(-) As for the defendant, the statute of limitations assumes that it is difficult for it to preserve its evidence as the years pass; and that he should be given certainty regarding his rights and obligations, in a way that will enable him to plan his steps, and to prepare for the risk that will be claimed during a defined and final period of time (Civil Appeal 1254/99 Hameiri v. Hachsharat HaYishuv - Insurance Company Ltd.IsrSC 55(2) 535, 553-554 (2000); Civil Appeal 165/83 Buchris v. Housing for Oleh Ltd., IsrSC 38(4) 554, 558-559 (1984)).
(-) From the point of view of the public interest, the statute of limitations arrangements reflect an approach according to which judicial resources should be devoted to matters in the present, inter alia, in view of the burden involved, as a rule, in judicial clarification of obsolete issues (Civil Appeal Authority 6552/20 Israel Discount Bank in the Appeal Taxes N. A. Levy Investments & Construction Ltd., paragraph 13 [Nevo] (2.12.2020); Civil Appeal 2919/07 State of Israel - Atomic Energy Commission v. Guy-Lepel, paragraph 30 [Nevo] (19.9.2010)).
- As for the rationale underlying Section 9 Law The Statute of Limitations, as stated, that if a defendant admits to the plaintiff's right, the limitation period will begin anew on the date of the confession, even if it was given after the original limitation period. The meaning of the section is, therefore, that a defendant's admission of the existence of a right may re-establish the plaintiff's power to file a claim for that right, a power that he would not have had otherwise had it not been for that admission.
This section therefore reflects a perception that when a defendant admits the existence of the plaintiff's right, the original balance between the various interests that stand at the foundation of the law, as stated, is changed, in a manner that justifies reopening the statute of limitations race with respect to that right.
Thus, when a defendant admits the plaintiff's right, and does not claim a statute of limitations in respect of it, his admission can be seen as a kind of constructive agreement to provide remedies for a violation of that right, in a way that reduces the justification for protecting his interests in the issue of the statute of limitations (Tal Havkin Statute of limitations 196-195 (2014) (Hereinafter: Havkin)). Subsequently, there is an approach According to which the defendant's admission of a right is perceived as an implied undertaking to fulfill it, in a way that establishes a new cause of action for the plaintiff whose statute of limitations begins on the date of the admission (Civil Appeal 3179/19 Nash Ramot on appeal Taxes v. State of Israel - Ministry of Construction and Housing, paragraph 38 [Nevo] (3.10.2021); Civil Appeal 459/59 Finkelstein v. Estate of FroshteyerIsrSC 14 2327 (1960); Israel Gilad Statute of Limitations in Civil Law 392-393 (2022) (hereinafter: Gilad);Andrew McGee, Limitation Periods 335 (2018);Terence Prime & Gary Scanlan, The Law of Limitation 52 (2001); Calvin W. Corman, Limitation of Actions 83-85 (1991)). In addition, given that the statutes of limitations are intended, inter alia, to prevent a situation in which the defendant has a good defense, but due to the passage of time he is unable to prove it as required, the defendant's admission of the plaintiff's right undermines this rationale (Assaf Posner: "Old doctrines, new issues, written things - are you allowed to say orally?" The Book of Gabriel Bach 539, 555 (David Hahn, Dana Cohen-Lekach & Michael Bach eds., 2011) (hereinafter: Posner)). Finally, in the public interest, the perception is that the defendant's admission of the plaintiff's right diminishes, as a rule, the burden involved in clarifying old issues (see: Havkin, at pp. 195-196).
- If so, in view of this meaning of Section 9 Law The Statute of Limitations, as well as the rationales underlying it and the law as a whole, we will examine the purpose of the written requirement in this section.
The purpose of the written requirement in section 9 of the law
- In Israeli legislation, one can find a variety of provisions, in different contexts, that establish a requirement for the making of a written document (see, for example: Section 8 Law The Real Estate, 5729-1969; Section 5 Law Waiting, 5728-1968; Article 14 Law Patient's Rights, 5756-1996; Section 1 Law Prenuptial Relations between Spouses, 5733-1973). Regarding the provisions of this type of law, Acting President Y. Sussman has already noted the following:
"It can be said that the written demand comes for one of two purposes. SOMETIMES LEGISLATION REQUIRES THE MAKING OF A WRITTEN DOCUMENT IN ORDER TO DETER A PERSON FROM MAKING A HASTY AND FRIVOLOUS UNDERTAKING, BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRANSACTION (AD SOLEMNITATEM). The written requirement may impress the obligee with the seriousness of his action, and protect him from haste. AND SOMETIMES THE WRITING IS REQUIRED FOR EVIDENCE ALONE (AD PROBATIONEM), SO AS NOT TO EXPOSE A PERSON TO THE WEAKNESS OF THE MEMORY OF THE WITNESSES AND TO THE DANGER OF FALSE TESTIMONY" (CIVIL APPEAL 726/71 Grossman v. K.B.K. Registered Partnership v. Executors of the Estate of Yehoshua Biderman, para. 8 [Nevo] (November 28, 1972)).
- Indeed, as detailed above, this issue stands at the heart of the dispute between the parties to the appeal before us. While the appellants claim that the written requirement is fixed In section 9 The law has an evidentiary purpose, and the respondents' argument is that the writ of mandamus is intended to ensure that the defendant gave his confession seriously and to protect him from delivering it hastily.
Let us now turn to discuss and decide this dispute.
- As explained above, Section 9 The law states that a defendant's confession in favor of the plaintiff can breathe life into a claim that has already lost its power and has become obsolete. If the conditions for recognizing the validity of such a confession are met, the defendant is the one who is liable to expose himself to the lawsuit, otherwise his confession would not have been The Plaintiff There is a barrier to its submission. A valid confession of a defendant under Section 9 The law therefore leads to a waiver on his part of his procedural right to invoke the statute of limitations, and in any case it has very dramatic legal implications for him.
In view of the above, it seems that it should be attributed to the written requirement, which is fixed In section 9 The law has a purpose to ensure that the defendant's confession was given with the proper seriousness, out of awareness and intention (see Gilad, at p. 400), and to prevent a situation in which a defendant exposes himself to such a risk in haste and recklessness. This is done by taking into account the characteristics inherent in writing, as a rule, in the work of writing, as opposed to those inherent in the act of speech (see and compare: Matter Grossman, verse 8; Daniel Friedman and Nili Cohen Contracts Volume 1, 466 (2nd ed., 2018); Civil Appeal 4921/12 Ish Hiram Construction and Investment Contracting Company in Appeal Taxes v. Bank Hapoalim Ltd., verse 11 [Nevo] (16.12.2014); Further Discussion 13/67 "Bachan" Insurance Company in Appeal Taxes Haifa v. RosenzweigIsrSC 22(1) 569, 578 (1968)).
- Indeed, such a purpose of the written requirement in section 9 The law may also be inferred from the language of the section as a whole, as well as from the internal logic reflected in its structure (for the fact that the language of the legislation, as well as its structure and the logic derived from it, are central sources for formulating the purpose of the legislation, see, for example: Aharon Barak Interpretation in a sentence - Interpretation of legislation 312-303 (1993) (hereinafter: Lightning)). Let us therefore revisit the language of the section:
| Admitting the existence of a right |