In Criminal Appeal 8551/11 Yitzhak Cohen Selchgi v . State of Israel [published in Nevo] (2012), the Honorable Justice D. Barak-Erez set three stages in order to examine whether this is a matter of selective enforcement (ibid., in paragraph 14 of her judgment):
"In principle, the claim of selective enforcement must be examined with reference to three questions: The first question is what is the equality group to which the person who raises the claim of selective enforcement belongs. ....The second question is – in those cases in which the authorities do not enforce or do not enforce equally towards everyone who belongs to the same equal group – how should situations of selective and improper enforcement be distinguished from normal and legitimate situations of partial enforcement for reasons of resource constraints and priorities? The third question is what is the evidentiary burden placed on a person who raises a claim of selective enforcement – in general, and in criminal law in particular. It should be emphasized that the three questions presented are separate, but their examination must take place in close relation to each other. Thus, for example, factual ambiguity may make it difficult to draw the equality groups. In addition, even when it is possible to determine that different people belong to the same equal group, certain differences in their circumstances can affect the setting of enforcement priorities within the framework of the second stage of the examination. A decision made in relation to one of the questions may therefore affect the continuation of the discussion."
With regard to selective enforcement, factors have been established that must be proved, all of which are included, in the first stage of protection from justice – that is, the identification of the defects and their intensity (see on this matter paragraph 45 of the judgment of the Honorable Justice N. Hendel in the Gottesdiener case). For the purpose of this stage, the person claiming selective enforcement must show that it is possible to point out differences in enforcement within the equal group to which the defendant belongs; Second, he must show that this is selective enforcement, as opposed to legitimate partial enforcement, and finally, he must stand on a prima facie evidentiary basis for the claim of selective enforcement. In this case, the evidentiary basis is clear, since the claim of discrimination between the organs and the corporation is the very act of prosecution. However, there is another factual question, namely, whether the immunity agreements were indeed required, which can only be examined at the end of the proceeding (regarding the evidentiary basis, see: Prof. Dafna Barak-Erez's article: "Selective Enforcement: From the Right to Remedy," HaSanegor 200, p. 14 (2013)). I will now turn to the question of whether this is an equality group and whether it is selective enforcement. Next, I will examine the second condition for examining the defense from justice – the entirety of the circumstances of the proceeding.