In the Borowitz case, the court noted the considerations that the prosecution must take into account in considering a distinction in prosecution (ibid., at p. 820, paragraph 32):
"The prosecution is entitled – in exceptional cases and on the basis of defined, clear and equal criteria – to make do with accusing some of those involved. In formulating its position on this matter, the prosecution must take into account a range of considerations and attribute appropriate weight to them, including the nature of the offense and the circumstances of its commission; the number of perpetrators of the offense and the portion (absolute and relative) of each of them; The degree of public interest that there is, in the circumstances of the case, in full enforcement as opposed to the possible advantages of prosecuting some of the perpetrators, such as saving resources, streamlining the process, and achieving a speedy judicial decision. The reasonableness of its decision in any such case is derived from the existence of proper considerations that support the decision and the existence of a proper balance between these considerations and the opposing considerations."
The examination is whether there was a defect in the prosecution's judgment in prosecuting. This examination will be conducted in accordance with the usual rules for judicial review of administrative discretion (see Borowitz, at p. 823). In this context, it should be emphasized that this review is limited by nature and nature, since the enforcement authorities are particularly professional authorities, and in light of the precedents that require very limited intervention in the prosecution's considerations in prosecution. In this regard, see the words of the Honorable Judge Y. Amit inCriminal Appeal 5975/14 Ibrahim Darwish Agbaria v. State of Israel (published in Nevo, December 31, 2015), in paragraph 19 of his judgment:
"It is well known that this Court, sitting asa High Court of Justice, does not have the right to interfere with the discretion of the prosecuting authorities regarding the conclusion of state witness agreements, and that the prosecution has considerable scope of action in these matters... The force of this rule applies even where the court examines the matter with indirect attack while sitting as a trial court or as an appellate court, as in the present case. .... In general, I believe that the result of 'one out of three' is preferable to the result according to which none of the three involved would have been held accountable...."