He adds (ibid., at p. 898):
"The theory of identification is based on the concept that certain officers are identified with the corporation, to the extent that their actions and thoughts will be considered identity for the purpose of imposing criminal liability. As a result, legal systems around the world tended to locate the required identity not for all officers in the corporation, but only for the senior officers, who control the corporation. The accepted metaphor in the legal literature in this context is that the senior officers constitute the mind of the corporation (with regard to the mental element) and the hands of the corporation (with regard to the factual element)...However, this is only a metaphor, which does not accurately describe the legal situation...The corporation bears criminal liability in addition to the criminal liability of the officers."
(Emphasis added - M.A.C .)
In other words, identity is relevant and required for the purpose of attributing the offense from the organ to the corporation for the purpose of imposing criminal liability and nothing more. Identity is required to locate who the organ is, whose behavior and thoughts will be attributed to the corporation. In other words, when it is determined who is an organ for the purpose of attributing an offense to a corporation, it does not mean that there is an identity and identification between the two from that moment on.
Thus, in the Modi'im case, the Honorable Justice E. Barak emphasized that the Torah is required only in order to attribute criminal liability to a corporation (paragraph 5, p. 379):
"Over the years, the 'theory of organs' has developed, which is intended to overcome the lack of a human dimension to society and thus enable it to fulfill the requirements of the law regarding the existence of human qualities necessary for the purpose of imposing responsibility or for the purpose of providing protection or immunity from liability (civil, criminal or otherwise... According to this doctrine – which is not limited to the criminal field, but applies to all areas... The mental element that exists in the organ is perceived as the mental element of the corporation. Similarly, the active behavioral component that exists in the organization is perceived as the active behavioral component of the corporation.... Through this doctrine, it is possible to attribute to the corporation – despite the lack of human qualities – the thought and action of the organ, and thus it is possible to fulfill the provisions of any law (or contract), conditioning a legal result on the existence of these human qualities. To be precise: the theory of organs is not intended to impose liability on a corporation for the liability of the organs. To this end, there is the doctrine of vicarious liability. The theory of organs stems from the assumption that there is a legal norm that relates to the corporation. According to it, certain results arise (whether they are related to the imposition of liability, or whether they are related to exemption or protection from liability, or otherwise) if the corporation develops human qualities, such as criminal thought (awareness, intent), active action, and the like. The theory of organs makes it possible for the corporation to be able to sustain these human qualities. Therefore, a corporation may be liable (civil, criminal or otherwise) even if the organ itself is not responsible. The responsibility of the corporation for the activities of the organ is not vicarious liability, and it is not contingent on the responsibility of the organ. Indeed, while an employer or sender is vicarious liable only if the employee or shipper is (in the substantive sense) personally responsible, this condition is not required by the corporation's liability for the conduct of the organist.... The corporation's responsibility for the activity of the organ is personal, while through the actions and thoughts of the organ the corporation is able to uphold the foundations of the legal norm that it seeks to apply to it."