not perform air alert at all.  It should be added that as stated above, in accordance with Dr.  Rosen's testimony, when the plaintiff moved to full-time work, the defendant no longer paid air alert to his employees, but only to employees who had previously received payment for this alert as a "historical relic".  Moreover, the plaintiff's full position was not entirely in the position of computer coordinator (the position in which she was approved for 40 hours of air alert).  The other half of the job was in the field of recycling.
8. It should be added that there is no dispute that in practice the plaintiff did not perform air alert in the scope of 80 hours per month; and the plaintiff did not report in real time about the execution of such alert.  It is important to note that according to the plaintiff's testimony before us, this is a standby that was actually carried out at the time it was approved, and not only as an additional salary as the plaintiff claims in her summaries.  In this regard, the plaintiff testified: "I had a beeper for air alert, or I had a phone, so at the time there was no report." Therefore, a demand for payment for 80 hours of air alert is a demand for payment for an alert that has not been performed.
9. The conclusion from all of the above is that the plaintiff's claims of deprivation and discrimination on the part of Dr.  Rosen on the subject of "air alert" are unfounded and should be rejected.  The standby arrangements for the male employees to which the plaintiff referred in the affidavit preceded Dr.  Rosen's entry into the position and were made while the male employees were working full-time and the plaintiff was working part-time.  Dr.  Rosen even acted to allow the plaintiff to receive 40 hours of air alert as soon as the opportunity arose.  Moreover, the plaintiff agreed to keep the on-call quota at 40 hours, even when she switched to a full-time position (part-time as a computer coordinator and half-time in the rotation).  This consent is valid and binding.  The plaintiff's comparison with male employees who received 80 hours of air alert is irrelevant due to various employment circumstances and the "virtual" nature of this alert when the plaintiff switched to full-time work.
10. Against the background of the above, the claim for payment of air alert is dismissed. 

Preparedness for Hazardous Materials and the Request to Embark on Professional Training in this Field

1. At the outset, we should note that even in the matter of the standby of the Hazardous Hazards, we were not presented with any orderly and clear procedure with respect to the question of the entitlement of employees to perform the standby of the Hazardous Hazards, or with regard to the criteria for participation in designated training in this field and the manner in which the defendant allocated the alert.  From the documents submitted to the file, it appears that despite the plaintiff's requests, including a written request dated November 16, 2010 requesting to go on standby for hazardous hazards alert,[79] and despite the fact that the plaintiff's request to perform a hazardous alert came up again in 2012,[80] no clear written document was submitted on behalf of the defendant explaining the failure to approve the plaintiff's departure for professional training for the hazardous hazard alert and her non-enlistment in those years to the staff of the hazardous emergency responders.  The defendant's reasons that the plaintiff should not be put on alert were put in writing explicitly and transparently only at the September 2017 management meeting.  81]
2. Despite the failure to present a clear procedure regarding the employees who are entitled to perform the Hazardous Materials Alert, and despite the lack of orderly documentation regarding the responses received by the Plaintiff in the early days of September 2017 regarding the Emergency Preparedness Alert, we accept the clear testimony of the Director-General, Dr.  Rosen, that the Plaintiff did not have the appropriate education and work experience to perform the Emergency Preparedness Alert.  In this regard, we note that beyond Dr.  Rosen's explanation in the framework of her affidavit of her main testimony and her testimony in court, it can also be learned from the manner in which the plaintiff requested to go to the Hazardous Hazardous Hades training program, that the plaintiff does not have the appropriate background for this training: "I reiterate my request to receive training to perform the Hazardous Hazardous Materials Alert as well as employees who do not have a background or previous education in the field of Hazardous Hazardous Materials." (Emphasis added - R.G.).  It should be noted here that the plaintiff did not prove that workers who did not have the appropriate background and education to carry out the emergency preparedness actually carried out the alert.  These claims were made in vain without referring to the various roles of the alert operators.  It should be emphasized that in all the hundreds of pages submitted to the file, the plaintiff did not clarify exactly the role of each of the employees who performed the alert and that she believed that there was room to compare her conditions regarding the execution of the alert to theirs.  The plaintiff's claims, despite the fact that they are many, were "thrown" into space, and the court was required to gather details from the totality of the claims in an attempt to understand what each employee was dealing with at the relevant time.  Even after examining the totality of the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, it emerges that there is no clear data regarding the positions held by those employees, and certainly not with regard to their education and employment experience.  In this regard, it should be recalled that the plaintiff's claim that G.  received a hazardous emergency alert and did not actually perform the alert was also not proven.
3. Dr.  Rosen also clarified at the management meeting on September 26, 2017 that an organization held by the union was intended, among other things, to regulate the issue of the alerts that were given in the past, and clarified that the workers who carry out the on-call hazards have been doing so for many years: "An organization that the union has been leading in recent years, is intended, among other things, to regulate the issue of wages and hours of alert that have been given in the past.  For years, these same people have been on this alert."[83] In this regard, it should be remembered that the men to whom the plaintiff allegedly compares herself worked during the period when they were approved for full-time hazardous hazard alert hours and even carried out actual hazardous hazards alert.  It should be emphasized that there is no dispute that the alert for the Hazardous Materials is an actual alert that was carried out, the driver had a patrol car attached to it, and he was required to arrive at events in the field and fill out an incident report.  [84] During the approximately 20 years in which the Hazardous Materials Agents fulfilled this role in practice, the plaintiff did not ask to join the team of Hazardous Materials Drives.  As the plaintiff notes, her request in this matter arose in about 2010.
4. On the merits of the matter, we accept Dr.  Rosen's testimony that the role of the Hazardous Hazardous Materials Coordinator does not constitute a mere salary increase, but rather a position of a unique and extremely important professional nature for the prevention and treatment of hazardous materials incidents that may endanger the public and the environment.  Dr.  Rosen explained, and her testimony was not contradicted, that this position entails a heavy responsibility of "pikuach nefesh" and requires specific training, knowledge and experience.  In the minutes of the management meeting of September 26, 2017, Dr.  Rosen emphasized the sensitivity and professionalism required of this position: "Alert is not a tool for raising wages." She added: "I have to know and be calm that when there is a complex environmental event and an event involving hazardous substances, the association is the right person." [86] Dr.  Rosen detailed to the management the requirements for the position of a Hazardous Materials Drive, which require appropriate education: "In order to be a Hazardous Materials Drive, you need appropriate education that includes knowledge of chemistry, appropriate training, familiarity with the factories, and more."[87] She noted that the plaintiff was not explicitly suited for this position: "Sylvie does not have the training, education and knowledge.  It does not even know the various factories and businesses."[88] Dr.  Rosen even suggested another, more suitable worker to carry out the alert that she does not perform: "If there is anyone who is entitled to receive an alert today and does not receive it, it is Jenny Luria, coordinator of hazardous materials and noise.  A chemical engineer who is well acquainted with the factories and knows all the tools for risk assessments...  There is no doubt that Jenny deserves to be on alert long before Sylvie." [89] We should add that as stated above, at that time, the plaintiff had just completed her bachelor's degree in management (2016) and was at the beginning of her master's degree studies in environmental studies, which she completed about two years later (in 2019).

