"The defense of justice argument allows the court to dismiss an indictment because it is unable to give the defendant a fair trial, or because the conduct of the criminal proceeding violates the sense of justice and fairness. The result of accepting the defense of justice argument is that there is no longer room to prosecute a defendant criminally or conduct a criminal proceeding against him, regardless of the question of his guilt or innocence."
The proposal is based on both the main rulings that were handed down on the matter – the Yefet case and the Borowitz case, as well as the criticism and academic writing on the matter, and proposed the proposal that was anchored in the law. The bill itself did not set tests, but it appears that in light of the alternatives mentioned in the proposal, and when the less stringent bill was chosen, the intention was to adopt the more flexible test or tests of the Borowitz rule (see in this regard the Defense from Justice Bill, at p. As for the parliamentary development of the bill and previous private bills, see: Segal and Zamir Defense of Justice in the Law, starting at p. 234).
Segal and Zamir, Defense of Justice in Law, noted at p. 250 that parliamentary history shows:
"The legislative purpose that emerges from parliamentary history as a whole is that of pumping new blood into the arteries of criminal law so that it is possible to bring about the abolition of the criminal proceeding against the background of a material contradiction to the principles of justice and legal fairness. This legislative direction gives the court ample space for interpretation, which is supposed to fill the content of the sweeping and general framework designed by the legislature. The purpose of the legislation was to create a broad test in determining a kind of general and undefined "basket clause", which the courts would fill with concrete content. This is in contrast to other preliminary arguments inthe Criminal Procedure Law, most of which are defined in a focused manner, which does not leave such much room for judicial interpretation."