In addition, these arguments of harm to populations such as shareholders, employees and creditors are also applicable to civil liability (contractual and tort), which is indisputably applicable to all companies. Thus, for example, in the case of Exxon, which was awarded $507.5 million in damages due to the pollution of the sea with oil (Exon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 s. Ct. 2605 (2008)) and of course the British Petroleum company BP's case with the Gulf Gulf pollution, in which a number of people were killed in April 2010 and huge liabilities were imposed on it (see Laura E. Lyons, "I'd like my life back": corporate personhood and the BP oil disaster", Biography, v.34, p. 96 (2011).).
Today, the trend is to impose criminal liability on corporations even in places where such liability has not been imposed in the past, such as, for example, the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland, which established this in 2003 (for an overview see Sun Beale, Corporate Criminal Liability, starting at p. 1494; see also Ana Maria Neira Pena, "Corporate Criminal Liability: Tool or Obstacle to Prosecution", in: Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability 197 (Dominik Brodowski, Manuel Espinoza de los Monteros de la Parra, Joachim Vogel & Klaus Tiedemann, eds., 2014) (hereinafter: Neira Pena, Corporate Criminal Liability ). The author reviews the differences between the legal systems, some of which have criminal liability and others administrative, and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each method in terms of preventing corporate criminality).As part of this trend, there have been easements to impose criminal liability on corporations, such as the United Kingdom (for causing death by negligence) and Canada.
However, there are countries that have not adopted a regime of imposing criminal liability on corporations, but adopt one way or another of supervising the criminal activity of corporations, even if not in an actual criminal proceeding (see: Assaf Hamdani, ibid.). See also: Carol R. Goforth, "'A Corporation Has No Soul' - Modern Corporations, Corporate Governance, and Involvement in the Political Process", 47 Hous. L. Rev. 617, 629-30 (2010), although there are still those who argue that administrative responsibility should suffice (for this critique see, among many: Samuel W. Buell, "Criminal Procedure within the Firm", 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1613, 1662 (2007); See also: Gregory M. Gilchrist, "The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity", 64 Hastings L. J. 1, 5 (2012)). A slightly different approach is taken by Assaf Eckstein, in his article, "On Agreed-upon Arrangements and the Appointment of a Supervisor as a Substitute for Criminal Enforcement Against Corporations," which is expected to be published in Legal Research, Vol. 32, available for viewing https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2927678. On page 3 of the article (prior to its publication), Eckstein notes that: "The same considerations [punitive considerations], at least in part, exist with less intensity when we are dealing with criminal enforcement directed at corporations," and therefore, in his opinion, administrative compliance arrangements of companies should be considered. However, I will not elaborate on this matter because in Israel the rule of criminal liability for a corporation has been adopted.