It should be emphasized that after Dr.  Rosen explained to the management why she believed that the plaintiff was not suitable to perform the said alert, the plaintiff did not explain why she was suitable in terms of training, education, work experience and knowledge to carry out the said alert, the plaintiff's claim later was general: "There is discrimination, there are employees who receive more than me.  I didn't ask to be a manager, but more salary and I don't care what it's called, on-call or incremental.  I came to voice my arguments and I did not begin."[90] (emphasis added - R.G.).  Later in the hearing, the plaintiff claims: "I want to summarize my remarks.  I do need to get standby hours for a website.  Afternoon work plus air quality alert.  I get 40 hours and want 80 hours.  I want you to check with the Ashdod municipality what is happening there.  We are following the Ashdod Municipality's regulations" (emphases added - R.G.).  Dr.  Rosen replied, among other things, "The association adopts the appropriate procedures of the Ashdod Municipality in order not to reinvent the wheel.  The association does not "copy paste" everything that is done in Ashdod.  We are a small body with other needs, and I don't compare the computerization system in the union to that in a big city.  I also don't know who gets computerized alert at the municipality, what the salary is and what the compensation is.  In any case, today alertness is not a tool for improving wages.  Alert must be carried out in practice."[91] (emphasis added - R.G.).

1. In her affidavit of her main testimony, Dr.  Rosen reiterated that "...Only an employee who has been specially certified for this purpose can engage in the field of hazardous materials, and only an employee who has professional training and experience in the field of industry and hazardous materials, as opposed to the plaintiff, who does not have any training as required."[92] (emphasis added - R.G.).  In her testimony in court, Dr.  Rosen explained:

A: ...  The issue of hazardous materials and hazardous materials is not something that anyone can do.  You can do it with a few conditions, training, experience, the nature of the work, familiarity with the factories, familiarity with the materials, familiarity with the rural area, it's not something that anyone can do, it's something that is my responsibility, it can be pikuach nefesh, it's something very, very professional.  Now, either you come with the training of a chemical engineer and do it, by the way, I also come from this field, I came from the ministry as a coordinator of hazardous materials for the association.  Or there are people, there are, one of the people, for example, who has a doctorate in geography, but he is constantly in the factories, he knows the factories, he knows the materials, he has gained experience that is equivalent to education.  You can't give dangerous materials to those who can't be responsible, that's pikuach nefesh.  Even today, after this alert was transferred to the fire department and why it switched to firefighting, because they decided that firefighters are much more available, they can be jumped up faster, but we are still the professional advisor of the fire department.  When there is a command center at an event, in a hazardous materials event, we are the professional consultant, we know the factories, where exactly they are stored, the rest of the factories' toxins, it goes around, it's not sitting in front of a refinery control center, it's physically being in a refinery, knowing where each can is, where each container is, it's getting to know the entrance, the exit, the people who deal with it, It can't be everyone....