Assaf Hamdani adds in his article: "Transactions of interested parties and the responsibility of the corporation for securities offenses, following Crim. Appeal 3891/04 Eisenberg v. State of Israel", Mishpat Studies 23, 769, 773 (2007, hereinafter: Hamdani, Corporate Liability), and emphasizes that even if there is not always a direct possibility for the shareholders to supervise, After all, imposing criminal liability on the corporation will contribute to deterrence (according to him, at p. 774):
"The practical significance of imposing liability on the corporation is economic harm to the shareholders, who are not necessarily involved in the day-to-day management of the corporation, and may not be able to act to prevent violations. In many cases, there is even a gap of interest between the shareholders and those who actually navigate the affairs of the corporation – the management or the controlling shareholders.
However, imposing liability on the corporation for deterrence considerations is not necessarily intended to bring the shareholders to take personal action to prevent the commission of offenses. Moreover, even the fear of a conflict of interest between the shareholders and the management or the controlling shareholders does not preclude the imposition of liability on the corporation. It is possible, however, that the corporation's management will choose not to invest the resources required to prevent offenses, even if the shareholders would have preferred otherwise; However, the corporation operates a variety of mechanisms – some market mechanisms and some legal – whose goal is to cause management (or the controlling shareholders) to act in the corporation's favor. The purpose of imposing liability is to harness these mechanisms in order to motivate the management to take the necessary measures to prevent offenses.
However, there are those who argue that when a corporation is held criminally liable, it harms populations that cannot contribute to the prevention of crimes, such as shareholders, creditors, employees, and other communities (see, among many: Albert W. Alschuler, "Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations", 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1437 (2009)). This argument was also raised by the defendant's counsel. According to him, there is no reason to impose criminal liability on Siemens, since those who will be harmed are its employees and current shareholders, who may not have been in the relevant period, and in any case could not have done anything about it.