The Farhi case pertains to our case, since there, as well as in the case before me, the possibility of invalidating evidence that in itself was obtained by valid means, but which derives from evidence obtained by improper means (the "fruit of the poisoned tree" doctrine). Thus, in the case before me, the defendant argues that no use should be made against her of any evidence stemming from the testimonies and statements of the organs who served in it, even though no claims were raised regarding flaws in the investigation of the organs themselves. In the Farhi case, it was held that, as a rule, evidence derived from evidence that should have been inadmissible is admissible, since in our trial the doctrine of "the fruits of the poisoned tree" was not accepted, by virtue of which derivative evidence must also be invalidated (despite the determination of the rule of inadmissibility in the Issacharov case). However, it was held that in exceptional cases, in which the invalidity that adheres to the evidence obtained illegally, substantially stains the derived evidence as well, it will be possible to disqualify derivative evidence as well (for analysis and criticism of the judgment in the Farhi case, see: Elkana Leist, Case Law Note: On the Invalidity of the Fruit of the Poisoned Tree, and on Protection from Justice at the Punishment Stage – Following Criminal Appeal 4988/08 Farhi v. State of Israel, Defense Attorney 173, p. 4)
As I clarified above, I am of the opinion that an additional step in the disqualification rule was established by the legislature in the Protection from Justice legislation, which I will discuss below. Therefore, I will examine the circumstances of the matter before me in light of the principles between which a balance must be struck in both these two cases.
5.1.3 Whether the conditions for the application of the rule of invalidation of evidence are met in the case before
5.1.3.a.The Conflicting Interests: The Rights of the Accused vs. the Need to Fight Criminality