In paragraph 24 of the preamble, it is stated that the right to remain silent is an important part of the presumption of innocence, and should be given to suspects and defendants as a defense against self-incrimination. In paragraph 25 of the introduction, similar things are said regarding the right to self-incrimination. Section 7 of the Directive regulates the rules in this regard.
Most of the above arguments are also applicable to Israeli law, and I believe that they are substantial. In other words, there is doubt as to whether to grant these rights to corporations. In any event, even if the approach is accepted that these rights should be granted to the corporation, then the scope of the right should be discussed. I believe that the rights are "weaker" when it comes to a corporation. In the Criminal Appeal Authority 1840/12 Yehuda Ozer v. State of Israel (published in Nevo, 2013, hereinafter: the Ozer case), the question of whether it is possible to determine that a corporation committed the acts attributed to it without a conviction was discussed. The Honorable Justice Hendel held there that as a matter of principle, it is indeed possible not to convict a corporation, but the cases in which it would be appropriate to do so will be limited to those in which there would be room not to convict a person. In paragraph 11, the Honorable Justice N. Hendel states, as follows:
"As part of this decision, I would like to emphasize the difference between these two groups. It can be assumed that the circle of cases in which it would be right and right not to convict people despite their guilt will be wider than the circle of guilty societies about which it is right not to convict. This stems if only from the difference between flesh and blood and society. While the former has a basic right to life, liberty and dignity, the limited company, with all its importance in the modern economy, is nothing but a legal creature that exists by virtue of the nature of the law and not by virtue of the law of nature. IPOs make their mark, for example, in considerations of rehabilitation of a person who has sinned, as opposed to considerations of rehabilitation of a society that has gone through a past. It is true that the term "social rehabilitation" is familiar, but its meaning only highlights the difference between it and the rehabilitation of a defendant. Again, it should be emphasized that it is also possible to avoid convicting a corporation found guilty of criminal offenses. Once the Israeli legislature, like other legislators, has decided that it is possible to use the mechanism of criminal law against a corporation, the latter is entitled – as long as it is possible and logical – to benefit from the leniency that applies to every defendant. The law does not prohibit the non-conviction of a defendant, including a company, who is found guilty....However, a distinction must also be made between punishment and personification in deciding when not to convict. It seems that the "non-conviction" rule should be applied to society only in those cases in which the result of the conviction is not proportionate to the damage that will be caused to the company. It should be clarified that if the result of not convicting a defendant (and of course referring to an adult) is an exception, such a result against a company will apply within the scope of a more limited exception."